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In recent literature much research has been produced regarding the
macroeconomic effects of crises, and on how these effects spread to
different countries through contagion channels. However, there is a
lack of information on the microeconomic repercussions of these
crises, particularly for emerging market economies. The book “Macro-
economic Crisis and Firm Performance” brings up additional know-
ledge on this topic, using as case study the Mexican 1994 currency
crisis. We begin questioning if the Mexican 1994 crisis was anticipated
or not, under a firm-level perspective. The main result obtained is
that Mexican firms were not able to anticipate this currency crisis, or
at least that they did not have the flexibility to adjust their capital
structure accordingly before the crisis took place. The crisis propa-
gation and effects on Mexican firms are then studied into depth. The
main findings show that this currency crisis had generally negative
effects on companies’ balance sheets, and firms’ interconnections
evolved in propagation among themselves. In addition, recovery was
only partial and gradual, and overall the crisis episode was prejudicial
even for surviving firms. Nevertheless, there were some differences in
performance, related to firm characteristics such as internal corporate
governance arrangements. We conclude that, during the Mexican
crisis, having bank links was prejudicial for companies´ performance.
On the contrary, during this crisis episode, belonging to business
groups contributed to firm performance. An export-orientation
showed to have an increasingly positive effect on performance, from
pre-crisis to post-crisis periods. From the findings obtained, we derive
a number of recommendations in order to reduce companies´ vulner-
abilities to future macroeconomic crises.
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CHAPTER 1: 
 
¨What goes up, must come down¨ 
Law of Gravity 
                                                              Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1686, Newton´s Law of Gravity formalized the well-known saying: 
¨What goes up, must come down¨.  This law applies not only to physics and 
mathematics, but to everyday life.  As so, the financial and economic 
worlds are not the exception, and we clearly see it with the economic and 
business cycles:  Periods of expansion are followed by prosperity, 
contraction, and recession.  After the recession, the expansion can start 
again.  
 
Economists throughout time have tried to understand and reduce the 
magnitude of the economic cycle.  They have succeeded in building theory 
around it as well as shortening the recession periods; nevertheless, it has 
been impossible to eliminate the cycle and consequently break the Law of 
Gravity.  Even worse, they have not been able to avoid economies from 
falling into crisis episodes, as suggested by the recent crises in Latin 
America, East Asia, and Russia. 
 
The fact is that the rate of production, income, and spending fluctuate over 
time, and so does the performance of companies.  As we cannot avoid 
macroeconomic downturns, or in the extreme case macroeconomic crises, 
at least we can try to mitigate their negative effects on firms.  The quest 
begins by comprehending the repercussions of economic crises on firm 
performance, and how these vary according to differences between 
corporates.  Variables such as capital structure, industry, size, and internal 
corporate governance might help to explain these divergences.  In addition, 
the institutional environment in which companies operate can determine 
much of the effects of macroeconomic crises on firm performance.  
Emerging market economies usually are more volatile than developed ones, 
due to factors such as financial repression, rigid macroeconomic policies, 
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and political instability.  Therefore, in these types of economies, 
macroeconomic downturns and crises tend to be more costly.  These 
understandings permit to suggest business policies that can favor 
performance once an economy enters a crisis episode. 
 
In recent literature much research has been attained regarding the 
macroeconomic effects of crises, and how these effects spread to different 
countries through contagion channels.  However, there is a lack of 
information on the microeconomic repercussions of these crises, 
particularly for emerging market economies.  The book ¨Macroeconomic 
Crisis and Firm Performance¨ brings up additional knowledge on this topic, 
using as case study the Mexican 1994 currency crisis. 
 
The book is a compendium of thematically related papers, most of them 
already published or accepted for publication in international and Mexican 
journals (chapter 2: Frontiers in Finance and Economics, vol.3, num.1; 
appendix 1: Economía Mexicana, vol.XIV, num.1; appendix 2: 
EconoQuantum, vol.2, num.2).  The main group of papers is included as 
chapters two to four of the book, and the rest are incorporated as appendix 1 
and 2.  These last papers have been designed for those readers most 
involved and interested with the Mexican case.  In fact, the two papers 
included as such have been accepted for publication in Mexican journals.   
 
Chapter two begins questioning if the Mexican 1994 crisis was anticipated 
or not, under a firm-level perspective.  According to the crisis literature, 
anticipated crises are less severe than non-anticipated ones, as agents are 
able to adjust their expectations and react in a gradual rather than in a shock 
manner.  Under the assumption of capital structure flexibility, if Mexican 
firms could have forecasted the crisis, then they would have reduced their 
dollar denominated debt prior to it.  Companies would have searched for 
liquidity in order to face the forthcoming crisis, which could have been 
achieved by increasing their cash allowances and internal financing.  In 
addition, some firms might have begun to focus on producing for the 
external markets instead of the domestic one, and investment would have 
been reduced.  These variables were considered in an event study, and 
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regressions were run using different possible anticipation periods:  four 
quarters, three, two, and one quarter.  The main result obtained was that 
Mexican firms were not able to anticipate this currency crisis, or at least 
that they did not have the flexibility to adjust their capital structure 
accordingly before it took place.  This is consistent with the general belief 
that no one was able to anticipate this crisis, as at the time the fundamentals 
of the Mexican economy were optimistic. 
 
As there was apparently no crisis anticipation, it is not surprising that this 
currency crisis had a significant impact on Mexican firms.  Due to the 
previous expansion of foreign capital inflows (as a result of the 
liberalization process of the 1990´s), Mexican companies had more access 
to dollar denominated debt.  Although the exchange rate was quasi-fixed 
during the time, it seemed that the favourable macroeconomic conditions 
diminished the concerns of the exchange rate risk implicit in this debt.  The 
high levels of investment were financed mainly by bank loans and in less 
degree by trade credit and outside equity; therefore, debt levels were high.  
With the 1994 peso devaluation, firms faced a significant increase in the 
peso value of their dollar denominated debt.  In addition, the rise of internal 
interest rates increased the cost of peso denominated debt.  This, together 
with a reduction in credit options and in internal demand, caused many 
firms to go bankrupt or at least seriously distressed.   
 
The crisis propagation and effects on Mexican firms are studied into depth 
in chapter three.  The main assumption underlying this chapter is that 
deterioration and recovery manifest themselves through significant changes 
in the level of a firm’s financial, operational, solvency, and performance 
ratios.  Therefore, tests for structural change were performed to establish 
the occurrence and significance of these events.  Specifically, the 
techniques developed in Andrews (1993) and Bai et al. (1998) were 
employed to test the null hypothesis of no change against the alternative of 
two instantaneous breaks in the level of a particular ratio, where the break 
dates were treated as unknown.  Whereas the crisis’ effects on balance 
sheets might have occurred instantaneously (as there was no anticipation of 
the crisis), it is reasonable to argue that recovery might have not been 
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sudden, but rather may have appeared gradually.  Therefore, we allowed for 
the possibility of gradual recovery by modifying the two-breaks model in 
this direction.  The main findings show that generally this currency crisis 
had negative effects on companies’ balance sheets (they deteriorated 
between the fourth quarters of 1993 and 1995), and firms’ interconnections 
evolved in propagation among themselves.  In addition, recovery was only 
partial and gradual, and overall the crisis episode was prejudicial even for 
surviving firms.   However, there were certain differences in performance 
according to industry.  For instance, the last industries to recover were 
telecommunications and services, and the least wounded sectors were 
mining and conglomerates.   
 
A tentative explanation for the differences in firm performance relates to 
internal corporate governance arrangements.  Research linking firm 
performance and corporate governance structures has produced the 
consensus view that poor corporate governance is associated with lower 
operating performance and Tobin’s Q.  This is most evident during times of 
crises, as it is then when expropriation of stakeholders becomes more 
severe.  Due to the circumstances, nervous investors take their money away 
from companies with poor governance, which further deteriorates profits 
and firm value.  In addition, the odds of bringing in claims increase.  This 
situation is worse in emerging markets, where external governance 
mechanisms (such as legal protection) are deficient.   
 
In chapter four we consider the influence of internal corporate governance 
arrangements, such as bank, business, and family ties, on Mexican firms´ 
performance.  Export-orientation and exposure to external capital markets 
constitute another dimension of internal corporate governance mechanisms, 
and are also included in the analysis.  We estimated a random effects panel 
data model, and concluded that during the Mexican 1994 currency crisis 
having bank links was prejudicial for companies´ performance.  The 
reasoning behind this remark is that during emerging markets’ crisis 
periods, bankers usually act as accomplices instead of firm regulators.  
Therefore, under these circumstances, bank links represent poor governance 
schemes.  On the contrary, during this crisis episode belonging to business 
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groups favoured performance.  This is consistent with recent literature that 
evidences the positive governance effects (and risk diversification) of these 
business networks, as they ensure close monitoring of management and 
support internal trade and financing.  Finally, export-orientation showed an 
increasing positive effect on performance, from pre-crisis to post-crisis 
periods. 
 
From the findings obtained in chapters two to four, we were able to derive 
some business recommendations in order to reduce companies´ 
vulnerabilities to future macroeconomic crises.  These suggestions are 
exposed in the conclusive remarks of chapter five: 1) Trim down both the 
exchange rate and the debt mismatching, in order to decrease exchange rate 
risk; 2) Diversify risk by producing both for local and international 
markets, as export-oriented companies depend less than the rest on local 
macroeconomic conditions.  In addition, participation in international 
markets can imply better stakeholder protection, as exporting firms must 
possess good reputation in order to trade and obtain credit from external 
markets; 3) Rely more on equity and trade credit than on bank financing.  In 
emerging market economies, there is evidence that suggests that banks 
generally act as accomplices instead of firm regulators and advisors, which 
lessens their governance functions.  During normal periods, banks allow 
linked companies to increase leverage, making them more vulnerable 
during crisis times.  Therefore, bank links negatively relate with firm 
performance; 4) Keep liquidity indicators high, even though in the short-run 
earnings are being sacrificed, in order to increase companies’ flexibility to 
deal with crises; 5) Create networks with other companies, with the 
objective of building diversified business groups.  This implies a type of 
insurance, as companies belonging to diversified business groups or 
conglomerates stabilize aggregate profits.  These networks support internal 
trade and financing, and ensure close monitoring of management.  
Therefore, in times of crises performance for these firms can be better than 
for others.  Nevertheless, this is an effective but expensive way (in terms of 
administrative and operative costs) to reduce risk, and consequently during 
normal periods performance tends to be poorer than for the rest of firms. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE MEXICAN CRISIS ANTICIPATION AT A MICRO-LEVEL* 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
During the period 1989-1994, Mexico was considered as a growing and 
stable country.  The annual GDP grew on average 4%, the inflation rate was 
low (in 1993 it reached one digit for the first time in 20 years), and public 
finances were controlled. The overall public sector deficit in Mexico 
declined from 15% of the GDP in 1987 to less than 1% in 1993.  Capital 
inflows, most of which were allocated to the private sector, represented 
27.1% of the 1994 GDP.  On average, the credit to the private sector 
increased 56% annually, in real terms, reaching a growth of 92% in 1994.1 
 
In the early 1990’s, Mexico and other Latin American countries began to 
liberalize the financial sector and the current account.  Banks were 
privatised, and foreign investment increased dramatically.  These events 
generated a boom in the banking industry, as it had access to more funds.  
New banks started operating, services were expanded, as well as credit.  In 
Mexico, credit controls and lending restrictions were abolished, as well as 
minimum reserve requirements.  However, the credit expansion, together 
with bad credit analysis and poor regulation of the banking system, evolved 
in banks financing more risky projects.  This increased banks’ fragility to 
external and internal economic shocks.    
 
The Mexican crisis began with the political tension during 1994.  Capital 
outflows were generated as the response to the Chiapas conflict and the 
assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio.  These events, together with a 
growing external current account deficit, brought devaluation, which 
occurred at the end of the year (in a two month period, the devaluation was 
more than 100%).  The current account deficit, in percent of GDP, grew on 
average 1 percentage point from 1989-1994, reaching 7% during 19942.  
                                                 
1 See Kalter and Ribas (1999). 
2 See Kalter and Ribas (1999). 
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Interest rates were increased in order to avoid more devaluation, which 
caused economic recession and banks’ insolvency (as depositors were 
taking their money away from banks, banks were paying higher interest 
rates, non-performing loans increased, and credit was reduced).  The real 
GDP declined by 10% during 1995 and inflation reached 52% during the 
same year. 
  
In several studies concerning the Mexican crisis, it is a general belief that 
no one was able to anticipate it.  As stated by Aybar et al. (2000), the 
fundamentals of the Mexican economy were optimistic, and early 1994 no 
economist nor government official forecasted a crisis.  On the contrary, 
Mexico was apparently ready to enter NAFTA, even with its significant 
current account deficit.  Calvo and Mendoza (1996) reinforce this view, as 
they point out that the 1994 crisis took place in a different economic setting 
than the rest of the Mexican crises:  inflation was low, there was fiscal 
surplus, and high reserves.  Although in 1993 there was debate on the 
current account deficit and the real appreciation of the peso, many 
economists argued that this was a normal outcome of equilibrium 
adjustments due to the structural reforms.  Nevertheless, ex-post some 
authors have argued that the signs of crisis were present early 19943, as 
there was a reduction in annual GDP growth to 0.5% in 1993, excessive 
dependency on capital inflows due to scarce internal savings, growing 
current account deficit, and political tensions beginning in March 1994 with 
the assassination of Colosio (see Aybar et al. (2000)).   
 
However, most of these studies deal with a macroeconomic or political 
point of view rather than from an entrepreneurial framework.  The focus of 
this study is to examine if Mexican firms were able to anticipate the 
financial crisis and adjust their capital structure accordingly.  For this 
purpose, the quarterly balance sheet data from I 1993 to I 2001 of a sample 
of 73 private Mexican firms, that survived the crisis and were still operating 
in 2001, will be used.   
                                                 
3 Other authors such as Clark (2000) mention that the signs of crisis were present even 
before 1993.  In an excellent paper Clark uses portfolio theory joined with political 
economy to demonstrate that international lenders were adjusting to the forthcoming crisis 
as far back as 1991.   
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Under the assumption of capital structure flexibility, supported by 
Claessens et al. (2000), if firms could forecast the crisis, it is clear that these 
companies would have reduced their dollar denominated debt prior to the 
crisis.  Firms would have searched for liquidity in order to face the 
forthcoming crisis, which could have been achieved by increasing their 
cash allowances and internal financing (increase social capital, reduce 
dividend payments, sell stock in the primary market, and increase the 
reserves for future capital expansions).  In addition, some companies might 
have begun to focus on producing for the external markets instead of the 
domestic one, and investment would have been reduced.  These variables 
will be considered in the event study, whose methodology is explained in 
the following sections. 
 
This chapter is organized in the following way:  Section 2 analyses the 
Mexican crisis and compares it to the Asian crisis.  It appears that both 
crises took place in a setting of poor banking supervision and highly 
leveraged firms.    However, in contrast to the Asian situation, in which 
there was in general a current account surplus, the Mexican crisis originated 
as a currency crisis.  This section also gives some clues on detecting crises 
risk factors, and explains the effects of financial crises on corporates.  
Section 3 deals with the data description and methodology of the event 
study.  A descriptive analysis of the firms’ performance and capital 
structure comes before the event study, which is concerned with the 
anticipation of the crisis.  Section 4 analyses the companies’ performance 
and reaches the conclusion that both the ROA and the operational margin 
increased during the crisis period.  This is attributed to a rise in exports.  
Section 5 studies the capital structure of firms.  It concludes that, for the 
entire period under consideration, there is a great amount of financial 
vulnerability.  Short-term debt represents more than half the amount of total 
debt, foreign-denominated debt corresponds to almost 50% of total debt, 
and of this type of debt, more than 50% is short-termed.  Section 6 deals 
with the crisis anticipation analysis.  The model to be used is explained and 
the regression results are discussed.  The regressions were run using 
different possible anticipation periods:  four quarters, three, two, and one 
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quarter, and allow for industry and size effects.   The main result obtained 
is that Mexican firms were not able to anticipate the 1995-1996 financial 
crisis, or at least that they did not have the flexibility to adjust their capital 
structure accordingly before the crisis took place.  Section 7 outlines the 
conclusions of the chapter and makes suggestions for further work on this 
topic. 
 
2 ANALYSIS OF THE MEXICAN CRISIS 
 
2.1 Crisis background 
 
According to Kalter and Ribas (1999), the factors that originated the 
Mexican crisis were:  the real appreciation of the Mexican peso4, a weak 
banking system, political instability, the rise in the US interest rates, 
maturity and currency mismatches in public-debt management, an 
increment in non-performing loans relative to total loans from 5.5% in 1992 
to over 8% in mid 1994, inappropriate banking regulations, and moral 
hazard related to the belief that the IMF would bail out risky loans.  In 
addition, there was an increasing current account deficit. 
 
2.2 Similarities and differences between the Mexican and Asian crises 
 
Although several firm-level surveys providing data on corporate crisis and 
recovery have been made for Asia (for example Hallward-Driemeier 
(2001)), less attention has focused on Mexico, though there are a number of 
similarities with the Mexican crisis.  Pomerleano (1998a) points out that the 
Asian crisis had its roots in financial sector weaknesses (like poor bank 
supervision), inconsistent macroeconomic policies, reversal in capital 
flows, and the distortion generated by guarantees on the financial system.  
He also mentions the corporate roots of the crisis, as firms were excessively 
leveraged and there was poor profitability.  According to his analysis, Asia 
suffered from a lack of financial discipline; companies used household 
                                                 
4 Stone (2000b) recalls that overvaluation of the exchange rate also makes external 
borrowing less costly, so countries become more leveraged in foreign currency.  This 
increases vulnerability to crises.  
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savings to increase their indebtness in foreign currency, banks did not 
consider risk appropriately while lending (only 55% of the firms needed to 
provide audited statements to receive a loan (see Hallward-Driemeier 
(2001))), and there was a lack of transparency in the system.  As an 
example, traditionally the Korean financial system was used as a 
government instrument to finance industrial production.  Therefore, banks 
did not take into account market principles as they offered credit.  
Borensztein and Lee (2000) point out that Chaebol firms were the ones who 
suffered the most from the new credit rules imposed by banks during the 
crisis.  In the region, 60% of firms went bankrupt during this period.   
 
Krugman (1999) states that the East Asian Crisis originated in corporate 
balance sheet problems, such as high levels of short-term and unhedged 
corporate borrowing, and volatile international capital flows.  Stone (2000b) 
for example, studies the impact of corporations in financial crises, using 
data from 9 crises: Chile, Mexico (83), Hungary, Poland, Mexico (95), 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.  He describes the evolution of 
crises in three phases: 1) A vulnerability phase, in which there is a credit 
expansion for some sectors, usually guided by development and growth 
governmental policies.  This results in excess leverage and undiversified 
bank portfolios.  2) A contraction phase, where the countries stop receiving 
capital inflows due to an external shock (like an increase in international 
interest rates) or the deterioration of expectations concerning the corporate 
sector.  The first effect is depreciation, which is transmitted to the real 
sector and then to the banks as corporations seize paying their debts.  This 
in turn generates credit rationing and worsens the real sector performance.  
The outcome is a recession.  3) A recovery phase, in which the government 
takes an active role to restructure the corporate sector.  This recovery takes 
on average two years. 
 
Claessens et al. (1998) reach similar conclusions with respect to the 
corporate roots of the Asian crisis.  They find that the combination of high 
investment and low profits in Asia indicate that much external financing 
was used in the financial structure of those firms.  Outside equity was 
scarcely used due to the underdeveloped capital markets, and retained 
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earnings were limited, so leverage was high in most countries.  Short-term 
debt was very important in several places, especially Malaysia, Taiwan, and 
Thailand.  This type of capital structure reveal high risk, as firms find it 
difficult to survive rises in interest rates, depreciation and declines in the 
demand for their products.   
 
The Mexican crisis, like the Asian crisis, took place in a setting of poor 
bank supervision, implicit and explicit loan guarantees, and great amounts 
of investment.  As Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) indicate, a situation 
in which short-term external liabilities were not matched by foreign assets 
of similar characteristics.  In both crises non-bank capital markets were 
incipient, lacking alternative financing options for companies, and therefore 
firms were highly leveraged.  Stone (2000a) points out the importance of 
developing non-bank sources of corporate financing (equity, commercial 
paper, and bond markets) to reduce the countries’ vulnerability to a crisis, 
and the severity of the latter.   These markets not only provide an 
alternative to financing, but also allow hedging against the risk of exchange 
rate devaluation, and for better corporate governance (which is especially 
important in places where there is a high degree of ownership 
concentration). 
 
In contrast to the Asian situation, in which there was in general a current 
account surplus, the Mexican crisis originated as a currency crisis.  The 
exchange rate was overvalued, there was a current account deficit, and 
foreign reserves were dropping; the result was the December 1994 
devaluation of the Mexican peso.  Kalter and Ribas (1999) point out the 
effect of Mexico’s fiscal policy in the real exchange rate, measured as the 
relative price of traded to nontraded goods.  Their study uses data from 
1987-1994, which corresponds to the period of trade and financial 
liberalization.  For this period, the prices of nontradable goods increased on 
average 33% annually.  Compared to a 23% price increase in the tradable 
goods sector, this means that the real exchange rate appreciated by over 
40%.  Kalter and Ribas (1999) argue that an increase in government 
expenditure (which increases aggregate demand, interest rates, and capital 
inflows) and taxation causes an increment in production costs.  This is 
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translated into a price increase for nontraded goods, but not for traded 
goods.  The higher production costs that affected the tradable goods 
producers, together with the increment in domestic interest rates, increased 
the companies’ and banks’ vulnerability.  The real appreciation of the 
exchange rate caused by the fiscal policy was a distortion that discouraged 
the production of exportable merchandise.  Imported goods became more 
attractive, which developed eventually into a current account deficit.  Due 
to the quasi-fixed exchange rate in Mexico prior to the crisis, this reduced 
the amount of foreign reserves held by the Central Bank.  Soon speculation 
took place, causing capital flights, currency and financial crisis. 
 
2.3 Detecting risk factors of financial crises 
 
There are several risk factors that might announce a financial crisis.  
Detragiache and Spilimbergo (2001) study the relationship between 
liquidity and financial crisis.  They use a sample of 69 countries, from 
1971-1998, in which there are 55 crisis episodes and 950 observations.  A 
crisis equation is tested, where the dependent variable corresponds to the 
occurrence of a debt crisis, and the independent variables are liquidity 
indicators, variables controlling for the size and structure of the external 
debt, and a set of macroeconomic variables.  Their results indicate that 
liquidity variables are highly significant and show the expected signs.  In 
addition, countries with greater amounts of external debt, less opened to the 
rest of the world, and with more overvalued exchange rates, seem to be 
more exposed to financial crises.  The rest of the macroeconomic variables 
not related to the external debt did not showed to be highly significant. 
 
Wei and Wu (2001) use a simple 2-period model to study the relationship 
between corruption and the different types of capital flows: foreign direct 
investment, bank loans, and portfolio capital inflows. The results show that 
corruption affects mainly foreign direct investment, followed by portfolio 
capital inflows, and to a minor extent bank loans.  Therefore, countries 
perceived to have relatively high levels of corruption (like Mexico) are 
more vulnerable to currency crisis, due to the composition of their capital 
flows. 
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Downes et al. (1999) use a practical methodology to evaluate the “financial 
system soundness” of countries.  It involves both a qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation of the financial system.  The qualitative evaluation 
takes into account macroeconomic risk factors, such as lending expansions, 
changes in asset prices, and volatility of capital inflows and exchange and 
interest rates.  It considers also financial system health indicators (such as 
foreign exchange exposure of the entities, credit concentration, and 
maturity structure of liabilities and assets), institutional regulations used to 
avoid excessive risk-taking, and systemic liquidity arrangements offered by 
organizations such as the Central Banks.  The quantitative evaluation deals 
with bank-by-bank analysis of balance sheets.  As Stone (2000a) states, 
perhaps the best way to avoid a crisis is to look for signs of vulnerability by 
monitoring balance sheets of banks and corporations. 
 
2.4 Effects of the Mexican crisis on the corporate sector 
 
This financial crisis had an important impact on firms.  Due to the previous 
expansion of foreign capital inflows, Mexican companies had more access 
to dollar denominated debt.  Although the exchange rate was quasi-fixed 
(band fluctuation) during the time, it seemed that the macroeconomic 
conditions diminished the concerns of the exchange rate risk implicit in this 
debt.  The high levels of investment were financed mainly by bank loans 
and in less degree by trade credit and outside equity; therefore, debt levels 
were high.  With the 1994 devaluation, firms faced a significant increase in 
the peso value of their dollar denominated debt.  In addition, the rise of 
internal interest rates increased the cost of peso denominated debt.  This, 
together with a reduction in credit options and in internal demand (sales 
declined due to the economic recession), caused many firms to go bankrupt.   
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3 DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The quarterly balance sheets from I 1993 to I 2001 of a sample of 73 
private, non-financial Mexican firms, who survived the crisis and are still 
operating, will be employed.  The databases were obtained through 
INFOSEL, a Mexican information enterprise, whose original source of data 
is the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (Mexican Stock Market).  Therefore, all 
firms are listed in the stock exchange, and are considered as big companies 
(on average their assets represent more than one million US dollars).  The 
information on the 73 firms corresponds to a comparable and balanced 
panel. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
The methodology employed in this event study is based on the one 
proposed by Campbell et al. (1997).  This is modified to suit the current 
research and it also uses the methodology in Barber and Lyon (1996).  The 
data set is quarterly and ratios are used; the ratios are constructed based on 
constant peso observations (from 2000).  The description and steps for this 
event study are the following: 
 
Study the firms’ performance pre, during, and post crisis.  The pre-crisis 
episode includes data from 1993 and 1994, as the crisis took place in 
December 1994.  The crisis period corresponds to 1995 and 1996, and the 
post crisis period is 1997 to 2001.  Since the measures that will be 
employed are not influenced by the liability structure of firms, this analysis 
will be useful in order to study specifically how the crisis affected 
profitability.  In addition, it will allow detecting if, similar to the Asian 
case, firm profitability was sparse before and during the crisis.  The ratios 
that will be employed are: 
 
a.  Rate of return on assets (ROA) in local currency, which is calculated as 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in constant pesos / total assets.  
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The use of EBIT results useful for comparing firms with different tax 
situations and different degrees of financial leverage.  The benchmark that 
will be used to determine the adequacy of the results is the US and 
Germany ROA for the period 1988-1996: 5.3% for the US and 4.7% for 
Germany5.   
 
b.  Operational margin, which refers to sales-costs of good sold / sales.  
Once more US and Germany results (1988-1996 average) will be used: 
14.4% for the US and 14.6% for Germany. 
 
Study the firms’ capital structure pre, during, and post crisis.  An analysis 
of the firms’ capital structure will show how highly leveraged firms were 
prior to the crisis, and to which extent the debt represented short-term, 
foreign currency denominated loans.  As discussed earlier, these are 
symptoms of crisis vulnerability.  In addition, the analysis of the capital 
structure during the crisis can be useful to study the incidence of a credit 
crunch, defined as the impossibility to offer credit to profitable companies.  
Finally, by referring to the post-crisis capital structure, one could detect if 
firms changed their financing strategies after the crisis experience.   The 
ratios that will be employed are: 
 
a.  Leverage, which is calculated as total debt / equity.  This ratio measures 
how much borrowed money a company is using, relative to its equity, and 
shows corporate vulnerability.  The benchmarks used in this case are 
103.4% for the US and 151.4% for Germany, which correspond to the 
period 1988-1996.  
 
b.  Liquidity, which refers to short-term debt / total debt.  This ratio 
indicates the maturity of the debt.  Once more US and Germany results 
(1988-1996 average) will be used: 24.1% for the US and 44.7% for 
Germany. 
 
                                                 
5For the US and Germany benchmarks see Claessens et al. (1998). 
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c.  Foreign debt/ total debt, which indicates the importance of foreign debt 
in the firms’ capital structure, and shows vulnerability to exchange-rate 
risk. 
 
d.  Foreign short-term debt/ total foreign debt.  This ratio is also used to 
study corporate vulnerability. 
 
e.  Interest payment coverage, which is computed as earnings before 
interest and taxes (adding back depreciation, which is the same as EBITDA 
or operational cash flow) / interest expenses.  This shows the ability of cash 
flows to pay back the interests.  The benchmark that will be used is the US 
“A” rated companies’ coverage of 8 times6.   
 
Event definition and event window.  The event under study is the 
anticipation of the Mexican crisis (1995-1996) by Mexican firms.  The 
event window is defined as 1994, due to the belief that if there was any 
anticipation, it could not be prior to 1-year time.  The information from 
1993 will be used to determine normal firm behavior prior to the crisis.  
The variables of interest for this study are: 
 
a.  Leverage ratio.  If firms were able to foresee the crisis, prior to its 
occurrence they would have reduced the leverage ratio, by decreasing total 
debt and/or increasing equity. 
 
b.  Liquidity ratio.  Just like the leverage ratio, this ratio should have 
declined prior to the crisis, if companies were able to anticipate it.  The 
participation of short-term debt in total debt would have been reduced, in 
order to better the firms’ financial situation before the approaching crisis. 
 
c.  Foreign debt / total debt.  Once more, it is expected that this ratio would 
have been lowered before the crisis took place, assuming firms anticipated 
the latter, for the devaluation would increase the value of the debt in peso 
terms. 
 
                                                 
6 See Pomerleano (1998b). 
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d.  Cash allowances, which is calculated as the sum of money and temporal 
investments, over total assets.  This ratio gives an idea of how liquid a firm 
is.  Therefore, in order to deal with the forthcoming crisis, firms would 
have increased the participation of cash allowances in total assets prior to 
the crisis (assuming there was anticipation). 
 
e.  Internal financing (which results as the addition of social capital, selling 
of stock, and reserves for future capital expansions, minus paid dividends) 
over total debt.  This ratio offers an understanding of the importance of 
self- financing for a firm, and its reliance on external financing.  The 
argument on the behavior of this indicator prior to the crisis, if firms were 
able to foresee the latter, is analogous to the cash allowances case. 
 
f.  Exports / total sales, which refers to the proportion of product sold 
outside the national frontiers.   If firms anticipated the crisis, they would 
have made efforts to increase their foreign sales prior to its occurrence, in 
order to deal with a future contraction in the internal demand for their 
products. 
 
g.  Investment / total assets.  This ratio shows the participation of 
investment in total assets.  If firms were able to anticipate the 1995-1996 
financial crisis, it is expected that they would have delayed their investment 
projects for after the crisis.  Therefore, this ratio should have declined.   
 
Definition of normality and abnormality of the variables.  Normality 
refers to the ratios during 1993.  Abnormality would correspond to the 1994 
ratios, if they differ significantly from the previous ones. 
 
Testing Procedure.  The general equation to be used in order to test for 
abnormal ratios is the following7: 
                                                 
7 This model specification is used instead of a structural one for several reasons: 1) The 
objective of the paper is to test if there was crisis anticipation, not to explain the 
determinants of this anticipation; 2) It is not the purpose of this research to explain what 
determines the ratios under consideration, which actually depend on issues such as firm 
strategy; 3) It is not necessary to include macroeconomic variables since Mexico’s 
macroeconomic situation was stable during the period under study. 
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Rit =   β0 + β1*T + β2*Dummy + β3*Dummy*Telec + β4*Manuf + β5*Telec 
+ β6*Com + β7*Const +  β8*Serv + β9*Hold + β10*Others + β11*Dn +  
β12*Dn*Dummy   (1) ;    
 
i=1,..,73,   t=1,…,8  
 
where: 
 
R= ratio under consideration, 
T= Time, 
Dummy= 1 for 1994 and 0 for 1993 in the case of 1 year 
anticipation, 
Telec= 1 for Telecommunications Industry, 0 for others, 
Manuf= 1 for Manufacturing Industry, 0 for others, 
Com= 1 for Commercial Industry, 0 for others, 
Const= 1 for Construction Industry, 0 for others, 
Serv= 1 for Services Industry, 0 for others, 
Hold= 1 for Holdings, 0 for others, 
Others= 1 for rest of industries, without including Mining Industry 
(reference industry), 0 for others, 
Dn= 1 for big firms (more than 10,000,000,000 pesos, 26 firms in 
total) and 0 for small firms 
 
This equation allows considering industry and size effects on the selected 
ratios. 
 
The main hypothesis tested is that for each of the ratios under study, there is 
abnormality in the 1994 ratios.  This implies that there is evidence that 
firms were able to anticipate and adjust to the financial crisis, no matter the 
size or industry they belong to.  To test the abnormal ratios in 1994, one 
must check that the parameters are statistically different to zero.  For this 
the t-statistic is used, or alternatively, the Wilcoxon test statistic if extreme 
observations are frequent.   
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In order to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, the Newey-
West procedure was used.  Ordinary least squares offer consistent 
parameter estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity but its standard 
errors will not be accurate (this affects the t-statistic).  With the Newey-
West method, the estimates remain the same but their standard errors are 
corrected.  The procedure involves constructing a general covariance matrix 
estimator consistent both with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.   
  
4 ANALYSIS OF THE FIRMS’ PERFORMANCE PRE, DURING, 
AND POST CRISIS 
 
The analysis of the companies’ performance is based on the rate of return 
on assets (ROA) and the operational margin.  The following ratios were 
obtained using quarterly balance sheets from 73 Mexican firms, from I 
1993 to I 2001.  They correspond to average ratios, for the pre-crisis (1993 
and 1994), crisis (1995 and 1996), and post-crisis (1997-2001) periods. 
 
Table 1     Firm Performance 
The average ROA and operational margin for the US and Germany is used as a 
benchmark.  It corresponds to the period 1988-1996. N.A. refers to non-available data. 
Variable Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis US Germany 
ROA 5.84% 6.40% 6.70% 5.30% 4.70% 
Operational Margin 32.33% 34.55% 33.37% 14.40% 14.60% 
Exports/ Total Sales 10.85% 18.89% 18.77% N.A. N.A. 
 
The Mexican firms’ rate of return on assets, for the three periods 
considered, is higher than for Germany and US companies.  It is worthy of 
note that this indicator follows an increasing tendency, even during the 
crisis period (1995 and 1996).  This means that either earnings increased or 
assets declined, or both.  Looking at the data, it comes into sight that during 
the crisis period both earnings and assets increased, on average 13.45% and 
17.64%, respectively.  During the post-crisis era, earnings grew on average 
8.76%, and assets declined 2.65%.  Therefore, the progress shown in this 
indicator is attributed in a great degree to an increment in earnings.   
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The obvious question that rises in this setting is how could average earnings 
increase, when the economy was suffering from the 1995-1996 recession8.  
One tentative answer is that the crisis did not affect all sectors in the same 
way.  For example, during this period production increased 1.5% in the 
telecommunications industry, 2.7% in the mining industry, and 3.0% in the 
manufacturing industry.  The sectors that were worst affected were 
construction (growth of -6.9%) and commerce (growth of –5.4%).  From 
the 73 firms studied, 34 belong to the telecommunications, mining, and 
manufacturing sectors, which represents almost half of the sample.  There 
are only 20 firms from the construction and commerce industries, less than 
30% of the sample. 
 
Another explanation for the increment in earning is attributed to the 
behaviour of the operational margin.  Once more it seems that this indicator 
is much higher for Mexico than for US and Germany.  The operational 
margin increased during the crisis period (possibly to face the crisis, 
assuming goods’ price-elasticity is not too high) and then declined during 
the post-crisis era (1997-2001).  The second question that arises then is who 
were buying goods during the crisis.  The data shows that national 
consumption declined on average 3.3% during 1995 and 1996.  However, 
the participation of exports in total sales increased 8 percentage points 
during the crisis period.  This can be accredited to the devaluation, which 
made Mexican products cheaper in the international markets.  Contrary to 
the Asian case, Mexican firms’ performance seems to be appropriate, even 
during the crisis period.    
 
5 ANALYSIS OF THE FIRMS’ CAPITAL STRUCTURE PRE, 
DURING, AND POST CRISIS 
 
The analysis of the companies’ capital structure is based on foreign debt / 
total debt, foreign short-term debt / total foreign debt, interest payment 
coverage, leverage, and liquidity ratios.   
 
                                                 
8 During 1995, the internal production decreased by 6.17%.  In 1996 it increased 5.15%, 
which gives an average decline of 0.5% during the crisis period. 
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Table 2     Capital Structure 
 
Variable Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-
Crisis 
US Germany 
Liquidity 62.84% 62.17% 55.14% 24.10% 44.70% 
Leverage 108.99% 132.46% 125.38% 103.4% 151.4% 
Foreign Debt/ Total 
Debt 
40.30% 49.26% 43.24% N.A. N.A. 
Foreign Short Term 
Debt/ Foreign Total 
Debt 
58.31% 58.32% 54.47% N.A. N.A. 
Interest Payment 
Coverage 
36.42  
times 
14.29 
times 
111.58  
times 
8.00  
times 
N.A. 
The prior ratios were obtained using quarterly balance sheets from 73 Mexican firms, 
from I 1993 to I 2001.  They correspond to average ratios, for the pre-crisis (1993 
and 1994), crisis (1995 and 1996), and post-crisis (1997-2001) periods.  Average 
ratios for US and Germany are used as a benchmark.  They correspond to the period 
1988-1996. N.A. refers to non-available data. 
 
Mexican firms show financial vulnerability, as their short-term debt 
represents more than 60% of the total debt.  However, there is a small 
tendency to reduce the participation of short-term debt in total debt, 
possibly after the crisis experience.  In US and Germany, this indicator is 
much lower, 24.1% and 44.7% respectively. 
 
Another measure of corporate vulnerability is the leverage ratio, which 
measures how much borrowed money a company is using relative to its 
equity.  This ratio increased during the crisis period, reaching 132.46%, 
higher than the US ratio of 103.4%, but still lower than Germany’s ratio of 
151.4% (period 1988-1996).  After the crisis, this ratio smoothly declined 
to 125.38%.   
 
Almost half of Mexican firms’ debt is foreign denominated debt.  Even 
after the crisis, this percentage remained high: 43.24%.  Of this debt, more 
than 50% is short-term debt, which once more reflects financial 
vulnerability, and brings the question of how these firms survived the crisis.  
A tentative explanation for this highlights the importance of debt-relief 
programs.  For the pre-crisis period, earnings could cover on average 36 
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times the interests paid, much higher than for US firms.  During the crisis, 
the interest payment coverage was reduced to 14 times, possibly because 
the devaluation caused interest payments to increase in peso terms, due to 
the high amount of foreign debt.  The data shows that effectively interest 
payments increased 108.75% during the crisis period.  After the crisis, the 
interest payment coverage reached 111 times, which may suggest that firms 
were not paying interests, as part of the debt-relief program.  In fact, during 
this period interest payments declined 43.78%.   
 
A natural question that comes up is why firms after the crisis experience 
still have high amounts of dollar denominated debt.  Perhaps peso credit is 
scarce or too expensive.  The 1995 exposition on monetary policy by the 
Bank of Mexico announced that there would be a strict credit policy as part 
of a restrictive monetary policy.  For the crisis period, peso credit to the 
private sector declined by 12.53%; during the post-crisis period, on average 
this type of credit was reduced 0.08% annually.  However, like the Korean 
case, it seems that there was not a credit crunch in Mexico, since the 
profitable firms under study continued to receive loans.  Their debt 
increased on average 26.87% from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, and 
then it continued increasing (1.80% on average).   
 
The elevated amount of foreign debt in the capital structure of these 
companies can be due both to the strict credit policy and the high peso 
interest rates.  During the pre-crisis episode, peso loans were charged with 
average interest rates of 18.6%.  Inflation during this time reached 7.5%; 
therefore, real interest rates were approximately 11.1%.  During the same 
period, companies were able to obtain dollar denominated loans at a cost of 
less than 6%.  This made dollar denominated credit more attractive.  During 
the crisis period the situation was reversed, as peso interest rates increased 
to 42.5%, the inflation rate boosted to 40%, and the difference became just 
2.5%.  Dollar rates for this period were much higher than that, so peso 
denominated debt was obviously preferred.  However, the strict credit 
policy did not allow for an expansion of this type of debt as is reflected in 
the higher proportion of foreign debt in the firms’ total debt.  During the 
post-crisis period, peso interest rates were on average 21% and prices 
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increased 12% on an average annual base.  The real peso interest rates 
became then approximately 9% and the dollar interest rates that apply to 
these companies were on average 6.5%.  Once more dollar denominated 
debt became more attractive.   
 
The higher cost of peso denominated debt, the experience of the debt-relief 
programs, together with a reduction in the devaluation expectations that 
emerged with the floating exchange rate regime and the betterment of the 
economy, can explain why these firms continue to finance themselves with 
foreign-denominated debt. 
 
6 CRISIS ANTICIPATION 
 
6.1 Variables  
 
The ratios of interest to examine if Mexican firms anticipated the 1995-
1996 financial crisis are the leverage ratio, liquidity ratio, foreign debt / 
total debt, cash allowances / total assets, internal financing / total debt, 
exports / total sales, and investment / total assets.  The behavior of many of 
these variables has already been explained.  The rest of them are shown in 
the following table. 
 
Table 3     Crisis Anticipation Ratios 
 
Variable Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Cash Allowances/ Total Assets 7.50% 5.87% 5.89% 
Internal Financing/ Total Debt 318.64% 7.80% 5.79% 
Investment/ Total Assets 11.46% 10.52% 9.38% 
The prior ratios were obtained using quarterly balance sheets from 73 Mexican 
firms, from I 1993 to I 2001.  They correspond to average ratios, for the pre-
crisis (1993 and 1994), crisis (1995 and 1996), and post-crisis (1997-2001) 
periods.   
 
The cash allowances refer to money and temporal investments.  They 
represented 7.5% of total assets during the pre-crisis period and then they 
decreased to 5.9%.  The amount of investment, relative to the firms’ assets, 
shows also a declining tendency.    
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Before the crisis, the internal financing (includes social capital, selling of 
stocks, and reserves for future capital expansions, and subtracts paid 
dividends) represented more than 3 times the value of the total debt.  
Perhaps this was one of the factors that helped firms survive the financial 
crisis, as they had enough internal funds to deal with the problems that 
emerged.  During the crisis the internal financing dramatically declined to 
7.8% of total debt, and it has been following a decaying tendency in recent 
years.   
 
6.2 The model 
 
In order to test if firms anticipated the crisis, equation (1)9 was estimated.  
The hypotheses tested were that: 1) all firms anticipated the crisis:  β2 ≠ 0; 
2) only big firms were able to anticipate the crisis (or at least that they were 
the only ones that had the flexibility to adjust before the crisis occurred): 
β12 ≠ 0; and 3) only those firms belonging to the telecommunications 
industry were able to anticipate the crisis, as there were rumors that this 
industry had knowledge about the coming crisis: β3≠ 0.  
 
6.3 Regression results 
 
The regressions were run using different possible anticipation periods:  four 
quarters, three, two, and one quarter.  The following table shows the results 
for the four quarters period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 See page 18. 
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Table 4     Results for 4-Quarters Anticipation 
 
4-Quarters Anticipation 
Dependent 
Variables  
 Independent Variables 
Variables T Dummy Dummy
*Telec 
Dn Dn* 
Dummy 
Leverage -0.034 0.38 0.09 0.12 -0.24 
Liquidity 0.001 -0.01 0.08 -0.14 -0.04 
Foreign Debt / 
Total Debt 
0.020 -0.02 -0.02 0.17 0.00 
Cash Allow/ 
Assets 
-0.001 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 
Internal Fin/ 
Debt 
0.780 -12.94 2.02 -8.60 9.64 
Exports/Sales 0.003 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Invest /Assets 0.002 -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.02 
The regressions were obtained by the method of ordinary least squares, 
using the Newey-West covariances.  The issues on bold represent that they 
are significant at a 10% level.    
 
The results indicate that big firms have significantly less short-term debt in 
their capital structure than small firms.  This makes them less vulnerable to 
financial shocks.  However, the participation of foreign debt in total debt is 
higher for big firms than for small ones, which represents a higher exposure 
to exchange-rate risk.  Actually, in the aggregate, the proportion of foreign 
denominated debt in the firms’ total debt shows an increasing tendency, 
which represents a generalized corporate threat.  On the other hand, big 
firms, compared to small ones, tend to maintain a higher proportion of 
investment in their assets (but not significantly higher).  However, the 
participation of cash allowances (money and temporal investments) is 
smaller for big companies; therefore, it seems they have more long-term 
investments and less liquidity.  This might not be prejudicial for these 
companies, since they have less short-term liabilities to deal with.   
 
In 1994, contrasted to 1993, big firms increased significantly more their 
cash allowances than small firms, perhaps to deal with the coming crisis.  
However, the rest of the variables considered did not show any abnormal 
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change during 1994.  Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that big firms 
anticipated the financial crisis. 
 
Compared to 1993, in 1994 firms reduced significantly the internal 
financing of their operations.  If companies were able to anticipate the 
crisis, one would expect that internal financing would increase prior to the 
crisis (as explained in prior sections).  No other variable showed an 
abnormal performance during 1994; therefore, it is not possible to conclude 
that firms anticipated the financial crisis. 
 
The telecommunications industry, compared to the rest of industries, 
decreased (however not significantly) its cash allowances in 1994.  If these 
companies expected the crisis, they should have increased their cash 
allowances instead.  During 1994 no variables for this sector showed an 
abnormal performance, which indicates that these firms were not able to 
foresee the crisis. 
 
In conclusion, there is no statistical evidence to support either of the 
hypotheses using a 1-year anticipation basis.  The next table shows the 
results using 1994’s last three quarters as the anticipation period. 
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Table 5     Results for 3-Quarters Anticipation 
 
3-Quarters Anticipation 
Dependent 
Variables  
  Independent Variables 
Variables T Dummy Dummy* 
Telec 
Dn Dn* 
Dummy 
Leverage -0.035 0.40 0.10 0.08  -0.23 
Liquidity -0.004 0.01 0.06 -0.15  -0.03 
Foreign Debt / Total 
Debt 
0.018 -0.00 -0.00 0.18  -0.02 
Cash Allow /Assets -0.000 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01  0.02 
Internal Fin /Debt -0.400 -6.25 1.59 -6.67  7.71 
Exports/Sales 0.003 0.00 -0.00 -0.01  0.01 
Invest /Assets 0.000 -0.01 -0.01 0.04        0.01 
The regressions were obtained by the method of ordinary least squares, using 
the Newey-West covariances.  The issues on bold represent that they are 
significant at a 10% level.    
 
The results in this case are quite similar to the ones obtained using 1994’s 4 
quarters as the event window.  The main differences are that the internal 
financing of firms did not decline significantly during II-IV 1994, and 
compared to small firms, during II-IV 1994 big firms did not increase 
significantly their cash allowances.  Once more, there is no statistical 
evidence to support either of the hypotheses.  The following table contains 
the results using two quarters as the anticipation period. 
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Table 6     Results for 2-Quarters Anticipation 
 
2-Quarters Anticipation 
Dependent 
Variables  
  Independent Variables  
Variables T Dummy Dummy*Telec Dn Dn*Dummy 
Leverage 0.004 0.15 0.14 0.02 -0.10 
Liquidity -0.006 0.03 0.04 -0.16 -0.02 
Foreign Debt / 
Total Debt 
0.016 0.01 0.01 0.18 -0.03 
Cash Allow/ 
Assets 
-0.002 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 
Internal Fin/ 
Debt 
-0.974 -2.60 1.32 -5.37 6.40 
Exports/Sales 0.002 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Invest /Assets 0.000 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 
The regressions were obtained by the method of ordinary least squares, 
using the Newey-West covariances.  The issues on bold represent that 
they are significant at a 10% level.    
 
It is easy to notice that the results show to be analogous to the ones 
obtained using 1994’s 3 quarters as the event window.  The next table 
corresponds to the results using only one quarter as the anticipation period. 
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Table 7     Results for 1-Quarter Anticipation 
 
1-Quarter Anticipation 
Dependent Variables  Independent Variables   
Variables T Dummy Dummy* 
Telec 
Dn Dn* 
Dummy 
Leverage 0.084 -1.11 0.30 -0.13 1.02 
Liquidity -0.005 0.03 0.04 -0.16 -0.00 
Foreign Debt / Total 
Debt 
0.011 0.07 0.09 0.18 -0.07 
Cash Allow /Assets -0.002 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 
Internal Fin /Debt -1.066 -1.37 1.31 -4.46 5.52 
Exports/Sales 0.002 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 
Invest /Assets 0.001 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 
The regressions were obtained by the method of ordinary least squares, 
using the Newey-West covariances.  The issues on bold represent that they 
are significant at a 10% level.    
 
In this case the results are quite similar to the ones obtained using 1994’s 2 
quarters as the event window.  The main differences are:  
 
1.  In the last quarter of 1994 leverage decreased (however not 
significantly) for all firms, compared to the prior period.  This might 
manifest anticipation of the crisis, as firms would have reduced their debt 
and/or increase their equity in order to prepare and survive a coming 
calamity.  The crisis anticipation hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that 
cash allowances increased significantly for big firms during this period.   
 
2.  The amount of foreign denominated debt in the capital structure of firms 
increased significantly during the last quarter of 1994.  This gives no 
evidence for the crisis expectation hypothesis; if this were the case, one 
would expect foreign denominated debt to decline with respect to total debt.  
An alternative explanation for the increment in this ratio would be the 
dramatic rationing of peso denominated loans during this period of time. 
 
Once again, there is no statistical evidence to support either of the 
hypotheses.  Therefore, it seems that these Mexican firms were not able to 
anticipate the 1995-1996 financial crisis, or at least that they did not have 
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the flexibility to adjust their capital structure accordingly before the crisis 
took place.  However, it is important to consider the limitation that perhaps 
some firms anticipated the crisis less than a quarter before it occurred.  The 
available data refers to quarterly information; therefore, this hypothesis is 
not possible to test.  
 
7 CONCLUSION 
 
The 1995-1996 Mexican crisis was a surprising, unexpected episode.  Not 
long before its occurrence, Mexico was considered as a developed country; 
expectations were favorable, which were reflected in high amounts of 
foreign capital and investment.  During the crisis, many banks and 
companies went bankrupt, the economy suffered from a recession, high 
inflation, and devaluation, and internal consumption was greatly reduced.   
 
The present study shows that even those firms who survived the crisis, and 
were still operating in 2001, did not foresee the coming event.  Therefore, 
they did not adjust their capital structure accordingly.  The reasons why 
they survived the crisis cannot be explained by assuming they had 
knowledge of the future calamity.  However, it is possible to argue that they 
possessed several advantages prior to the crisis that helped them face it, and 
that their managers were clever in adjusting to the new situation. 
 
The advantages many of these firms had prior to the crisis, that helped them 
deal with the latter, were basically high levels of internal financing (it 
includes social capital, selling of stocks, and reserves for future capital 
expansions, and subtracts paid dividends) and a first-class reputation, which 
gave them access to loans even during the crisis period.  On the other hand, 
right after the crisis they were aided with debt-relief programs, which 
temporarily excused them from interest payments.   
 
The administration of these firms was also successful in managing the 
crisis.  On average, during this catastrophic period the return on assets 
increased as well as the operational margin.  This was possible due to a 
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remarkable increment in exports, which can be both accredited to the 
managers’ effort and to the devaluation.   
 
The 1995-1996 Mexican financial crisis took most people for surprise.  
Although many explanations have been attempted, the general belief is that 
the overvalued peso was its main determinant.  In order to avoid future 
calamities, soon after the crisis, the quasi-fixed exchange rate model was 
substituted for a flexible model.  At the time of the study, Mexico once 
more had a healthy economy, with less than two digits inflation, peso 
interest rates in the order of 14%, high internal consumption, and annual 
growth of more than 6%.  Future studies will reveal in what ways the 
change in the exchange rate model affected the capital structure of firms.   
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CHAPTER 3: 
MACROECONOMIC CRISIS AND INDIVIDUAL FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE* 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
 
To deal with the economic problems carried from the 1980s’ so-called Debt 
Crisis, early 1990’s Mexico and other Latin American countries initiated 
stabilization programs. As part of these programs, Mexican President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari privatized public enterprises and 18 banks, 
pursued tight monetary and fiscal policies, and fixed the exchange rate of 
the peso against the US dollar. In order to control inflation, the Pacto was 
signed among government, business, and labor representatives. In addition, 
in 1992 Mexico signed the Brady Plan, reducing its external public debt to 
22% of GDP. The government then relaxed monetary policy in order to 
stimulate credit, liberalized interest rates, and permitted the exchange rate 
to fluctuate in a band10. Credit controls and lending restrictions were 
abolished, as well as minimum reserve requirements. These events 
generated a boom in the banking industry, as it gained access to more 
funds. New private banks started operating, and services and credit were 
expanded.  This was the end of the financial repression in Mexico (see 
Cabello, 2001).  However, the credit expansion, together with bad credit 
analysis and poor regulation of the banking system, evolved in banks 
financing more risky projects. This increased banks’ fragility to internal and 
external economic shocks.  
 
By the end of 1993, few economists had foreseen a downturn in the 
Mexican economy, as the fundamentals were optimistic. As pointed out by 
Calvo et al. (1996), the 1994 Mexican crisis took place in a different setting 
than other crises: inflation was low, there was a fiscal surplus, and foreign 
reserves were large. The government was confident about the stability of 
the economy, and Mexico was apparently ready to enter NAFTA. However, 
in 1994 the current account deficit (which grew on average 1 percentage 
                                                 
10  See Aybar et al., 2000; Doshi et al., 2001. 
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point per year during 1989-1994, reaching 7% of GDP in 1994) continued 
to expand, as the peso was overvalued. As long as external capital 
continued to enter the country there was no apparent risk. However, several 
political events took place in 1994, which generated a strong capital 
outflow.  
 
In March 1994 Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was 
assassinated. This event was followed immediately by a 6% devaluation of 
the peso and a doubling of domestic short-term interest rates (e.g., Aybar et 
al., 2000). In addition, the Chiapas conflict happened later that year, and 
foreign investors doubted new President Zedillo´s willingness to maintain 
the quasi-fixed exchange rate regime. Indeed, on December 20th, 1994, the 
Mexican peso was allowed to float. Christmas came with 40% devaluation; 
in a two-month period the peso´s devaluation was around 100% (e.g., 
Kalter et al., 1999).  
 
Interest rates were subsequently increased in order to avoid further 
devaluation of the peso. This caused economic recession and banks’ 
insolvency: depositors withdrew their money from banks, banks were 
forced to pay higher interest rates, non-performing loans increased, and 
credit was reduced. Real GDP declined by 10% during 1995 and inflation 
reached 52% during the same year.  
 
As expected, the macroeconomic crisis had a significant impact on 
individual firms. Due to the previous expansion of foreign capital inflow, 
Mexican companies had attained more access to dollar denominated debt. 
Although the peso exchange rate was quasi-fixed (band fluctuation) at the 
time, it seemed that the favorable macroeconomic conditions diminished 
concerns about the exchange rate risk implicit in this debt. The high level of 
investment was financed mainly by bank loans and to a lesser degree by 
trade credit and equity; therefore, debt levels were high. With the 1994 peso 
devaluation, firms faced a considerable increase in the peso value of their 
dollar denominated debt. In addition, the higher domestic interest rates 
increased the cost of peso denominated debt. This, together with a reduction 
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in credit options and internal demand, caused many firms to go bankrupt or 
at least to be seriously distressed.  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to determine the timing and magnitude 
of surviving firms’ balance sheets variations (both downturn and recovery), 
related to the December 1994 Mexican currency crisis. For this reason, 
different financial, operational, solvency, and performance ratios are 
examined for this type of companies, and tests for structural change are 
performed on groups of firms formed according to characteristics such as 
relative size and industry. Firms that continued operating after the currency 
crisis bound the sample, in order to identify the overall ex-post impact of 
this crisis on balance sheets.  
 
A significant number of papers have been published on the topics of 
financial crises in general and the Mexican 1994 crisis in particular. 
However, there are still several gaps in this research area. First of all, most 
studies deal with the question of how a financial crisis in one country 
affects itself or other countries from a macroeconomic point of view, 
ignoring the direct microeconomic effects on individual companies. There 
are only few firm-level analyses; a notable exception is Forbes (2002, 
2004), who studied how financial crises affect firms inside and outside the 
crisis region, testing for the different contagion channels put forward in the 
literature. In addition, a considerable amount of research has considered 
corporate performance during financial crises11; nevertheless, this is a 
rather new topic for Mexico12.    
                                                 
11 For instance, four hypotheses have been tested in the recent literature to explain the 
relationship between the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and corporate performance (e.g., 
Claessens et al., 2000).  These can be summarized as: 1) aggregate macroeconomic shocks 
causing firms’ downturns; 2) weak balance sheets prior to the crisis making firms 
vulnerable when the latter takes place; 3) financial markets’ imperfections resulting in 
credit crunches at the time of the crisis; and 4) inefficiency of debt resolution facilities.  
Although the purpose of this paper is not to test these hypotheses, there is some insight 
concerning the first three. 
12 For a sample of papers on the Mexican crisis, see Calvo et al. (1996); Carstens et al. 
(1998); Kalter et al. (1999); Kaminsky et al. (1999), and Martinez et al. (2001).  With 
regard to papers on macroeconomic effects of crises and corporate performance during 
financial crises, see Allen et al. (2000); Chan et al. (2002); Claessens et al. (2000); 
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This study is relevant for three reasons.  First of all, the Mexican 1994 
economic crisis provides a perfect scenario for a natural experiment on 
corporate performance during crises.  Unlike the Asian 1997 crisis, in 
which there is no consensus on the exact date when this event took place, in 
Mexico it is clear that the crisis began at the end of the year 1994.  It is then 
possible to study differences in performance prior, during, and after the 
crisis, without committing a mistake on the event date.  Second, there has 
been in Mexico a lot of debate concerning the ways companies survived the 
crisis.  Some have argued that certain entrepreneurs were informed about 
the devaluation of the peso before it took place, which favored the 
performance of their firms during this episode.  If this is true, the 
anticipation of the crisis can be witnessed in balance sheet variations such 
as declines in leverage, short-term debt, and US dollar denominated debt 
before the crisis took place13.   Others believe the government favored 
mostly big companies, providing them with credit lines and reducing their 
interest expenses.  Third, in an emerging market like the Mexican, it is 
common for stock markets to be underdeveloped.  With banks going 
bankrupt, there are few alternatives for distressed firms to finance their 
operations.  One alternative is trade credit (and the amount of time given to 
pay for it), which is represented in balance sheets as bill payment rotation.  
Therefore, the study of firms´ balance sheets before, during, and after the 
financial crisis can provide useful information on the ways companies 
colluded with the government and other stakeholders in order to survive.   
 
There is still a theoretical and empirical gap on how firms’ balance sheets 
deteriorate and recover from a crisis. Important, but unanswered questions 
include: Which are the relevant variables to consider? Does the timing of 
the downturn and recovery vary systematically according to firms’ 
characteristics? What are the important relationships between companies 
that can help explain the spreading between them?  
 
                                                                                                                           
Edwards et al. (2002); Edwards et al. (2001); Hernandez et al. (2001); Kaminsky et al. 
(2000); Kim et al. (1999); Krugman (1999); Sachs et al. (1996). 
13 See Watkins (2006). 
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For the purpose of this research, Mexican corporate performance prior, 
during, and after the December 1994 currency crisis is considered. There 
are immediate effects on firms at the time of the crisis, which need not 
necessarily be negative as some firms may benefit. However, balance 
sheets’ changes with certain lags before (and after) the crisis are also of 
interest, as these would suggest corporate roots of the crisis (and 
interconnections between the initially affected firms and the rest could 
result in spreading between firms). The main findings show that there are 
multiple directions of the Mexican crisis’ cause and effect framework: 
firms’ decisions influenced the macroeconomic outcome; the currency 
crisis had negative impacts on companies’ balance sheets, and firms’ 
interconnections evolved in propagation among themselves. In addition, 
recovery was only partial and gradual, and overall the crisis episode was 
prejudicial even for these surviving firms.    
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Fourteen 
ratios are extracted from quarterly balance sheets of 88 private, non-
financial Mexican companies that survived the crisis. The methodology 
used to examine balance sheets’ variations is explained in Section 3. Tests 
for parameter instability and structural change are applied to individual 
ratios (which are then grouped into four principal components) for each 
industry and size of firms. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4, 
showing some evidence for corporate roots of macroeconomic crises. 
Section 5 points out the main conclusions of the research.  
 
2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The data set is compiled from quarterly balance sheets (from the first 
quarter 1993 (93.1) to the first quarter 2001 (01.1)) of 88 private, non-
financial Mexican firms that survived the 1994 crisis and were still 
operating in 2001. The data was obtained through INFOSEL, a Mexican 
information enterprise, whose original source of data is the Bolsa Mexicana 
de Valores (Mexican Stock Market). Historic data was completed with 
microfilms found in the Mexican Stock Market, which makes the data set 
unique. All firms are listed on the stock exchange, and are considered as 
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large companies. The information on the 88 firms corresponds to a 
balanced panel, in constant Mexican pesos (base year 2000).  
 
Following several authors14, the following ratios were constructed for the 
analysis: 
 
1. Leverage (LEV), which is calculated as total debt / equity. 
2. Debt ratio (DR), measured as total debt / total assets.  
3. Liquidity (LIQ), which refers to short-term debt / total debt. 
4. Foreign debt / total debt (FD/TD), which indicates the importance of 
dollar denominated debt in the firms’ capital structure, and signals 
vulnerability to exchange rate risk. 
5. Foreign short-term debt / total foreign debt (FSTD/TFD). This ratio 
is also used to measure corporate vulnerability. 
6. Interest payment coverage (IPC), which is computed as earnings 
before interest and taxes (adding back depreciation, which is the 
same as EBITDA or operational cash flow) / interest expenses.  
7. Internal financing (IF), which results as the sum of social capital, 
selling of stock, and reserves for future capital expansions, minus 
paid dividends / total debt. 
8. Short-term assets / short-term debt (STA/STD), which is an 
indicator for solvency. 
9. Bill payment rotation (BPR), which is calculated as total sales / 
average bills unpaid. 
10. Inventory rotation (IR), which refers to costs of goods sold / average 
inventory. 
11. Exports / total sales (X/Sales), which refers to the proportion of 
products sold outside the national borders, and gives an idea of the 
importance of the international markets for a firm. 
12. Operational margin (OM), which refers to operational earnings / 
total sales. 
13. Rate of return on assets (ROA), which is defined as earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) / total assets. 
14. Rate of return on equity (ROE), computed as EBIT / equity. 
                                                 
14 For example Claessens et.al. (2000) and Pomerleano (1998). 
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Firms are grouped according to their size and industry. The classification 
includes seven industries (with abbreviations and number of firms in 
brackets): Telecommunications (Tel; 4 firms), Manufacturing (Man; 35), 
Commerce (Com; 15), Construction (Const; 11), Services (Serv; 6), 
Conglomerates (Congl; 10), and Mining (Min; 7). Firms were also arranged 
into three different groups according to their relative sizes: Large (more 
than $10, 000, 000 in assets – 28 firms), Medium (Med-between $1, 000, 
000 and $10, 000, 000 in assets – 38 firms), and Small (less than $1, 000, 
000 in assets – 22 companies). 
 
For industry X, the value of ratio K for a particular period corresponds to a 
weighted average of this ratio registered for all firms belonging to this 
industry. The weight that is given to each firm corresponds to the 
proportion of its assets with respect to the industry’s total assets. The same 
procedure was used in order to construct ratios for the different firm size 
groups.  
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
 
The main assumption underlying this research is that deterioration and 
recovery manifest themselves through significant changes in the level of a 
firm’s financial, operational, solvency, and performance ratios. Therefore, 
for the sample of 88 Mexican firms, tests for structural change are 
performed to establish the occurrence and significance of these events. 
Specifically, the techniques developed in Andrews (1993) and Bai et al. 
(1998) are employed to test the null hypothesis of no change against the 
alternative of two instantaneous breaks in the level of a particular ratio, 
where the break dates as treated as unknown.15  Note that this analysis is 
univariate, in the sense that it is tested for structural changes in each ratio 
individually. An alternative approach is to test for common breaks in 
multiple ratios simultaneously, as developed by Bai et al. (1998).  
Empirical work related to this type of methodology can be obtained from 
                                                 
15 An excellent non-technical survey of the literature on the econometrics of structural 
change can be found in Hansen (2001). 
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Bekaert et al. (2002).  These authors used several financial and 
macroeconomic variables simultaneously, in order to detect the dates of 
market integration for a sample of 20 countries.   
 
The basic structural change regression model is given by 
 
,)()()()()( 22114344234121 tttttttt tIbtIbDDaDDaDDaaY εττ +≥+≥+−+−+−+=   (1) 
 
where Yt denotes the ratio under consideration, Dst, s=1,…,4, are quarterly 
dummy variables taking the value 1 if quarter t corresponds with season s 
and 0 otherwise, and I(A) is an indicator function for the event A. In the 
model in (1), τ 1 and τ 2 are the break dates for a ratio’s downturn (or 
upturn) and recovery, respectively, which are treated as unknown. The 
quarterly dummy variables are included to account for the pronounced 
seasonal patterns that can be observed in many of the ratios. Most ratios 
also display substantial autocorrelation, which has been accommodated by 
using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard 
errors and test statistics.16 Initially the analysis is performed using 
individual ratios; they are then classified into performance (ROE, ROA, 
and OM), solvency (LEV and STA/STD), operational (BPR, IR, and 
X/Sales), and financial ratios (DR, IPC, LIQ, FD/TD, FSTD/TFD, and IF), 
for which a principal components’ analysis is conducted. 
 
Estimates of the break dates, along with the remaining parameters are 
obtained by minimizing the sum of squared residuals in (1), where an 
exhaustive grid search is performed over all possible combinations of τ 1 
and τ 2 such that each sub-period contains at least 15% of the available 
observations. Confidence intervals for the break dates are computed using 
the methods developed in Bai (1997).17 Conditional on the break date 
                                                 
16 Because of the small sample size (T=33 observations), it was decided not to include 
lagged Yt’s in (1). 
17 When computing these confidence intervals, the variance of the error term in the 
regression (1) is allowed to be different before and after the break. This results in 
asymmetric confidence intervals, with less uncertainty about the break date in the high 
than the low volatility period. 
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estimates, the remaining parameters can be estimated by least squares, and 
Newey-West HAC standard errors are obtained in the usual fashion. Note 
that in (1), a1 measures the average level of the ratio before the first 
structural change, while b1 and b2 indicate the effects of the first and second 
breaks, respectively. The average level of the ratio after the first break 
(crisis) is given by a1 + b1, while the sum a1 + b1 + b2 gives the average 
level after the second break (recovery). Hence, an interesting hypothesis to 
examine in (1) is b1 + b2 = 0, which implies that the ratio Yt returns to its 
pre-crisis level after recovery occurs. If |b1| > |b2|, recovery was only partial, 
while, on the other hand, if |b1| < |b2|, the particular group of firms not only 
recovered, but in fact benefited from the crisis.  
 
To test for the presence and significance of the structural changes, the 
following procedure is used. Let W(τ 1, τ 2) denote the HAC Wald test of 
the null hypothesis b1=b2=0 in the regression model (1). As noted above, 
these break dates are treated as unknown. The supremum Wald statistic 
(denoted SupW) is then employed, which is obtained as the maximum of 
the point wise Wald statistics W(τ 1,τ 2) using the same grid of values for τ 1 and τ 2 as in the estimation of (1) discussed above. Given the small 
sample size (T=33), it is not appropriate to rely upon the (non-standard) 
asymptotic distribution of the SupW statistic to determine its significance. 
Hence, the bootstrap is used as recommended in Hansen (2000).18 In case 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, or if the sign of the point estimates 
of b1 and b2 do not correspond with the expected signs under the crisis-
recovery model, we estimate a model with a single structural change (and 
test for its significance) to examine whether the particular financial ratio 
experienced a level shift only due to the crisis or only due to recovery. 
 
Whereas the crisis’ effects on balance sheets may occur instantaneously, it 
is reasonable to argue that recovery might not be sudden, but rather may 
appear gradually. Therefore, we allow for the possibility of gradual 
recovery by modifying equation 1 as follows: 
                                                 
18 Specifically, the stationary bootstrap of Politis et al. (1995) has been employed to 
accommodate the autocorrelation in Yt. The number of bootstrap replications is set equal to 
999. 
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The function (3) thus is equal to 0 until the first structural change (crisis) 
occurs, then jumps to  in the period following the 
break, and continues to increase gradually towards 1 as t increases. The 
parameter 
1
2 )))(exp(1(
−−−+ τγ t
γ  determines the smoothness of the recovery: when ∞→γ , the 
function (3) becomes an indicator function I (t ≥ τ 2). Hence, the gradual 
recovery model in (2) nests the instantaneous recovery model in (1) as a 
special case. τ 2 refers to the moment when recovery is halfway through, as 
(3) is equal to 0.5 when t = τ 2. 
 
4 FIRMS’ PERFORMANCE DURING CRISIS AND RECOVERY 
 
This section starts with a basic preliminary data analysis, examining the 
ratios’ average values during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. 
Then the results from the structural change tests and the corresponding 
regression models are described.  
 
4.1 General results 
  
4.1.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
The first column of Table A1 in the appendix shows the average values for 
the 14 ratios under consideration, averaged across all firms during the pre-
crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. During the pre-crisis period (from 93.1 
till 94.3), the debt structure of Mexican firms reflected high levels of 
financial vulnerability. Short - term debt on average represented almost half 
of total debt. In addition, foreign-denominated debt corresponded to more 
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than 50% of the debt (with 41% being short-term). It was clear that the peso 
devaluation would be devastating; however, firms continued obtaining 
dollar-denominated debt as it was cheaper and there was confidence in the 
Mexican economy and the exchange rate regime.  
 
During the pre-crisis episode, peso loans were charged with average interest 
rates of 18.6%. Inflation during this time reached 7.5%, resulting in real 
interest rates of approximately 10.3%. During the same period, companies 
were able to obtain dollar denominated loans at a cost of less than 6%. This 
made dollar denominated credit more attractive. During the crisis period 
(94.4 to 97.3) the situation was reversed, as peso interest rates increased to 
42.5%, inflation boosted to 40%, and the real interest rate was just 1.8%. 
Dollar rates for this period were much higher, so peso denominated debt 
was obviously preferred. However, the strict credit policy did not allow for 
an expansion of this type of debt as reflected in the higher proportion of 
foreign debt in the firms’ total debt. The firms’ indebtedness grew 
considerably, especially with respect to dollar-denominated debt, which 
increased the possibility of going bankrupt. During the post-crisis period, 
peso interest rates were on average 21% and prices increased 12% on an 
average annual base. The real peso interest rates became then 
approximately 8% and the dollar interest rates that applied to these 
companies were on average 6.5%. Once more dollar denominated debt 
became more attractive.  
 
Most of the debt indicators (except for the debt ratio) improved after the 
crisis, although pre-crisis levels were not reached anymore; in this sense, 
recovery from the crisis (which was possible due to the growth in exports, 
good liquidity indicators and internal financing, as well as governmental 
programs that delayed the payment of interests19, and network 
considerations) was just partial. Leverage increased during all periods, 
which is attributed mostly to increments in total debt (21.89% on average), 
as EBIT and equity did not decline significantly. 
  
                                                 
19 Its effect can be seen in the improvement of the interest payment coverage indicator 
during the post-crisis period. 
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Mexican enterprises experienced a demand cut during the crisis, which is 
evidenced by the remarkable increase in the amount of days it took to sell 
inventories. In addition, as firms were suffering from the crisis, the amount 
of time given to pay back for trade credit increased (although not 
significantly), which also reduced the frequency of cash flows. In spite of 
this, due to the expansion of exports (as a result of the peso devaluation), 
returns were not seriously damaged. However, the crisis did not affect all 
firms in the same way; as shown in sections 4.2 and 4.3, some sectors even 
benefited.  
 
4.1.2 Econometric results for univariate series  
 
Table 1 
Results from the gradual recovery and two-breaks models: All firms 
  
Gradual Recovery Model 
 
Two-Breaks Model 
 First break τ
2 
First break Recovery 
LEV  95.3 
b1= 0.68     
 
96.4 
b2= -0.62 
γ = 200.0 
95.3 
b1= 0.85    
(0.20) 
96.3 
b2= -0.79 
 
DR  94.4 
b1= 0.04    
 
00.1 
b2= 0.10 
γ = 14.3 
94.3 
b1= 0.04     
(0.00) 
NO 
 
 
LIQ  95.3 
b1= 0.04     
 
97.3 
b2= -0.03 
γ = 138.3 
95.3 
b1= 0.04      
(0.20) 
97.3 
b2= -0.03 
 
FD/TD  95.1 
b1= 0.10     
 
99.2 
b2= -0.17 
γ = 6.6 
94.3 
b1= 0.09     
(0.40) 
NO 
 
FSTD/TFD  95.2 
b1= 0.04    
 
99.1 
b2= -0.03 
γ = 116.2 
95.1 
b1= 0.04     
(0.80) 
NO 
 
IPC  95.1 
b1= -5.32     
 
95.3 
b2= 7.68 
γ = 2.4 
94.3 
b1= -3.08     
(0.20) 
95.4 
b2= 4.40 
 
IF  93.4 
b1= -0.86    
 
99.4 
b2= -1.06 
γ = 11.9 
93.4 
b1= -0.72     
(0.00) 
NO 
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Table 1 
Results from the gradual recovery and two-breaks models: All firms (continue) 
  
Gradual Recovery Model 
 
 
 
Two-Breaks Model 
 First break τ
2 
First break Recovery 
STA/STD  94.4 
b1= -0.40    
 
00.1 
b2= -0.27 
γ = 146.2 
94.3 
b1= -0.41     
(0.00) 
NO 
 
BPR  95.3 
b1= 0.49    
 
00.3 
b2= 1.07 
γ = 132.9 
NO 
 
NO 
 
IR  95.3 
b1= 16.46    
 
00.3 
b2= -5.13 
γ = 1.2 
95.2 
b1= 15.99     
(0.00) 
97.2 
b2= -1.44 
 
X/Sales  93.4 
b1= 0.04     
 
94.4 
b2= 0.11 
γ = 44.4 
94.4 
b1= 0.04     
(0.30) 
NO 
 
OM  95.1 
b1= 0.03    
 
95.2 
b2= -0.05 
γ =11.7 
95.4 
b1= -0.04     
(0.10) 
96.4 
b2=0.02 
 
ROA  94.4 
b1= -0.05 
 
95.1 
b2=0.05 
γ = 143.1 
94.1 
b1= -0.03     
(0.10) 
95.1 
b2= 0.02 
 
ROE  94.4 
b1= -0.13 
 
95.1 
b2= 0.13 
γ = 137.4 
NO 
 
NO 
 
This table refers to initial break points, half-through recovery dates (τ 2 , gradual recovery 
model), and recovery dates (two-breaks model), for each of the 14 ratios under 
consideration.  No significant presence of breaking points is described with a NO.  For 
the gradual recovery model, the first break point is bounded between 1993 and 1995. This 
has been done since the two-breaks model shows that balance sheets deteriorated between 
the fourth quarters of 1993 and 1995.  Values for b1 (effect of first break point), b2 (effect 
of second break point), and γ  (smoothness of recovery) are shown, as well as bootstrap 
p-values of the SUPW test (in parenthesis) for the two-breaks model.  Asymptotic p-
values of the SUPW test for the two-breaks model are all smaller than 0.01. 
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Table 1 provides results for univariate series, for the gradual recovery 
model and the two-breaks model20. In general, the estimates of b1 show the 
expected signs21 and are significant at a 20% confidence level. According 
to the two-breaks model, only two ratios do not manifest the expected 
results: bill payment rotation, as the first break point takes place after the 
crisis era, and return on equity, given that there does not seem to be any 
shock at all. The gradual recovery model shows that bill payment rotation 
actually increased during the third quarter 1995, and continued increasing 
during the following periods. In this sense, the crisis had a permanent 
negative effect on this ratio. As for ROE, the gradual recovery model 
suggests it declined during the crisis and recovered rapidly (the value for γ  
is relatively big, greater than 100). 
 
With respect to recovery, as expected there are few significant recovery 
breaks for the two-breaks model, due to the fact that recuperation from the 
crisis was gradual. For recovery to occur, first there has to be a prior break 
point, b1 and b2 must show opposite signs, and recovery has to take place 
before the third quarter of 1998, given that in August 1998 there was 
another currency crisis (although not as important as the one in 1994)22. 
Consequently, for the following ratios there seems to be an initial break 
point, but not a recovery one: debt ratio, foreign debt as percentage of total 
debt, foreign short-term debt / total debt, internal financing, short-term 
assets / short-term debt, and exports / total sales. The gradual recovery 
model confirms that the crisis had a permanent effect on the debt ratio, 
internal financing, short-term assets / short-term debt, and exports / total 
sales (this being the only case where the effect is positive). With respect to 
the rest of the variables (foreign debt / total debt and foreign short-term 
debt / total debt), there seems to be gradual recovery. 
 
The two-breaks model fits accurately for leverage, liquidity, interest 
payment coverage, inventory rotation, operational margin, and ROA. In this 
                                                 
20 The first column of tables A2 and A3 in the appendix gives further details. 
21 b1 is expected to be positive for all ratios expect for interest payment coverage, internal 
financing, short-term assets / short-term debt, operational margin, ROA, and ROE.  The 
opposite is expected for b2.   
22 See Pratap et al. (2003). 
 
  Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance  
_________________________________________________________________ 
48 
sense, for these ratios the crisis’ effect was temporary, as the initial 
negative shock is weakened by a second shock of opposite sign. Taking into 
account all ratios, balance sheets deteriorated between the fourth quarters of 
1993 and 1995, which points out the possibility that firms were in bad 
shape before the occurrence of the macroeconomic crises (this may suggest 
corporate roots of the crisis; see Pomerleano, 1998a,b). It seems that in 
general corporations recovered from the crisis between the first quarter of 
1995 and the third quarter of 1997.  
 
The first ratio that showed a decline was internal financing (the last one was 
operational margin); the first ratio to manifest recovery was ROA (the last 
one was liquidity). This suggests that financial ratios present downturns 
before performance ratios, and that the latter are the first to recover. 
However, inspecting the rest of the ordering, there does not seem to be a 
regular pattern. Instead, internal financing declined almost at the same time 
as did return on assets (93.4 and 94.1, respectively). As a result, one quarter 
before the crisis ratios such as debt ratio, foreign debt / total debt, interest 
payment coverage, and short-term assets / short-term debt already 
weakened. These suggests firms were in “bad shape” before the crisis took 
place, which may provide evidence for the corporate roots of 
macroeconomic crises’ hypothesis, and the second hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between financial crises and corporate performance in East 
Asia.  
 
When the currency crisis took place (last quarter of 1994), there were some 
positive and negative results: exports immediately rose, which made 
possible return on assets’ recovery (95.1); later in 1995 an aid program to 
delay interest payments was implemented by the government, which 
improved interest payment coverage. On the other hand, due to the crisis, 
companies experienced an increase in foreign short-term debt / total debt 
(95.1) and inventory rotation (95.2, because of shrinking internal demand). 
Nonetheless, the positive effect on exports and the government’s support 
made possible a turn down in leverage (96.3). Between the end of 1996 and 
beginning of 1997, operational margin and inventory rotation showed 
recovery, as firms once more faced increasing demand for their products. 
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Finally, by the third quarter of 1997 there was some debt restructuring, 
reducing the percentage of short-termed debt with respect to total debt. 
 
Considering the gradual recovery and two-breaks models together, this 
crisis improved interest payment coverage and exports’ ratios. According to 
the gradual recovery model, there is also a post-crisis positive effect for 
foreign debt / total debt. Due to the rise in exports, ROA and ROE did not 
significantly deteriorate. However, both the two-breaks and gradual 
recovery models show that this crisis was prejudicial for most of the debt 
indicators and operational margin. Consistent with the two-break model, 
excluding interest payment coverage, the degree of weakening is seen to be 
greater than recuperation; therefore, although firms recovered from the 
1994 currency crisis, the improvement was just partial (and overall the 
crisis episode was prejudicial for firms). Taking into account the alternative 
model, due to the adjustment for gradual recovery, it seems that the overall 
effect of the crisis was neutral. Nevertheless, during the transition from the 
crisis to full recovery, this crisis did have adverse consequences on firms. 
 
4.2 Industry results 
 
4.2.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
Columns 2 to 8 of table A1 in the appendix show the accounting ratios’ 
average levels during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods for the 
different industries. Taking into account pre-crisis debt variables, one can 
conclude that conglomerates, construction, and services were exposed to 
the highest levels of financial vulnerability. Together with mining, they had 
the greatest levels of foreign-denominated debt with respect to total debt; as 
well, construction enterprises possessed the utmost debt ratio (almost 50%), 
followed closely by conglomerates and services sectors.  
 
The less vulnerable industries (regarding debt indicators) were mining and 
commerce. The mining industry, although it had an important percentage of 
its debt in foreign-denominated currency, also had the lowest debt ratio 
(followed by telecommunications and commerce). Similarly, even though 
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commercial business had 84% of its debt as short-term debt, its level of 
foreign-denominated debt (with respect to total debt) was the lowest of all 
industries. This is the main reason why this sector was one of the few that 
after the crisis was able to reduce its debt ratio.  
 
Due to the large amounts of dollar-denominated debt, when the peso 
devaluation took place, interest payments immediately increased. The 
interest payment coverage indicator declined over 20% for 
telecommunications, construction, and services. It is interesting to note, 
however, that this indicator increased by 97% for the mining industry, 
which reflects a significant improvement (seven times) in its earnings 
during the crisis period. This was possible mainly because mining exports 
increased by 115% during this time. During the post-crisis period, 
manufacturing, commerce, construction, and services revealed important 
progress in the interest payment coverage indicator, which relates to 
governmental policies to temporarily postpone interest payments. In fact, 
this indicator increased thirteen times for the services’ industry; this was the 
worst performing sector during the crisis and therefore the one that needed 
governmental aid the most.  
 
The services industry presents the worst financial and operational results 
during and after the crisis period. Leverage increased more than 5 times 
during the crisis, earnings declined by 187% during the same period, and it 
exhibited negative returns on assets and on equity during both the crisis and 
post-crisis periods. In addition, prior to the crisis, values for ratios such as 
short-term assets / short-term debt, exports/total sales, and internal 
financing were much lower than for the majority of industries.  
 
In contrast, the mining industry was the most robust sector prior to the 
crisis. It had comparatively the highest percentage of sales in foreign 
markets23, which made it less vulnerable to internal shocks compared to 
other industries. Instead of being injured by the crisis it benefited, as its 
operational margin, earnings, return on assets and return on equity 
                                                 
23 Not only it had the highest exports/sales ratio, but also the price of its goods is 
determined in international markets. 
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increased during that period. Other strengths it possessed prior to the crisis 
that helped to survive were its relatively high internal financing and 
liquidity indicators24. 
 
Taking into consideration the behavior of earnings, it can be argued that 
manufacturing, conglomerates, and commerce also benefited during the 
crisis. During this period, their earnings increased with 90%, 62%, and 
26%, respectively. Both conglomerates and the manufacturing sector 
showed increases in operational margin (although this is significant only for 
manufacturing), which could be seen as a strategy to overcome the crisis, 
assuming low price-elasticity for its goods. An alternative and perhaps 
more accurate explanation for the rise in the operational margin is that the 
peso’s devaluation was such that firms in these industries could increase 
both the operational margin and exports. During the crisis period exports 
grew on average 104% for the manufacturing industry, and 180% for 
conglomerates.  
 
Together with mining and construction, conglomerates and manufacturing 
had the highest exports / total sales ratio prior to the crisis, which made 
them less vulnerable. Manufacturing also showed one of the highest interest 
payment coverage ratios (after commerce), and had adequate levels of 
internal financing and liquidity. As for conglomerates, this is the most 
diversified industry, which is an effective but expensive way (in terms of 
administrative and operative costs) to reduce risk. Commerce, on the other 
hand, was not only the least indebted industry together with mining and 
telecommunications, but it also had the lowest level of dollar-denominated 
debt. 
 
The only industries that were seriously wounded during the crisis were 
services and to a lesser degree telecommunications. As for the 
telecommunications industry, prior to the crisis it possessed one of the 
lowest exports / total sales ratios (together with commerce and services). 
                                                 
24 These results for services and the mining industry support the second hypothesis on the 
relationship between financial crises and corporate performance in East Asia (e.g., 
Claessens et al., 2000). 
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Therefore, the internal demand decline it suffered (as seen by the inventory 
rotation indicator that increased by 56 days) had a negative effect on its 
earnings, which declined 16% during the crisis period.  
 
Taking into account the firms’ performance during and after the crisis, it 
seems that external markets played a major role in explaining the survival 
of these companies, followed by the capital structure.  
 
4.2.2 Econometric results for univariate series 
 
Columns 2 to 8 of tables A2 and A3 in the appendix show the industry 
results for univariate series, for the two-breaks model and gradual recovery 
model. In general, the estimates of b1 show the expected signs and are 
significant at a 20% confidence level. According to the first break point, 
apparently telecommunications and services were harmed at the time of the 
currency crisis. This is as expected, since prior to this event they had the 
lowest exports / total sales ratios25, making them more exposed than other 
industries to local macroeconomic conditions. The contrary occurred for the 
mining sector, as it did not depend as much as the rest on the Mexican 
economy26. Results show that the remaining industries were not 
significantly influenced by the crisis.  
 
On an industry basis, there are not many differences for the timing of the 
first break point. However, the sector that most reflected the official timing 
of the macroeconomic crisis was services, whose balance sheets 
deteriorated between the third quarters of 1994 and 1995. Once more this is 
an expected outcome, as services represents the most vulnerable industry 
prior to the crisis, with less flexibility to react once this event took place. 
 
When considering recovery in the two-breaks model, balance sheets for 
manufacturing, telecommunications, commerce, and services reveal 
                                                 
25 Excluding commerce. 
26 This provides evidence in favor of the first hypothesis on the relationship between 
financial crises and corporate performance in East Asia (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000).  In 
addition, as most of the mining sector assets were denominated in US dollars, this sector 
suffered less from exchange rate risk.  
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improvements, and the opposite occurs for the mining industry. Overall, the 
crisis episode was favorable for manufacturing and commerce, which were 
also the first to recover (as shown by ROA). This can be partly explained 
by their pre-crisis high interest payment coverage ratios; in addition, 
manufacturing exported an important percentage of its products, and 
commerce possessed relatively the lowest foreign-denominated debt in its 
debt structure.  
 
According to the two-breaks model, overall the crisis was harmful for 
telecommunications, construction, and services. With regard to 
construction, it had one of the greatest debt ratios prior to the crisis, and 
much of its debt was denominated in US dollars. Construction was the last 
industry to recover from the currency crisis, between the third quarter of 
1997 and the second quarter 1998. This coincides with the Mexican GNP’s 
recuperation during the third quarter 1997; it is not surprising for 
construction is especially sensitive to macroeconomic fluctuations. The 
gradual recovery model points out telecommunications being the only 
industry to be permanently (and negatively) influenced by the crisis. 
 
Finally, results show that conglomerates and mining did not benefit nor 
weakened from this episode. As for the mining sector, the initial boom it 
experienced from the devaluation was a temporary effect; regarding 
conglomerates, they were efficient reducing risk, as they represent the most 
diversified industry of all.  
 
4.3 Size results 
 
4.3.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
The last three columns of Table A1 in the appendix show the values of 
ratios when firms are grouped according to size. Regarding debt structures, 
at first glance it seems that prior to the crisis small companies were the least 
vulnerable. As they are less likely to obtain dollar denominated debt, the 
percentage of foreign debt to total debt was the lowest for all firms. 
However, it is also true that due to their small size and high-risk levels, they 
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have more difficulties in obtaining long-term credit. Their short-term debt 
represented more than 70% of their total debt, higher than for medium and 
large companies. Small firms also had the highest debt ratios for all periods 
considered, which reflects the importance of bank credit compared to other 
(cheaper) types of financing such as internal financing and trade credit.  
 
Prior to the crisis, large companies were less leveraged than smaller ones; 
this relationship changed during the crisis period, when small firms became 
the least leveraged. Looking at the leverage data and considering that small 
firms’ equity declined on average 16% during the time, there is evidence of 
an important credit crunch for small companies27. After the crisis leverage 
increased for small companies, however it remained lower than for other 
firms.  
 
Small firms were the most vulnerable companies prior to the crisis, as their 
exports represented less than 3% of their total sales during the pre-crisis 
period, their liquidity and internal financing indicators were lower than for 
larger firms, and they were facing negative returns on assets and on equity. 
Also, their operational margin was negative during the pre-crisis and crisis 
periods, which could reflect an aggressive sales strategy, sacrificing profit 
in order to gain liquidity and overcome the immediate difficulties.  
 
The higher returns on assets and on equity during the post-crisis era show 
that in general the crisis favored small firms. This can be attributed to the 
peso devaluation, which made possible a significant growth in exports, 
operational margin, and sales (as suggested by lower inventory rotation 
values). With respect to medium and large companies, there is no evidence 
of important changes in returns, even though for both types of firms, 
exports increased significantly (comparing the pre-crisis and post- crisis 
periods). A tentative explanation could be that sales declined considerably 
due to the internal demand cut, as shown by the increase in the number of 
days it took to sell the inventory and by reduced operational margin for 
large companies.  
                                                 
27 This provides evidence for the third hypothesis of the relationship between corporate 
performance and the East Asian financial crisis.   
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4.3.2 Econometric results for univariate series 
 
The last three columns of tables A2 and A3 in the appendix show the size 
results for univariate series, for the two-breaks model and gradual recovery 
model. In general, the estimates of b1 show the expected signs and are 
significant at a 20% confidence level. The first break for both small and 
medium firms took place between the fourth quarter of 1993 and the first 
quarter of 1996. However, contrary to medium enterprises, small 
companies reveal for the most part balance sheets’ improvements. As for 
large companies, the first break came about later in time: between the third 
quarter 1994 and the same quarter 1995. Therefore, one could argue that 
medium enterprises were financially and operationally unhealthy before the 
devaluation occurred, partly infecting large companies, and providing some 
evidence for the corporate roots of macroeconomic crises’ hypothesis28.  
 
Crisis propagation between medium and large firms can be explained by the 
operational margin and inventory rotation. A tentative explanation is that, 
due to competition between companies and goods’ substitutability, two 
quarters after medium firms’ operational margin declined (95.1) large firms 
experienced the same. But the effects do not end here, as during 1996 large 
firms’ poorer performance seems to have had consequences on medium 
companies. Trade links might have influenced this spreading, as medium 
enterprises experienced an increment in their inventory rotation three 
quarters later (during 96.1) than larger firms. As large companies were 
suffering from a demand cut, their claims for medium firms’ products 
declined as well, in part increasing the latter’s inventory rotation. Small 
firms were the first to manifest a rise in this indicator, however almost two 
years before the rest. 
 
With respect to recovery dates, there are no significant differences between 
medium and large companies (there is just a one-period lag in favor of 
medium firms). According to the two-breaks model, overall the currency 
                                                 
28 It is worthwhile to notice that large companies’ balance sheets also weakened before the 
macroeconomic crisis took place. 
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crisis was beneficial for small companies and prejudicial for large ones; 
medium enterprises seem to be in between, since they were not favored nor 
damaged by this crisis. With respect to the gradual recovery model, the 
crisis was beneficial for small firms, and had a neutral effect on medium 
and large companies.  
 
4.4 Robustness check: Principal components analysis 
 
To examine the possibility of joint structural change in multiple ratios, and 
also simplify the study, a principle components analysis is conducted. Four 
components are constructed, which relate to the different kinds of ratios 
under study: 1) Performance (ROE, ROA, and OM), 2) Solvency (LEV and 
STA/STD), 3) Operational (BPR, IR, and X/Sales), and 4) Financial (DR, 
IPC, LIQ, FD/TD, FSTD/TFD, and IF). The analysis is applied to 
normalized variables, such that they all have mean 0 and variance 1. The 
results for normalized variables are more meaningful because the variance 
of the original variables differs widely across ratios. The first principal 
component is considered, which in general explains more than 60% of the 
variance. For each component the gradual recovery model in (2) is 
estimated29. Results are shown in table A4 in the appendix. 
 
Consistent with the prior analysis, results show that the overall effect of the 
crisis is positive for small firms and negative for telecommunications. In 
general the currency crisis did not deteriorate nor improved firms’ balance 
sheets; however, there are negative effects on solvency and operational 
ratios (see figures 2 and 3). In contrast, financial and performance ratios 
were not seriously influenced by the crisis (see figures 1 and 4). In fact, 
there seems to be a significant smooth recovery of the financial component 
after the crisis, which relates to the favorable outcome of interest payment 
coverage. As for the performance component, due to the rise in exports, 
returns did not strongly declined.  
 
                                                 
29 Only results from the gradual recovery model are considered, as it seems that 
corporations smoothly recovered from the crisis. 
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Regarding the break date, it seems there are two crisis effects: the first one 
is a negative effect taking place at the time of the currency crisis (94.4), and 
the second one is a positive effect during the third quarter 1995. All 
components were damaged during the crisis era, except for financial ratios, 
due to the great increment of interest payment coverage early 1995. 
Afterwards, operational ratios continued deteriorating, solvency ratios 
adjusted to a slightly lower level than prior to the crisis, and there was 
improvement in performance indicators. However, it is not possible to 
establish a single recovery date, as it took place gradually between 1995 
and 2000. Nevertheless, the last industries to recover were 
telecommunications and services, which as stated in previous sections, were 
most seriously wounded by the crisis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: 
Performance 
component 
Figure 2: 
Solvency 
component 
Figure 3: 
Operational 
component 
Figure 1: 
Financial 
component 
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5  CONCLUSION 
 
The causality between the 1994 Mexican currency crisis and corporates’ 
performance is mixed. Although this crisis had immediate negative 
consequences even on surviving companies (which are reflected in ratios 
such as foreign short – term debt / total foreign debt and inventory 
rotation), and a positive direct effect on exports, it is also true that most 
financial indicators weakened right before this episode took place. During 
the third quarter of 1994, ratios such as the debt ratio, foreign debt / total 
debt, interest payment coverage, and short-term assets over short – term 
debt were deteriorated. This could be attributed to a prior decline in internal 
financing and return on assets, for which firms increased their dollar claims 
(being these less expensive than peso loans). Therefore, there is some 
evidence for corporate roots of the Mexican currency crisis, as firms were 
demanding more dollar-denominated debt. 
 
It is interesting to notice that overall, on an annual basis, investment rose 
during the third quarter of 1994.  During that time, large and medium firms’ 
total assets increased 5% and 14%, respectively, and only small firms 
experienced a 6% decline on this variable.  This supports the general belief 
that the 1994 crisis was a surprising event.  According to the pre-crisis 
period debt structure of firms, there is also no evidence on crisis 
anticipation; short-term debt and dollar denominated debt were high, and 
leverage actually increased during all periods.  The conspiracy explanation 
on how bigger firms survived the crisis due to privileged information and 
financing is not supported either, as results show that in general this crisis 
had a negative impact on big firms and a positive one on small companies.  
Nevertheless, this conclusion is not robust, as the sample of firms 
considered are the biggest ones in Mexico.  What can be interpreted from 
the data is that collusion between the government, companies, and other 
stakeholders had a significant impact on the survival of firms.  This is 
represented by governmental programs that delayed the payment of 
interests and an increase in the amount of days given to pay back for trade 
credit.   
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There is also some indication of propagation between firms. This effect is 
difficult to determine at an industry level; however, under a size approach it 
seems that medium and large companies could have influenced each other’s 
balance sheets. Spreading is better perceived through performance and 
operational ratios, such as the operational margin and inventory rotation, 
rather than financial and solvency ones.  
 
Summarizing, the analysis in this chapter provides evidence for multiple 
directions of the crisis’ cause and effect framework: firms’ decisions 
influenced the macroeconomic outcome, the currency crisis had negative 
impacts on companies’ balance sheets, and firms’ interconnections evolved 
in spreading between them. 
 
The principal components analysis points out that financial and 
performance ratios for surviving companies were not seriously influenced 
by the crisis, which relates to the favorable outcomes of interest payment 
coverage and exports. As a result of the significant rise in exports, the peso 
devaluation had a positive impact on financially strong companies. 
Furthermore, the lesser were the initial dependencies on the Mexican 
economy, the better the conditions for firms during the crisis, as revealed 
clearly by the mining sector. The last industries to recover were 
telecommunications and services, which were most seriously wounded by 
the crisis, as prior to this event they possessed the lowest exports / total 
sales ratios. According to this experience, conglomerates were efficient 
reducing currency risk, which might justify their existence in economically 
unstable countries. 
 
The Mexican firms´ experience during the 1994 macroeconomic crisis 
derives some corporate governance recommendations, which are crucial to 
avoid future calamities, as even in 2001 these companies showed several 
vulnerabilities. These suggestions are: 1) Reduce both the exchange rate 
and the debt mismatching; 2) Search for more external markets (not only 
the U.S) in order to diversify risk; 3) Increase social capital and savings, as 
well as selling of stocks, in order to depend less on bank credit; 4) Keep 
 
  Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance  
_________________________________________________________________ 
60 
liquidity indicators high, even though in the short-run earnings are being 
sacrificed.  
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6 APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A1 
General results for univariate series 
 All 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
LEV 
(times)            
Pre-crisis 0.8  0.9  0.7  0.7  1.1  0.8  0.9  0.61  1.2  1.0  0.8  
Crisis 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.2 5.9 1.1 0.72 0.0 1.0 1.1 
Post-
crisis 1.2
3 1.1 0.9 0.7 1.2 2.23 1.63 1.13 0.9 1.2 1.23 
DR (%)            
 
Pre-crisis 
 
41.71 
 
42.71 
 
35.51 
 
36.4 
 
49.91 
 
45.01 
 
46.51 
 
32.51 
 
44.51 
 
42.81 
 
41.61 
 
Crisis 
 
45.92 
 
44.6 
 
33.02 
 
35.6 
 
53.22 
 
78.92 
 
57.4 
 
37.52 
 
53.52 
 
47.1 
 
45.72 
Post-
crisis 
 
48.53 
 
44.3 
 
43.83 
 
35.5 
 
55.03 
 
61.03 
 
58.43 
 
47.63 
 
60.63 
 
44.9 
 
48.93 
LIQ (%)            
 
Pre-crisis 
 
46.01 
 
47.4 
 
25.51 
 
84.2 
 
36.61 
 
40.21 
 
56.4 
 
59.01 
 
71.9 
 
61.0 
 
43.61 
Crisis 49.22 48.2 40.6 83.62 32.12 63.32 59.32 47.02 69.4 61.72 47.3 
Post-
crisis 
 
47.2 
 
46.6 
 
45.13 
 
74.53 
 
42.13 
 
44.3 
 
47.33 
 
35.53 
 
69.4 
 
48.23 
 
46.93 
FD/TD 
(%) 
           
 
Pre-crisis 
 
52.91 
 
50.01 
 
47.31 
 
11.71 
 
66.81 
 
68.4 
 
64.01 
 
69.21 
 
29.2 
 
40.01 
 
54.91 
 
Crisis 
 
62.82 
 
62.12 
 
58.62 
 
18.72 
 
75.5 
 
69.22 
 
68.5 
 
77.22 
 
25.62 
 
54.22 
 
64.22 
Post-
crisis 
 
53.8 
 
52.2 
 
41.83 
 
14.8 
 
73.13 
 
49.13 
 
66.0 
 
69.0 
 
20.43 
 
46.33 
 
55.2 
FSTD/ 
TFD (%) 
           
 
Pre-crisis 
 
41.41 
 
44.5 
 
18.71 
 
69.81 
 
30.2 
 
34.61 
 
59.6 
 
52.71 
 
65.9 
 
57.4 
 
38.91 
Crisis 44.7 45.8 31.9 82.52 26.32 58.42 59.12 38.3 66.7 54.72 43.2 
Post-
crisis 
 
43.2 
 
47.1 
 
29.9  
 
79.13 
 
42.33 
 
40.1 
 
41.93 
 
31.63 
 
66.3 
 
46.63 
 
42.53 
IPC 
(times)            
Pre-crisis 9.8  13.6  9.81  36.1  2.51  1.51  1.5  2.31  8.81  6.11  10.3  
 
Crisis 
 
8.82 
 
13.42 
 
7.22 
 
38.62 
 
1.92 
 
0.02 
 
1.7 
 
4.62 
 
3.72 
 
4.62 
 
9.42 
Post-
crisis 
 
11.53 
 
18.13 
 
4.83 
 
50.73 
 
4.23 
 
12.93 
 
2.4 
 
1.33 
 
10.3 
 
10.63 
 
11.73 
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Table A1 
General results for univariate series (continue) 
 All 
FIRMS 
    
      
      
2.8 3.8 4.6 5.1 
Crisis 5.5 5.7 2.5 29.4 2.5 1.32 3.0 3.8 5.42 4.7 5.6 
Post-
crisis 6.0 6.3 2.6 26.4 3.2 2.9 3.2 2.8 9.2
3 4.5 6.2 
IR (days)            
Pre-crisis 4.41 2.4 1 4.1 7.3 5.3 2.6 2.8 9.0 4.8 4.31 
 
Crisis 
 
16.4 
 
2.8 
 
62.32 
 
4.4 
 
6.1 
 
2 3.1 
 
3.6  2
 
6.82 
 
6.02 
 
17.9 
Post-
crisis 
 
19.03 
 
3.2 
 
78.13 
 
4.0 
 
5.2 
 
7.63 
 
3.1 
 
4.7  3
 
4.83 7.33 
 
20.93 
X/Sales 
(%) 
           
 
Pre-crisis 
 
12.51 12.11 
 
11.51 
 
0.01 
 
12.5  1
 
2.3 
 
15.11 
 
34.11 
 
2.51 
 
9.7
 
13.01 
 
Crisis 
 
25.2 
 
21.5 
 
16.42 
 
0.22 
 
44.1 
 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
IF 
(times)  
   
Pre-crisis 2.6   1 2.31 2.21 1.91 1.61 1.01 1.11 16.31 1.6 7.71 1.8 
Crisis 2.22 2.6 2.72 2.5 1.32 0.42 0.9 5.1  2 1.5 4.12 1.92 
Post-
crisis 1.7
3 2.4 1.63 2.2 1.43 3.43 0.93 1.4  3 1.5 2.63 1.63 
STA/ 
STD 
(times) 
  
   
   
Pre-crisis 2.21 1.9 3.11 1.4 1.61 1.51 1.31 7.7 1.61 3.81 2.01 
Crisis 1.7 1.82 2.2 1.32 1.32 0.62 1.12 3.1 2.22 1.62 1.7 
Post-
crisis 1.8
3 2.13 2.03 1.63 1.23 1.13 1.23 2.9  3 1.93 2.33 1.73 
BPR 
(days)      
Pre-crisis 5.0 5.4 2.3 22.0 2.2 1.3 4.3 
3 
6.6
 
4.5
 
 
1 
4.22 
 
28.7 
 
47.3 
 
10.3 
 
19.52 
 
26.1 
Post-
crisis 
 
24.63 
 
21.63 
 
10.0 
 
0.73 
 
43.53 
 
3 
 
30.23 
 
48.03 
 
9.73 
 
17.43 
 
25.83 
OM (%)            
 
Pre-crisis 
 
18.5 
 
8.51 
 
37.01 
 
4.01 
 
24.81 
 
24.31 
 
13.1 
 
7.71 
 
-5.5 
 
8.8 
 
21.0 
 
Crisis 
 
17.4 
 
14.0 
 
29.42 
 
2.82 
 
19.42 
 
-0.7 
 
13.9 
 
21.92 
 
-1.1 
 
8.5 
 
20.2 
Post-
crisis 
 
17.03 
 
14.03 
 
31.93 
 
5.03 
 
22.33 
 
10.73 
 
12.2 
 
10.2 
 
0.13 
 
12.43 
 
19.33 
ROA (%)            
Pre-crisis 3.8 1.9 8.0 2.9 3.9 2.61 2.7 1.61 -0.3 2.1 4.1 
Crisis 4.1 3.3 5.6 4.0 4.0 -2.6 3.7 6.72 0.12 2.0 4.4 
Post-
crisis 3.6 3.6
3 5.9 4.5 3.2 -0.4 2.9 2.1 2.13 3.4 3.7 
8.8
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Table A1 
General results for univariate series (continue) 
 All 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
ROE (%)            
Pre-crisis 6.2 2.7 11.7 4.0 8.3 4.6 4.5 3.31 -7.7 1.8 6.9 
Crisis 5.6 3.2 7.9 6.5 10.3 -34.0 7.8 10.62 -3.12 3.6 6.6 
Post-
crisis 6.6 6.2 10.5 7.8
3 6.3 -0.5 6.4 2.8 10.43 4.9 6.8 
This table refers to the average values for the 14 ratios under consideration, during the pre-crisis (93.1 till 94.3), crisis 
(94.4 till 97.3), and post-crisis (97.4 till 01.1) periods. Firms are grouped according to their industry and relative size. 
1/ Pre-crisis and crisis values are significantly different at 10% confidence level. 
2/ Crisis and post-crisis values are significantly different at 10% confidence level. 
3/ Pre-crisis and post-crisis values are significantly different at 10% confidence level. 
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Table A2 
Two-breaks model: timing and effect 
  
 First break-point 
 ALL 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
LEV  
 
95.3/  - 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
95.3/
- 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
95.2/+ 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
95.3/- 
 
DR  
 
94.3/  - 
 
96.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
   NO 
 
94.3/ - 
 
94.4/ 
- 
 
94.3/- 
 
NO 
 
94.4/ - 
 
NO 
 
94.3/ - 
 
LIQ  
 
95.3/  - NO 
 
95.3/
- 
 
NO 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.3/ 
- 
 
94.3/ - 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.4/+ 
 
NO 
 
95.3/ - 
 
FD/TD  
 
94.3/  - 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
94.4/ 
- 
 
93.4/ 
- 
 
94.3/ - 
 
95.1/ 
- 
 
95.1/ - 
 
93.4/  
-    
 
93.4/+ 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
94.4/ - 
 
FSTD/
TFD  
 
95.1/  - NO 
 
96.4/ 
- 
 
93.4/ 
- 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.3/ 
- 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.3/+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
95.1/ - 
 
IPC  
 
94.3/  - 
 
96.2/
+  
 
94.4/ 
- 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
95.1/+ 
 
94.1/ - 
 
NO 
 
94.3/ - 
 
IF  
 
93.4/  - 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
94.3/ - 
 
NO 
 
94.4/ - 
 
93.4/ - 
 
NO 
 
93.4/ 
- 
 
95.1/+ 
 
STA/ 
STD  
 
94.3/  - 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
95.1/ 
- 
 
93.4/ 
- 
 
94.3/ - 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
94.3/ - 
 
93.4/ - 
 
96.1/+ 
 
93.4/ 
- 
 
94.3/ - 
 
BPR  
 
NO 
 
95.4/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
95.2/ 
- 
 
95.4/ - 
 
NO 
 
93.4/+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
95.2/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
IR  
 
95.2/  - 
 
95.4/ 
- 
 
95.2/ 
- 
 
95.2/ 
- 
 
94.4/+ 
 
94.3/
+ 
 
94.4/ - 
 
94.1/+ 
 
93.4/ - 
 
96.1/ 
- 
 
95.2/ - 
 
X/ 
Sales  
 
94.4/  + 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
94.4/+ 
 
NO 
 
94.4/+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
94.4/+ 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
94.4/ + 
 
OM  
 
95.4/  - 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
94.4/ 
- 
 
95.1/ 
- 
 
95.1/ - 
 
95.3/ 
- 
 
94.1/+ 
 
94.4/+ 
 
94.1/+ 
 
95.1/ 
- 
 
95.3/ - 
 
ROA  
 
94.1/  - 
 
94.1/ 
- 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
94.1/ 
- 
 
96.4/ - 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
95.4/+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
95.4/+ 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
95.1/ + 
 
ROE  
 
NO 
 
94.1/ 
- 
 
93.4/ 
- 
 
94.2/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
95.3/ 
- 
 
95.4/+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
94.3/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
 
Interval   
/ sign 
 
 
93.4- 
95.4/- 
 
 
94.1-
96.4/0 
 
 
93.4- 
96.4/ -   
 
 
93.4-
95.4/0 
 
 
93.4-    
96.4/0 
 
 
94.3- 
95.3/ -  
 
 
93.4- 
95.4/0 
 
 
93.4- 
95.3/+   
 
 
93.4- 
96.1/+ 
 
 
93.4- 
96.1/ - 
 
 
94.3-
95.3/- 
            
Recovery break-point 
 ALL 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
LEV  
 
96.3/  + 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.2/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
96.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
96.2/  - 
 
97.3/ 
- 
 
96.3/  + 
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Table A2 
Two-breaks model: timing and effect (continue) 
Recovery break-point 
 ALL 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
DR  
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
LIQ  
 
97.3/  + 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.3/
+ 
 
97.3/+ 
 
NO 
 
97.3/  - 
 
NO 
 
97.3/  + 
 
FD/TD  
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
98.1/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.2/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
FSTD/
TFD  
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
96.1/
+ 
 
98.2/ - 
 
97.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
IPC  
 
95.4/  + 
 
NO 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.4/ 
- 
 
97.1/  + 
 
NO 
 
95.4/  + 
 
IF  
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.3/+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
STA/ 
STD 
 
NO 
 
96.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
96.2/
+ 
 
NO 
 
97.4/
+ 
 
97.2/+ 
 
NO 
 
97.1/  - 
 
97.2/
+ 
 
NO 
 
BPR  
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
96.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
96.4/
+ 
 
NO 
 
IR  
 
97.2/  + 
 
NO 
 
96.4/
+ 
 
96.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
97.2/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
96.1/ 
- 
 
94.4/  + 
 
NO 
 
97.2/  + 
 
X/ 
Sales  
 
NO 
 
95.4/ 
- 
 
97.4/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
OM  
 
96.4/  + 
 
NO 
 
98.2/
+ 
 
96.4/
+ 
 
97.4/+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
95.4/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
96.1/
+ 
 
NO 
 
ROA  
 
95.1/  + 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
NO 
 
NO 
 
97.4/ - 
 
97.4/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
97.4/  - 
 
ROE  
 
NO 
 
96.1/
+ 
 
NO 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
NO 
 
96.3/
+ 
 
96.4/ - 
 
97.4/ 
- 
 
NO 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
NO 
 
Interval 
/ sign 
 
 95.1- 
97.3/  + 
 
95.1- 
96.3/+ 
 
95.4- 
98.2/+ 
 
95.1- 
97.2/+ 
 
97. 3- 
98.2/0   
 
96.3- 
97.4/+ 
 
96.4- 
97.4/0 
 
95.4- 
97.4/ - 
 
94.4- 
97.3/  0 
 
95.3- 
97.3/+ 
 
95.4- 
97.4/  + 
Overall effect 
 Average Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
LEV  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
DR  
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
LIQ  
 
0 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
- 
 
FD/TD  
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
FSTD/
TFD  
 
-  0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
- 
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Table A2 
Two-breaks model: timing and effect (continue) 
Overall effect 
 Average Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
IPC  
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
IF  
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
STA/ 
STD 
 
 
- + 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
BPR  
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
IR  
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
X/ 
Sales  
 
+ + 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
OM  
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
ROA  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
ROE  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
Overall 
effect 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
- 
This table deals with initial breaking points and recovery dates (two-breaks model), for each of the 14 ratios under consideration.  
No significant presence of breaking points is described with a NO.  Positive (negative) effects on balance sheets are shown with a 
+ (-) sign.  Considering all 14 ratios, no predominating effects (70% or more) are described with a 0. The overall effect of the 
crisis is identified according to the sign and magnitude of the first and second breaking points (b1 and b2) for each individual 
ratio.  The null hypothesis b1 = -b2, which implies that the ratio Yt  returns to its pre-crisis level after recovery occurs, has been 
tested using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent version of the Wald test (10% significance level).   
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Table A3 
Gradual recovery model: timing and effect  
 Breaking point 
 ALL 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
LEV  
 
95.3/- 
 
93.4/
- 
 
93.3/
- 
 
95.1/
- 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.3/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.3/+ 
 
95.1/
- 
 
95.3/- 
 
DR 
 
94.4/- 
 
93.4/
- 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.1/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.3/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
LIQ  
 
95.3/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.3/- 
 
93.3/+ 
 
93.3/
+ 
 
95.1/- 
 
95.2/
- 
 
93.4/+ 
 
FD/TD  
 
95.1/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.1/
- 
 
93.4/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
95.2/- 
 
95.2/- 
 
93.3/
- 
 
93.3/+ 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.1/- 
 
FSTD/
TFD  
 
95.2/- 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
95.3/
- 
 
94.1/
- 
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.3/- 
 
93.3/+ 
 
93.3/
+ 
 
93.4/+ 
 
93.4/
+ 
 
95.2/- 
 
IPC  
 
95.1/- 
 
95.1/
- 
 
95.1/
- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.1/- 
 
94.1/- 
 
95.1/- 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
94.2/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.1/- 
 
IF  
 
93.4/- 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
95.1/- 
 
93.4/
- 
 
95.3/+ 
 
93.3/
+ 
 
95.2/+ 
 
STA/ 
STD  
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.2/
- 
 
94.1/
- 
 
93.4/+ 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
93.3/
- 
 
95.3/+ 
 
93.3/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
BPR  
   
  95.3/- 
 
94.2/
+ 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
95.3/
- 
 
94.4/+ 
 
94.3/+ 
 
94.1/+ 
 
93.4/
- 
 
94.4/+ 
 
95.3/
- 
 
95.2/- 
 
IR  
 
95.3/- 
 
95.1/
- 
 
95.3/
- 
 
95.3/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/+ 
 
94.4/+ 
 
93.3/
+ 
 
94.2/- 
 
93.3/
- 
 
95.3/- 
 
X/ 
Sales  
 
93.4/+ 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
93.4/+ 
 
94.2/- 
 
95.1/+ 
 
93.3/
+ 
 
93.3/- 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
93.4/+ 
 
OM  
 
95.1/+ 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
95.1/
- 
 
95.1/
- 
 
95.2/- 
 
95.3/- 
 
93.3/+ 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
94.2/+ 
 
95.3/
- 
 
95.3/- 
 
ROA  
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
93.4/
+ 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.2/+ 
 
94.1/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.3/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
ROE  
 
94.4/- 
 
94.2/
- 
 
94.1/
- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
95.2/+ 
 
95.3/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
95.1/- 
 
94.4/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
Interval 
/ sign 
 
 
93.4- 
95.3/ - 
 
 
93.4-
95.3/0 
 
 
93.3-
95.3/0 
 
 
93.4-
95.3/- 
 
 
93.4-
95.2/0 
 
 
94.1-
95.3/- 
 
 
93.3-
95.2/0 
 
 
93.3-
95.2/0 
 
 
93.3- 
95.3/0 
 
 
93.3-
95.3/- 
 
 
93.4- 
95.3/- 
 τ
2 
 ALL 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
LEV  
 
96.4/+ 
 
00.1/
- 
 
00.3/
- 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
94.4/- 
 
96.4/+ 
 
00.3/- 
 
99.3/
- 
 
96.2/- 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
96.4/+ 
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Table A3 
Gradual recovery model: timing and effect (continue) 
τ
2 
 ALL 
FIRMS 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
DR  
 
00.1/- 
 
00.1/
- 
 
00.3/
- 
 
00.1/
- 
 
94.4/- 
 
98.1/+ 
 
96.1/- 
 
99.3/
- 
 
98.3/- 
 
00.1/
- 
 
00.1/- 
 
LIQ 
 
97.3/+ 
 
00.1/
+ 
 
95.3/
- 
 
99.4/
+ 
 
98.3/- 
 
98.4/+ 
 
97.3/+ 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
95.3/+ 
 
00.2/
+ 
 
95.1/- 
 
FD/TD  
 
99.2/+ 
 
99.3/
+ 
 
98.1/
+ 
 
98.4/
+ 
 
00.1/+ 
 
97.3/+ 
 
99.3/+ 
 
99.3/
+ 
 
96.1/+ 
 
99.4/
+ 
 
99.2/+ 
 
FSTD/
TFD  
 
99.1/+ 
 
99.4/
- 
 
99.2/
+ 
 
96.2/
+ 
 
     
 
      
       
96.2/
+ 
 
00.2/- 
 
ROA 
 
95.1/+ 
 
95.1/
+ 
 
94.1/
- 
 
95. 
1/+ 
 
97.1/- 
 
99.2/+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
98.1/
- 
 
99.2/+ 
 
96.1/
+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
ROE  
 
95.1/+ 
 
96.2/
+ 
 
00.3/
+ 
 
95.2/
+ 
 
98.1/- 
 
96.4/+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
98.1/
- 
 
00.3/+ 
 
95.3/
+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
Interval 
/ sign 
 
94.4– 
00.3 / 0 
 
95.1-
00.3/0 
 
94.1-
00.3/0 
 
95.1-
00.1/+ 
 
94.4-
00.1/0 
 
96.4-
99.2/+ 
 
95.1-
00.3/0 
 
94.4-
99.3/0 
 
94.4-
00.3/0 
 
93.4-
00.3/0 
 
94.4- 
00.3/0 
Overall effect 
 Average Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
LEV  
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
DR  
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
LIQ  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
FD/TD  
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
99.2/- 
 
98.1/+ 
 
97.3/+ 
 
95.4/
+ 
 
00.1/- 
 
97.1/
+ 
 
99.1/+ 
IPC  95.3/+ 99.4/
+ 
95.3/
+ 
96.4/
+ 
 
98.4/+ 
 
98.1/+ 
 
95.2/+ 
 
97.4/
- 
 
97.4/+ 
 
97.3/
+ 
 
95.3/+ 
 
IF  
 
99.4/- 
 
00.1/
- 
00.2/
- 
 
99.4/
- 
 
97.2/+ 
 
97.4/+ 
 
00.1/- 
 
96.2/
- 
 
00.2/- 
 
93.4/
- 
 
00.1/- 
 
STA/ 
STD 
 
00.1/- 
 
96.4/
+ 
 
00.1/
- 
 
96.3/
+ 
 
94.4/- 
 
97.4/+ 
 
97.2/+ 
 
99.2/
- 
 
98.1/- 
 
94.1/
- 
 
00.1/- 
BPR  00.3/- 00.3/
- 
95.1/
- 
96.3/
+ 
96.2/- 
 
97.4/- 
 
00.1/- 
 
97.2/
+ 
 
98.1/- 
 
97.2/
+ 
 
00.2/- 
 
IR  
 
00.3/+ 
 
99.3/
- 
 
96.4/
+ 
 
96.2/
+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
96.4/- 
 
95.1/- 
 
96.2/
- 
 
94.4/+ 
 
96.2/
- 
 
00.3/+ 
 
X/ 
Sales 
 
94.4/+ 
 
96.1/
- 
 
97.4/
- 
 
99.3/
+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
97.1/+ 
 
00.1/+ 
 
94.4/
+ 
 
95.1/+ 
 
00.3/
- 
 
94.4/+ 
OM  95.2/- 99.1/
- 
98.2/
+ 
98.4/
+ 
97.4/+ 97.1/+ 
 
99.4/- 
 
98.1/
- 
 
00.2/+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
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Table A3 
Gradual recovery model: timing and effect (continue) 
Overall effect 
 Average Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large 
 
FSTD/
TFD  
 
0  
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
IPC  
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
IF  
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
STA/ 
STD 
 
-  + 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
BPR  
 
- 
 
0 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0 
 
- 
 
IR  
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
0 
 
X/ 
Sales  
 
+  + 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
OM  
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
ROA  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
ROE  
 
0 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
Overall 
effect 
 
0 
 
0 
 
- 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
This table deals with the first breaking point and half-through recovery dates (τ 2 ), according to the gradual recovery model, for  
each of the 14 ratios under consideration.  For this model, the first break point is bounded between 1993 and 1995. This has 
 been done since the two-breaks model shows that balance sheets deteriorated between the fourth quarters of 1993 and 1995.   
Positive (negative) effects on balance sheets are shown with a + (-) sign.  Considering all 14 ratios, no predominating effects 
 (70% or more) are described with a 0.  The overall effect of the crisis is identified according to the sign and magnitude  
of the first breaking point and τ 2 (b1 and b2) for each individual ratio.  The null hypothesis b1 = -b2, which implies that 
 the ratio Yt  returns to its pre-crisis level after recovery occurs, has been tested using the heteroskedasticity and 
 autocorrelation consistent version of the Wald test (10% significance level).   
- 
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Table A4 
Principal components analysis  
Gradual recovery model 
   
Break point date and sign 
 All 
Firms 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large Mode Inter 
 
Fin. 
ratios 
 
 
95.1/- 95.3/+ 
 
 
95.3/+ 
 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
93.4/+ 
 
 
95.3/- 
 
 
93.3/+ 
 
 
93.4/+ 
 
 
93.3/+ 
 
 
95.1/- 
 
 
94.1/+ 
 
 
95.3/+ 
 
93.3
-
95.3
/+ 
 
Solv 
ratio 
 
 
94.4/- 95.3/+ 
 
 
95.3/- 
 
 
95.1/- 
 
 
93.4/+ 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
93.3/- 
 
 
95.3/+ 
 
 
93.4/- 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
94.4/-, 
95.3/+ 
 
93.3
-
95.3
/- 
 
 
Oper 
ratios 
 
 
 
93.4/- 
 
 
94.4/+ 
 
 
 
95.3/- 
 
 
 
95.3/- 
 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
 
94.4/+ 
 
 
 
95.1/- 
 
 
 
93.4/- 
 
 
 
93.3/- 
 
 
 
95.1/- 
 
 
 
93.4/- 
 
 
 
95.1/- 
 
93.3
-
95.3
/- 
 
 
Perf. 
ratios 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
 
95.2/+ 
 
 
 
95.1/- 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
 
95.2/+ 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4
-
95.2
/- 
 
Mode 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/0 
95.3/+ 
 
95.3/0 
 
95.1/0 
 
93.4/+ 
 
94.4/0 
 
94.4/- 
 
93.4/0 
 
93.3/0 
 
95.1/- 
 
94.4/- 
 
94.4/-, 
95.3/+ 
 
 
 In
te
rv
al
 
 
 
 
93.4-
95.1/ - 
 
94.4-
95.3/+ 
 
 
 
94.4-
95.3/- 
 
 
 
94.4-
95.3/- 
 
 
 
93.4-
95.2/+ 
 
 
 
94.4-
95.3/- 
 
 
 
93.3-
95.1/- 
 
 
 
93.3-
95.1/0 
 
 
 
93.3-
95.3/+ 
 
 
 
93.4-
95.1/- 
 
 
 
93.4-
94.4/- 
 
 
 
94.4-
95.3/0 
 
93.3
-
95.3
/- 
τ
2 and sign 
 All 
Firms 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large Mode Inter 
Fin. 
ratios 
 
00.3/+ 
 
00.1/- 
 
99.3/- 
 
99.4/- 
 
98.3/- 
 
97.4/+ 
 
98.1/+ 
 
95.4/+ 
 
00.3/+ 
 
97.2/+ 
 
00. 3/- 
 
00.3/0 
 
95.4
-
00.3
/0 
 
Solv. 
ratios 
 
00.2/- 
 
00.1/- 
 
00.3/- 
 
95.3/+ 
 
94.4/- 
 
96.4/+ 
 
96.3/+ 
 
99.3/- 
 
97.3/- 
 
95.3/+ 
 
00.2/- 
 
95.3/+ 
 
94.4
-
00.3
/0 
 
Oper 
ratios 
 
 
95.2/- 
 
 
00.3/- 
 
 
97.3/+ 
 
 
96.2/+ 
 
 
97.4/- 
 
 
97.1/- 
 
 
00.1/- 
 
 
96.2/- 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
96.1/- 
 
 
95.2/- 
 
 
96.2/0 
 
95.1
-
00.3
/- 
 
Perf. 
ratios 
 
 
95.2/+ 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
00.3/+ 
 
 
95.2/+ 
 
 
97.3/- 
 
 
98.3/+ 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
98.1/- 
 
 
00.3/+ 
 
 
95.2/+ 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
 
95.1/+ 
 
95.1
-
00.3
/+ 
 
Mode 
 
95.2/0 
 
00.1/- 
 
00.3/0 
 
ALL/
+ 
 
ALL/- 
 
ALL/
+ 
 
ALL/
+ 
 
ALL/- 
 
00.3/+ 
 
ALL/
+ 
 
ALL/- 
 
ALL/
0 
 
 In
te
rv
al
 
 
 
 
95.2-
00.3/0 
 
 
 
95.1-
00.3/- 
 
 
 
97.3-
00.3/0 
 
 
 
95.2-
99.4/+ 
 
 
 
94.4-
98.3/- 
 
 
 
96.4-
98.3/+ 
 
 
 
95.1-
00.1/+ 
 
 
 
95.4-
99.3/- 
 
 
 
95.1-
00.3/+ 
 
 
 
95.2-
97.2/+ 
 
 
 
95.1-
00.3/- 
 
 
 
95.1-
00.3/0 
 
94.4
-
00.3
/0 
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Table A4 
Principal components analysis  
Gradual recovery model (continue) 
Overall effect 
 All 
Firms 
Man Tel Com Const Serv Congl Min Small Med Large Final 
effect 
 
 
Fin. 
ratios 
 
0 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
Solv. 
ratios 
 
- - 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
Oper 
ratios 
 
- 0 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
Perf. 
ratios 
 
0 + 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
Final 
effect 
 
0 0 
 
0 
 predominating effects (70% or m re) are described with a 0. The overall effect of the crisis is identified according to the sign and 
- 
 
0 
 
0 
  
0 
 
0 
 
+ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
This table refers to the principal components’ analysis (first principal component-gradual recovery model), for the four types of ratios under  
consideration.  Positive (negative) effects on balance sheets are shown with a + (-) sign.  Considering the four kinds of ratios, no 
o
 magnitude of the breakpoint and τ 2, for each ratio category.  The null hypothesis b1 = -b2 , which implies that the ratio Yt   
returns to its pre-crisis level after recovery occurs, has been tested using the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent version  
of the Wald test (10% significance level).   
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CHAPTER 4: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE DURING 
NORMAL AND CRISIS PERIODS: EVIDENCE FROM AN 
EMERGING MARKET PERSPECTIVE* 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Research linking firm performance and corporate governance structures has 
produced the consensus view that poor corporate governance is associated 
with lower operating performance and Tobin’s Q (see La Porta et al., 1999, 
and Klapper and Love, 2003, among others).  This is most evident during 
times of crises, as it is then when expropriation of stakeholders becomes 
more severe (see Mitton, 2002, and Kim and Lee, 2003).  Due to the 
circumstances, nervous investors take their money away from companies 
with poor governance, which further deteriorates profits and firm value (see 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998, and Johnson et al., 2000a).  In addition, the odds 
of bringing in claims increase.  This situation is worse in emerging markets, 
where external governance mechanisms (such as legal protection) are 
deficient.  
 
Nevertheless, there is still no consensus on the definition of “good” 
corporate governance arrangements.  The literature provides contradicting 
empirical results on the relationship between firm performance and 
corporate governance variables (particularly internal ones, such as family 
ownership, business group affiliation, and bank links).   These differences 
can be explained taking into account two important elements: the particular 
business environment faced by the companies (developed or emerging 
markets), and the period of time considered (times of crises or normal 
times).  Although several studies keep in mind either of these issues 
independently, we believe this research is one of the few to take into 
account both aspects at the same time.   
Related to emerging markets’ crisis periods, authors such as Mitton (2002) 
and Baek et al. (2004), show that family controlled firms perform better 
than others.  However, in normal times there is no significant relationship 
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between performance and family ownership, as confirmed by Ho and 
Williams (2003).  On the other hand, there is evidence from the literature 
that business groups favour firm performance in emerging market 
economies (see Khanna and Palepu, 2000); nevertheless, the advantages of 
having these types of networks decline as the economy develops (see Joh, 
S.W., 2003; Johnson et al., 2000b).  Finally, during times of crises bank 
links represent negative corporate governance schemes, especially for firms 
operating in emerging market economies (see Baek et al., 2004).  
Nonetheless, these associations tend to be positive during normal periods, 
as described by Castañeda (2005). 
 
We find significant differences in firm performance according to these 
corporate governance characteristics.  In general, bank links represent 
negative governance schemes, while having family ties, belonging to 
business groups, and being export-oriented constitute positive governance 
mechanisms.  Nonetheless, these conclusions are not robust during all 
This chapter examines the effects of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on performance during normal times and in times of crises, 
under an emerging market perspective.  Particularly, we consider the 
influence of corporate governance arrangements such as bank, business, 
and family ties on performance.  In addition, we argue that export-
orientation and exposure to external capital markets constitute another 
dimension of internal corporate governance mechanisms, and include them 
in the analysis.  Size of companies, productivity, foreign-denominated debt 
over total debt, cash flows over total assets, and leverage are employed as 
control variables.  We use as case study the period around the Mexican 
1995 currency crisis.  This crisis provides an excellent scenario for a natural 
experiment on corporate performance.  Unlike the Asian 1997 crisis, in 
which there is no agreement on the exact date when this event took place, in 
Mexico it is clear that the crisis began at the end of the year 1994 
(December 20th).  It is then possible to study differences in performance 
prior, during, and after the crisis, without committing a mistake on the 
event date.   
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periods.  For instance, during normal times having group affiliation 
weakens performance, while the contrary is found during the crisis period. 
2.1 Corporate Governance  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section two deals with theory and 
literature review on corporate governance, and concludes with the Mexican 
case.  Section three refers to the hypotheses and data used for this study, 
and presents descriptive statistics.  Section four shows econometric results 
on the relationship between performance and corporate governance 
variables.  Section five concludes.  
 
2 THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Corporate governance involves institutional arrangements intended to 
ensure that company stakeholders’ rights are not violated.  By stakeholders 
we refer to all outsiders involved in one way or another with the firm: 
equity holders, creditors, and other capital suppliers; employees, 
consumers, suppliers, and the government.  In the words of Kose and 
Senbet (1998, page 372), “Corporate governance deals with mechanisms by 
which stakeholders of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders 
and management such that their interests are protected”.  This relates to the 
agent-principal problem, as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Myers (1977). 
 
Traditionally, the literature mentions agency costs of equity and debt.  
Agency costs of equity occur when managers maximize objectives other 
than performance (such as empire-building strategies or maximization of 
wages), which are not in the interest of shareholders.  Agency costs of debt 
occur between equity and debt holders.  These refer to actions such as 
excessive dividend payments, asset substitution, underinvestment, 
monitoring and bonding (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Band, 1992).  
More recently, authors allude to agency costs in a broader way, which is 
centred in the figure of the stakeholder.  Then, any action against 
stakeholders’ interests carries a type of agency cost.   
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Agency costs can be diminished through different types of governance 
mechanisms.  Boubakri et al. (2005) classify these mechanisms as external 
and internal.  Based on this classification, we consider external governance 
mechanisms as those not directly controlled by a firm, such as the legal 
system, labour markets, and markets for corporate control.  These vary 
across countries, and the general view is that in this sense stakeholders are 
better protected in developed economies than in emerging markets.  
Authors such as La Porta et al. (2000) have studied differences in external 
corporate governance structures between nations, and how these 
mechanisms protect outsiders from insiders.  They have focused on the 
importance of the legal system to avoid expropriation of minority 
shareholders and creditors; expropriation dealing with the generation of 
private benefits by managers or large shareholders that are not shared by 
others.  Regulatory measures such as clear accounting and disclosure 
procedures, transparency, and efficient judicial systems to enforce investor 
protection have been widely discussed.  In addition, authors such as Marnet 
(2004) have focused on the importance of joint regulation and monitoring 
to reduce agency costs, allowing for some human irrationality.  Well-
functioning labour and takeover markets also permit alignment with 
stakeholders’ interests, as there is constant pressure for outside directors 
and managers who fear they can be substituted (see Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  Many of these external corporate governance mechanisms 
obviously function better in developed markets than in emerging markets. 
 
Internal governance mechanisms relate to those directly controlled by a 
company, including ownership structure, board composition, and exposure 
to international trade and financial markets.  We split ownership structure 
into three categories: ownership concentration, family ownership, and 
informal ownership.  Ownership concentration relates to the amount of 
control rights and power enforced by stockholders of a firm, being 
members of the same family or not.  By family ownership we mean the 
fraction of equity held by members of the same family.  Informal ownership 
relates to the power and control outsiders hold in a company by means of 
belonging to the same group (business or bank). 
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Regarding informal ownership, several authors have emphasized the 
positive governance effects of business groups, particularly diversified 
groups, in emerging economies.  As stated by Khanna and Palepu (1996), 
these networks support internal trade and financing, and ensure close 
monitoring of management.  The reputation issue is relevant in these 
transactions, which reduces the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems.  The same arguments can be used to explain the favourable 
effects of bank links on firm performance, as these institutions act as credit 
suppliers, manager monitors and financial advisors, and they can contribute 
with knowledge on the industry the company belongs to (see Hoshi et al., 
In countries with poor external governance mechanisms, agency problems 
are generally reduced by managers having more control of the firm (as 
described by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and more recently by Boubakri et 
al. (2005)).  Nevertheless, Tosi et al. (2003) have found that companies 
with a high degree of management control but dispersed ownership are 
more susceptible to corporate governance problems, as managers of these 
types of firms have less constraints to act according to their own interests.  
This view is shared by Bunkanwanicha et al. (2003), who conclude that 
concentrated ownership relates to better governance, as large shareholders 
have greater interest to have a firm running properly.  This implies a lower 
incentive to expropriate stakeholders and more control over management.  
The same argument can be expanded to family owned companies.  In these 
companies large shareholders, members of the board, and even 
management usually are related, which creates greater incentives to have 
the firm running well.  An example is shown by Kim (2005), who refers to 
Chaebol firms as having better productivity performance than companies 
with less family ownership concentration.  On the other hand, authors such 
as Baek et al. (2004) mention that high ownership concentration (especially 
in family hands) reduces firm performance, particularly during crisis 
episodes.  Under these firm value destruction circumstances, it becomes 
more attractive to expropriate minority shareholders.  And, if external 
governance mechanisms do not function properly, the odds for these types 
of actions increase, pushing firm performance further down. 
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1990, Kang and Shivdasani, 1995, and Kroszner and Strahan, 2001).  
However, other authors such as Kim and Lee (2003) and Baek et al. (2004) 
reveal that during emerging markets’ crisis periods, bankers act as 
accomplices instead of firm regulators (for instance, by providing credit to 
finance losses).  This effect can be seen as well between business group 
members.   
  
The other two internal governance mechanisms under consideration are 
board composition and exposure to international trade and financial 
markets.  Board composition relates to the number of board members and 
the organization of the board of directors.  Stakeholders´ protection differs 
according to board composition; for instance, small independent boards, 
where the CEO is not the president of the board, have many times been 
related to better alignment with stakeholders’ interests.  Authors such as 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Brickley et al. (1994), and Cotter et al. 
(1997) report that the presence of independent board members (those not 
related with the company itself) reduces agency costs between managers 
and shareholders.  This positive effect is more significant in firms where 
board members are substituted regularly, on the basis of firm performance.  
Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Yermack (1996), and Jensen (1993) mention that 
small boards are more efficient than big ones, as there is better 
communication among board members, which makes it is easier to take 
decisions.  Regarding the CEO duality, it has mostly been argued that the 
board of directors loses its monitoring function for companies where the 
CEO is also the president of the board (see Mangel and Singh, 1993, and 
Jensen, 1993). 
 
Exposure to international trade and financial markets are also important 
corporate governance variables, especially for firms operating in emerging 
markets.  As external governance mechanisms are weak in these types of 
countries, participation in international markets can imply better 
stakeholder protection.  For example, companies listed in the U.S. through 
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) must comply with US GAAP 
accounting procedures, and are subject to SEC laws that protect minority 
shareholders (see Klapper and Love, 2003, and La Porta et al., 2000).  In 
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addition, exporting firms must possess good reputation in order to trade and 
obtain credit from external markets.  Although the literature has mentioned 
ADRs as a means for better corporate governance schemes, to the best of 
our knowledge export-orientation as a governance mechanism has not been 
contemplated yet.   
 
2.2 The Mexican case 
 
On December 20th 1994, due to internal and external pressures, Mexican 
authorities were forced to liberalize the exchange rate regime.  Internally, 
Mexico faced an increasing current account deficit.  In addition, there was 
political instability due to the assassination of presidential candidate Luis 
Donaldo Colosio, together with a guerrilla conflict in the south of Mexico 
(Chiapas).  Externally, U.S. interest rates were increasing.  Jointly these 
factors caused substantial capital outflows, which evolved in a shift from a 
fixed exchange rate regime to a floating one, and the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso.  The year 1995 started with the devaluation of the peso of 
around 100%, inflation of more than 50%, and a significant increase in 
interest rates.  Real GDP declined 10% during this year.  Many companies 
and banks went bankrupt, as not only did their debts increase in peso terms, 
but they were also highly indebted in dollar-denominated currency.   
 
Despite this economic catastrophe, some firms were able to survive the 
crisis, and others even benefited from it.  Two obvious questions that result 
from this are, first, why did some firms survive and others did not, and 
second, why did some firms perform better than others?  Recent studies on 
the Asian 1997 financial crisis have focused on corporate governance 
mechanisms in order to answer these types of issues (see Mitton, 2002; 
Baek et al., 2004).  Our paper adds to this literature for emerging markets 
by examining the Mexican case. 
 
Mexico’s industrial environment has been characterized as one with 
diversified firms, controlled by few influential families, who possess ties 
with the government and banks (see Castañeda, 2002).  This kind of 
business atmosphere is quite normal in emerging markets, where external 
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governance mechanisms are weak.  There are high agency costs, which do 
not permit the existence of well-functioning capital markets.  The existence 
of conglomerates is common, as these stabilize aggregate profits and 
therefore serve as insurance when capital markets are incipient (see Aoki, 
2001; Fischer et al., 1994).  In addition, in order to finance firms´ 
operations, emerging economies usually rely on bank credit and informal 
capital markets. The existence of these types of markets is possible in 
Mexico, as families usually control several firms (and banks), and create 
networks with other families holding other companies.  The existence of 
internal capital markets permits business groups to move funds from 
booming companies (usually export-oriented firms, which have greater 
access to foreign capital markets) to others that otherwise would not be able 
to obtain credit.  Also, there is an important amount of inter-group trading 
taking place. 
 
3   HYPOTHESES AND DATA 
 
3.1   Hypotheses 
 
For a specific economy, “good” and “bad” internal corporate governance 
schemes differ in times of crises and in normal times.  Therefore, we 
hypothesize that the benefits for a firm to have a particular governance 
structure depend on the period under study.  In addition, during crises firms 
operating in emerging market economies present more turbulence than 
those in developed economies, particularly because stakeholders are less 
protected.  It is more probable for firms to go bankrupt, and therefore 
internal corporate governance arrangements play a more significant role 
than in developed nations. 
 
According to the corporate governance literature for emerging markets, in 
normal times we would expect family links, bank ties, and business group 
affiliation to have a positive impact on firm performance.  Nevertheless, 
these local networks are probably prejudicial for company performance 
during crisis periods.  Authors such as Bunkanwanicha et al. (2003) and 
Singh and Davidson (2003) suggest that during normal periods family 
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ownership reduces agency costs, which favors firm performance.  This is 
known as the convergence of interest hypothesis.  The same argument can 
be extended to companies having business or bank links, as these networks 
provide effective monitoring functions (see Khanna and Palepu, 1996; 
Hoshi et al., 1990).  However, during crisis episodes there is evidence 
supporting the alternative entrenchment hypothesis.  In this value 
destruction circumstances, it becomes more attractive to expropriate 
minority shareholders and bank or business group members (see Baek et al., 
2004; Lang and Stulz, 1994), which reduces firm performance.  Regarding 
exposure to international financial and commodities markets, we 
hypothesize that these are beneficial for company performance during all 
periods, as they imply better stakeholder protection (see La Porta et al., 
2000). 
 
3.2  Sample and data sources 
 
Although several authors have analyzed corporate governance effects on 
performance, there are few papers concentrating on individual countries, 
and to our knowledge none related to the Mexican 1995 crisis.  This is 
probably due to the lack of publicly available company information and the 
difficulty to obtain historic data; for instance, there is no information on 
ownership structure, and the Mexican Securities Market provides online 
company data only from 1996 onwards.  In order to deal with the lack of 
data, we have created proxies for bank, business, and family ties, as 
described in the next paragraphs.   
 
                                                
We have built a unique database using five sources30:  Mexican Securities 
Market’s (BMV) online resources, microfilms at BMV for historic data and 
for firms who are not currently listed on the market, Annual Financial Facts 
and Figures (published by BMV), and electronic devices such as SIVA 
(Integrated System of Automated Securities) and Infosel-Financiero.  This 
dataset refers to last quarter non-balanced company information, from 1990 
 
30 We want to thank Gonzalo Castañeda for providing access to his company database, 
created as part of CONACYT Grant No. 32583-D, and Jaime Diaz Tinoco for providing 
access to SIVA.  Our thanks also to Patricia Angel Vazquez for her help at BMV. 
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till 2000, for all listed non-financial firms (176 in total).  The data 
contemplates all surviving, non-surviving, and late entry companies.  All 
monetary variables are presented in real terms (Mexican pesos of the year 
2000).   
 
3.3  Variables  
 
 
Information on internal corporate governance is difficult to obtain in 
Mexico.  In particular, there is no data on ownership structure.  Hence, as 
stated before, for the purpose of this research we have created proxies for 
family ownership and informal ownership, which we manipulate as dummy 
variables.  Ownership concentration is harder to construct accurately, so we 
have excluded it from the analysis.  We have also ignored board 
composition, as all our proxies are built out of it.  Consequently, adding 
board composition does not contribute significantly. 
 
We consider a company to be family owned when two or more members of 
the board have the same first and second last names, which suggest they are 
brothers or sisters.  Regarding informal ownership, we have constructed 
two indicators: 1) companies having bank links, meaning that at least one of 
the firm’s board members belongs to the directorate of one or more banks; 
2) firms having group affiliation, taking place when two or more board 
members of a firm sit on the board of at least another listed firm, whatever 
their position.   
 
For companies having external links, we consider an export-oriented firm 
as one whose exports represent more than 50% of its sales.  Companies 
issuing American Depository Receipts (ADRs) are regarded as those with 
exposure to external capital markets. 
As a performance variable we have chosen return on assets (defined as 
EBIT over total assets) instead of Tobin’s Q.  Tobin’s Q is a market based 
measure; therefore it is not an adequate indicator in countries with incipient 
capital markets like the Mexican.  In addition, this ratio is not available for 
the whole sample of Mexican companies, as some firms were not quoted 
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during 199531.  For robustness check, profit margin on sales is employed 
(defined as EBIT plus depreciation and amortization, over net sales). 
 
The log of assets is employed to capture size effects. Control variables for 
performance such as productivity, foreign-denominated debt over total 
debt, cash flows over total assets, and leverage are used.  Productivity is 
defined as net sales over net capital stock; high levels of productivity are 
associated with high performance.  Foreign-denominated debt is taken into 
account since it makes a firm more vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
economy.  Cash flows over total assets are directly related to the probability 
of a company to expand and diversify.  This makes a company less 
vulnerable, particularly during crises.  Finally, leverage is defined as total 
debt over equity.  As it increases, so does the exposure to shocks and the 
amount of agency costs of debt (see Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2005). 
 
3.4    Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 refers to the number of listed firms during the Mexican pre-crisis 
(1990-1994), crisis (1995-1996), and post-crisis (1997-2000) episodes, 
according to corporate governance characteristics.  Although there are 176 
private, non-financial companies in total, not all of them were listed during 
the same periods of time.  From 1990 till 1994, 126 firms were quoted in 
the Mexican Securities Market; this number increased to 147 during 1995 
and 1996, and declined to 139 from 1997 till 2000.     
The majority of companies represented possess family, bank, or business 
links.  This is consistent with the business environment of many emerging 
market economies, as described by authors such as Aoki (2001).  Firms 
having business ties dominate the pre-crisis era; bank links are the norm 
during the crisis episode, while family ties show a declining tendency from 
the pre-crisis to the post-crisis periods.  Surprisingly, only a minority of 
firms participate in international trade or financial markets; nonetheless, 
                                                
 
 
31 But their information was public since they issued bonds or commercial paper in BMV, 
see Castañeda (2005). 
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after the crisis experience more corporates have been exposed to these 
markets than before. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Number of companies during the Mexican pre-crisis (1990-1994), crisis (1995-
1996), and post-crisis (1997-2000) periods, according to firm characteristics 
 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 
 
 
Firm 
Characteristics 
 
 
Pre-Crisis  
 
Crisis  
 
Post-Crisis 
 
 
All Firms 
 
126    (100%) 
 
147   (100%) 
 
139       (100%) 
73        (58%) 74       (50%) 61           (44%) 
Bank Link 96       (65%) 92           (66%) 
Business Group  87        (69%) 86       (59%) 91           (65%) 
Export-Oriented 5            (4%) 16           (12%) 
Exposed to ADRs 10          (8%) 5           (3%) 25           (18%) 
 
The number of listed Mexican companies during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
periods are shown in table 1.  The percentage of companies with a particular characteristic 
(with respect to the total number of firms during each period) is in parenthesis. 
Family Tie 
75        (60%) 
19       (13%) 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics for the performance variables of 
interest, during the Mexican pre-crisis (1990-1994), crisis (1995-1996), and 
post-crisis periods (1997-2000).  From table 2 it is possible to observe the 
strong deviation of the data from its mean and median, particularly during 
the crisis and post-crisis episodes.  There are several extreme observations, 
such as the maximum value for profit margin on sales of 54755.  Due to 
these types of outliers, average performance (measured both by ROA and 
PROFIT) seems to follow an increasing tendency from the pre-crisis to the 
post-crisis era.  Nevertheless, median values indicate a reduction in firm 
performance during the crisis period, and a partial recovery (with respect to 
pre-crisis values) in the post-crisis era.  In order to allow some volatility in 
the data, but also eliminate extreme observations, ROA values greater than 
1 and less than –0.5 are eliminated as outliers, which represent 51 
observations.  PROFIT values greater than 1 in absolute value are also 
eliminated as outliers, which represent 74 observations.   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for ROA and PROFIT during the Mexican pre-crisis 
(1990-1994), crisis (1995-1996), and post-crisis (1997-2000) periods 
 
 
 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
 
 
PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
 
 
Statistics 
 
 
Pre-Crisis  Crisis  Post-Crisis 
 
Crisis  
   
 
Pre-Crisis  
 
 
 
Post-Crisis 
 
Mean 
 
0.37 
 
1.52 
 
0.12  
 
0.69 
 
128.5  
Median 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.11 
Maximum 1.76 
-3.07 
41.06 507.18 5.24 45.44 54755.00 
Minimum -0.40 -0.80 -0.79 -2.07 -25.31 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.13 2.67 22.02 0.35 3.95 2421.60 
  
0.06 
 
In table 3 extreme observations have already been excluded.  This table 
shows mean values for companies´ ROA and PROFIT during the three 
periods under study, according to corporate governance characteristics.  It 
is interesting to notice that average ROA is the same during all periods: 
0.05; however, its volatility is higher during the crisis episode (the same for 
PROFIT).  This implies that during the crisis, compared to normal times, 
there are stronger differences in performance between firms.  Taking a 
closer look at the data, it seems that during the crisis era most companies 
suffered from performance reductions, except for export-oriented ones and 
those belonging to business groups.  In the post-crisis period, performance 
indicators bettered.  
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Table 3: Mean values for ROA and PROFIT during the Mexican pre-crisis 
(1990-1994), crisis (1995-1996), and post-crisis (1997-2000) periods, 
according to firm characteristics 
 
 
 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
 
 
PROFIT MARGIN ON 
SALES 
 
Firm 
Characteristics 
 
 
Pre-
Crisis  
 
Crisis  
 
Post-
Crisis 
 
 
Pre-
Crisis  
 
 
Crisis  
 
 
 
 
All Firms  
 
0.13 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.10) 
 
0.05 
(0.15) 
 
0.05 
(0.12) 
 
0.11 
(0.17) 
 
0.09  
(0.24) 
 
Family Tie 0.07 
(0.10) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.11 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.07  
(0.25) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
Bank Link 0.05 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.08  
(0.25) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
Business Group  0.05 
(0.16) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
0.11  
(0.26) 
Export-Oriented -0.01 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.14) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.04 
(0.23) 
0.12  
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
Exposed to 
ADRs 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
0.11  
(0.08) 
0.15 
(0.17) 
 
Table 3 presents mean values for the two performance variables of interest: 
RETURN ON ASSETS and PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES.  ROA values 
greater than 1 and less than –0.5 are eliminated as outliers, which represent 51 
observations.  PROFIT values greater than 1 in absolute value are eliminated as 
outliers, which represent 74 observations.  Firms are classified as having 
family, bank, or business links.  Companies are further grouped according to 
export-orientation (50% or more of sales outside Mexico) and exposure to 
ADRs (dummy variable).  Standard deviation is shown in parenthesis.   
 
Post-
Crisis 
 
4   RESULTS 
 
4.1   Methodology 
 
This section presents econometric results for the relationship between 
internal corporate governance and performance indicators (ROA and 
PROFIT).  A random effects panel data model is estimated, using the 
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Swamy-Arora estimator of the component variances; time fixed effects are 
also introduced.  T-values based on standard errors that are robust to cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity are exposed.  The sample includes data from 
1990 till 2000, arranged from the pre-crisis (1990-1994), crisis (1995-
1996), to the post-crisis era (1997-2000).  The equality of the corporate 
governance coefficients obtained for the three periods under consideration 
is analysed through Wald tests.  According to the descriptive analysis of the 
data, return on assets values greater than 1 and less than –0.5 are eliminated 
as outliers, which represent 51 observations.  Profit margin on sales values 
greater than 1 in absolute value are eliminated also as outliers, which 
represent 74 observations.  Export / Sales values greater than 1 and less 
than 0 are removed too (2 observations).   
 
4.2    Econometric results for return on assets 
 
The second column of table A1 in the appendix shows econometric results 
for the relationship between return on assets (ROA) and different corporate 
governance variables, during the Mexican pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
episodes.  Control variables for performance, such as size, productivity, 
leverage, cash flows over total assets, and foreign debt over total debt are 
included, and present the expected signs (being productivity and cash flows 
over total assets significant at a 1% level). As stated in the prior section, 
results are constructed by estimating a random effects panel data model, 
using the Swamy-Arora estimator of the component variances.  Time fixed 
effects are also introduced, which reflect the negative outcome on 
performance of both the December 1994 Mexican crisis and a minor 
currency crisis taking place during August 1998.  Table A2 in the appendix 
tests the equality of the corporate governance coefficients obtained (through 
Wald tests) for the three periods under consideration. 
From table A1 it seems that for the whole period under study, in Mexico 
family ties represent good governance schemes.  Although this conclusion 
is robust only during the post-crisis era, pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis 
coefficients are not significantly different according to Wald tests.  This 
finding is in general consistent with corporate governance literature for 
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emerging economies, however one would expect a temporary negative 
effect of family links on firm performance during the crisis period.   
Regarding informal ownership, during normal periods having bank links 
show no significant effect on Mexican firms´ performance (measured by 
ROA).  Nevertheless, as expected, this type of governance arrangement 
faded performance during the crisis era, when banks were also financially 
distressed.  The negative effect of bank links on return on assets during the 
crisis is a transitory outcome, as pre-crisis and post-crisis coefficients are 
not significantly different.  On the other hand, belonging to business groups 
temporarily favoured firm performance during the crisis period; however, 
this does not represent a good governance mechanism during normal times.  
Although these last results contradict recent corporate governance literature 
on the topic for emerging market economies, they can be explained with 
risk diversification theory.  Companies belonging to diversified business 
groups or conglomerates stabilize aggregate profits, therefore in times of 
crisis performance for these companies can be better than for others.  
Nevertheless, this is an effective but expensive way (in terms of 
administrative and operative costs) to reduce risk, and consequently during 
normal periods performance tends to be poorer than for the rest of firms. 
Exposure to international trade and financial markets is expected to be 
beneficial for companies during all periods.  Exports show an increasing 
favourable effect on return on assets, from the pre-crisis to post-crisis 
periods.  Pre-crisis and post-crisis coefficients are significantly different, 
which reflects the permanent positive outcome of exports on performance.  
With respect to ADRs, during normal times they show no significant 
impact on Mexican firms´ performance.  Nevertheless, they have a 
negative, temporary effect on return on assets during the crisis period, 
which cannot be explained with the theory. 
4.3   Robustness check: profit margin on sales  
 
 
 
 
The fourth column of table A1 in the appendix shows econometric results 
for the relationship between profit margin on sales (PROFIT) and different 
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corporate governance variables, during the Mexican pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis episodes.  The same control variables for performance are 
employed as in section 4.2, which in general show the expected signs 
(being leverage and cash flows over total assets significant at a 10% level).  
Once more time fixed effects reflect the negative outcome on performance 
of both the December 1994 Mexican crisis and the minor currency crisis 
taking place during August 1998.  On average, results are quite similar to 
those attained using ROA as the dependent variable. 
 
For all periods under study, family links show no significant effects on 
profit margin on sales.  In addition, according to Wald tests, these 
coefficients for the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis episodes are not 
significantly different.  Nevertheless, as in ROA, the signs of these 
coefficients are positive for the whole time horizon, which indicate the 
favourable propensity of family links on firm performance.   
 
Analogous to the results obtained considering return on assets, during the 
crisis period bank links represent negative governance mechanisms.  
However, contrary to the prior analysis, this negative outcome extends to 
the post-crisis era (although not statistically significant).  On the other hand, 
and consistent to the conclusions obtained through ROA, belonging to 
business groups favoured performance during the crisis; however, this is 
not a good governance mechanism during normal times.  Nonetheless, in 
this case these last results represent only tendencies, as the coefficients are 
not statistically significant, nor different from each other according to Wald 
tests. 
 
Exports show a positive influence on profit margin on sales from the pre-
crisis to crisis periods (as in ROA).  However, its favorable outcome on 
performance deteriorates in the post-crisis era.  Nevertheless, only pre-crisis 
and crisis coefficients are significantly different according to Wald tests, 
which points towards the beneficial effects of exports on PROFIT during 
the crisis.  As in the case of return on assets, ADRs are significantly 
negative only during the crisis period.  This is a temporary effect, as crisis 
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and post-crisis coefficients are significantly different according to Wald 
tests. 
 
5  CONCLUSION 
 
Internal and external corporate governance arrangements determine to some 
extent firm performance and value.  Internal corporate governance schemes 
are particularly relevant for companies operating in emerging market 
economies, as external governance mechanisms (such as legal protection 
and markets for corporate control and management) are deficient in these 
types of markets.  In addition, ¨good¨ and ¨bad¨ internal governance 
structures differ in times of crises and in normal times.  As emerging 
market economies tend to be more volatile than developed ones, this 
differentiation is crucial in the design of governance policies.   
 
Considering the above, we have derived the following governance 
conclusions concerning companies operating in emerging market 
economies: 
 
1.  Family links positively relate to firm performance during all times, as 
concentrated ownership is an incentive for having a company running well.  
This implies a lower motivation to expropriate stakeholders and more 
control over management.  This conclusion is shared by authors such as 
Kim (2005), who refers to Chaebol firms as having better productivity 
performance than companies with less family ownership.  There is no 
evidence from the results of our research that during times of crises this 
kind of links increases the odds of expropriation of minority shareholders. 
 
2.  Bank ties represent ¨bad¨ governance mechanisms during crisis 
episodes; however, during normal times they make no significant difference 
on firm performance.  These conclusions indicate that in general bankers 
act as accomplices instead of firm regulators and advisors, which lessens 
their governance functions.  During normal periods, they allow related 
companies to increase leverage, making them more vulnerable during crisis 
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times.  This evidences the findings by Kim and Lee (2003) and Baek et al. 
(2004), for the recent East Asian financial crisis. 
 
3.  Business group affiliation reduces firm performance during normal 
times, but it represents a ¨good¨ governance arrangement during crisis 
episodes.  As these episodes cannot be perfectly anticipated, and are 
relatively frequent in emerging market economies, these types of networks 
are associated with positive governance mechanisms (as exposed by 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  This implies a type of insurance, as companies 
belonging to diversified business groups or conglomerates stabilize 
aggregate profits.  Therefore, in times of crises performance for these 
companies can be better than for others.  Nevertheless, this is an effective 
but expensive way (in terms of administrative and operative costs) to 
reduce risk, and consequently during normal periods performance tends to 
be poorer than for the rest of firms. 
 
4.  Export-orientation tends to be a positive governance mechanism, as it 
reduces firms´ dependency on local macroeconomic conditions.  In 
addition, participation in international markets can imply better stakeholder 
protection, as exporting firms must possess good reputation in order to 
trade and obtain credit from external markets.  This is shared by authors 
such as Klapper and Love, 2003. 
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6  APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Firm performance and corporate governance arrangements during the Mexican pre-crisis 
(1990-1994), crisis (1995-1996), and post-crisis (1997-2000) periods 
VARIABLE RETURN ON ASSETS 
 
PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
Family Tie  
    Pre-Crisis 
     Crisis 
     Post-Crisis 
 
0.02                  (1.05) 
0.02                  (1.21) 
0.01 *               (1.35) 
 
0.02                    (0.63) 
0.00                    (0.06) 
0.04                    (0.78) 
Bank Link 
     Pre-Crisis 
     Crisis 
     Post-Crisis 
  
-0.05 *          -1.49) 
 
 
-0.04 ***         (-2.15) 
 
-0.17 **            (-1.69) 
 
-0.29 ****        (-2.51) 
Period=1996 0.00                  (-0.02) 
-0.02 **          (-1.76) 
-0.04 ****      (-2.42) 
-0.02               (-0.76) 
0.00                  (0.13) 
-0.09 ****       (-2.37) 
0.00                  (0.15) 
0.02                  (0.36) 
-0.18 ***          (-1.98) 
-0.06                 (-1.13) 
Business Group 
     Pre-Crisis 
     Crisis 
     Post-Crisis 
 
-0.02               (-1.13) 
0.05*                (1.36) 
    (
-0.06                 (-1.23) 
0.06                   (0.96) 
-0.05                 (-0.65) 
Exports / Sales 
     Pre-Crisis 
     Crisis 
     Post-Crisis 
-0.11 ***          (-2.34) 
0.00                  (0.09) 
-0.27 ***          (-2.25) 
-0.08*               (-1.32) 
Exposure to ADRs 
     Pre-Crisis 
     Crisis 
     Post-Crisis 
0.01                  (0.63) 
-0.14 ****       (-4.13) 
0.00                  (-0.10) 
 
-0.05                 (-0.39) 
-0.16 ****        (-2.72) 
0.00                   (-0.03) 
Size 0.00                  (0.20) 0.02                  (1.19) 
Productivity(-1) 0.04 ****         (4.10) 0.03                  (1.13) 
Foreign Debt(-1) /Total Debt (-1) -0.01                (-1.16) 0.01                  (0.28) 
Cash Flows(-1) /Total Assets (-1) 0.27 ****        (2.37) 0.25 **             (1.70) 
Leverage(-1) -0.08                (-1.21) 
Period=1992 0.00                 (-0.40) -0.01                 (-1.18) 
Period=1993 -0.02 ****       (-4.39) -0.03 **            (-1.65) 
Period=1994 -0.08 ****      (-17.33) -0.16 ****        (-18.55) 
Period=1995 -0.01               (-0.43) -0.04                 (-0.44) 
0.00                 (0.07) 
Period=1997 -0.02                 (-0.65) 
Period=1998 -0.06*               (-1.39) 
Period=1999 -0.02                 (-0.36) 
Period=2000 0.03 *             (1.41) 0.04                  (0.96) 
*, **, ***, **** Significant at 20%, 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
The table presents results from estimating a random effects panel data model, using the Swamy-Arora 
estimator of the component variances.  Time fixed effects are also introduced.  The sample includes data 
from 1990 till 2000.  RETURN ON ASSETS values greater than 1 and less than –0.5 are eliminated as 
outliers, which represent 51 observations.  PROFIT values greater than 1 in absolute value are eliminated 
as outliers, which represent 74 observations.  Export / Sales values greater than 1 and less than 0 are 
eliminated also as outliers (2 observations).  t-values based on standard errors that are robust to cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis.   
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Table A2: Wald tests for the equality of pre-crisis (1990-1994), crisis (1995-1996), and post-crisis 
coefficients (1997-2000)  
 
 
 
RETURN ON ASSETS 
 
 
PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
 
Variable Pre-Crisis 
vs Crisis 
p-values 
Post-Crisis 
Crisis vs 
p-values p-values 
Pre-Crisis vs 
Post-Crisis 
p-values 
Pre-Crisis 
vs Crisis 
p-values 
Crisis vs 
Post-Crisis 
Pre-Crisis vs 
Post-Crisis 
p-values 
 
Family Tie  
 
0.92 
 
0.91 
 
0.96 0.71 
  
0.69 
 
0.77 
0.03 0.98 0.05 0.25 0.28 
0.08 0.40 0.12 0.91 
Exports / 
Sales 
0.14 0.27 0.04 0.05 0.30 0.39 
Exposure 
to ADRs 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.66 0.40 
 
0.03 
 
0.72 
p-values smaller than 0.10 are shown in bold. 
The null hypothesis is the equality of the coefficients for the periods under consideration.  
Bank Link 0.03 
Business 
Group 
0.07 0.30 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this book we have studied the effects of macroeconomic crises on firm 
performance, under an emerging market perspective.  Using Mexico as case 
study, we begin questioning if Mexican companies were able to anticipate 
the 1994 currency crisis.  Assuming capital structure flexibility, we analyse 
the evolution of seven financial ratios during different possible anticipation 
periods: four quarters, three, two, and one quarter.  Results indicate that this 
crisis was a surprising, unexpected episode, as firms did not adjust their 
capital structure accordingly.  Consequently, many firms went bankrupted 
or at least seriously distressed.  Nevertheless, there were significant 
differences in firm performance between companies, which can be 
explained with capital structure, industry, and internal corporate 
governance arguments. 
 
 
 
With the 1994 peso devaluation, Mexican firms faced a considerable 
increase in the peso value of their dollar denominated debt.  In addition, 
higher domestic interest rates increased the cost of peso denominated loans.  
This, together with a reduction in credit options and internal demand, had 
negative outcomes on a good number of companies.  Nonetheless, the 
significant rise in exports, attributable to the peso devaluation, had a 
positive impact on financially strong firms.  Regarding capital structure 
considerations, we realize that the advantages many survival firms had prior 
to the crisis, that helped them deal with the latter, were high levels of 
internal financing, liquidity, and a first-class reputation.  These gave 
corporates access to capital markets even during the crisis period.  In 
addition, right after the crisis they were aided with debt-relief programs, 
which temporarily excused them from interest payments.  
With respect to industry factors, we observe that prior to the crisis the 
mining sector was the most robust industry of all.  It had comparatively the 
uppermost percentage of sales in foreign markets, which made it less 
vulnerable to internal shocks compared to other industries.  Other strengths 
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it possessed, that helped its performance during the crisis, were its 
relatively high internal financing and liquidity indicators.  On the contrary, 
the most seriously wounded industries (and the last to recover) were 
telecommunications and services, as prior to this event they had the lowest 
exports / total sales ratios.  The services industry presented the worst 
financial and operational results during and after the crisis period.  
Leverage increased more than 5 times during the crisis, earnings declined 
by 187% during the same period, and it exhibited negative returns on assets 
and on equity during both the crisis and post-crisis periods. In addition, 
prior to the crisis, values for ratios such as short-term assets / short-term 
debt and internal financing were much lower than for the majority of 
industries.  On the other hand, conglomerates (which represent the most 
diversified industry) were efficient reducing currency risk, which might 
justify their existence in economically unstable countries. 
 
Concerning internal corporate governance arguments, it can be interpreted 
from the data that collusion between the government, companies, and other 
stakeholders had a significant impact on the survival and performance of 
firms.  This is represented by governmental programs that delayed the 
payment of interests and an increase in the amount of days given to pay 
back for trade credit.  We come across evidence that there are positive 
effects of business groups on related firms´ performance, during the crisis 
period.  These networks support internal trade and financing, and ensure 
close monitoring of management.  The existence of internal capital markets 
permits business groups to move funds from booming companies (usually 
export-oriented firms, which have greater access to foreign capital markets) 
to others that otherwise would not be able to obtain credit.  We also realize 
that during the crisis period bank links represent negative governance 
mechanisms.  During normal periods, banks allow interconnected 
companies to increase leverage, making them more vulnerable during crisis 
times.  Therefore, firm performance declines during these episodes.  
Finally, in Mexico family ties are good governance schemes, as 
concentrated ownership seems to be an incentive for having a company 
running well. 
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We find that on average the Mexican 1994 currency crisis had negative 
effects on companies’ balance sheets, which deteriorated between the 
fourth quarters of 1993 and 1995.  In addition, recovery was only partial 
and gradual, and overall the crisis episode was prejudicial even for 
surviving firms.  Concluding, this macroeconomic crisis was costly and had 
permanent effects on corporates, as expected for emerging market 
economies.  Through this crisis experience we derive five corporate 
recommendations for firms operating in these types of economies, in order 
to lessen their vulnerabilities to macroeconomic crises:  1) Trim down both 
the exchange rate and the debt mismatching, so as to decrease exchange 
rate risk; 2) Diversify risk by producing both for local and international 
markets, as export-oriented companies depend less than the rest on local 
macroeconomic conditions.  In addition, participation in international 
markets can imply better stakeholder protection, as exporting firms must 
possess good reputation in order to trade and obtain credit from external 
markets; 3) Rely more on equity and trade credit than on bank financing.  In 
emerging market economies, there is evidence that suggests that banks 
generally act as accomplices instead of firm regulators and advisors, which 
lessens their governance functions.  During normal periods, banks allow 
linked companies to increase leverage, making them more vulnerable 
during crisis times.  Therefore, bank links negatively relate with firm 
performance; 4) Keep liquidity indicators high, even though in the short-run 
earnings are being sacrificed, in order to increase companies’ flexibility to 
deal with crises; 5) Create networks with other companies, with the 
objective of building diversified business groups.  This implies a type of 
insurance, as companies belonging to diversified business groups or 
conglomerates stabilize aggregate profits.  Therefore, in times of crises 
performance for these firms can be better than for others.  Nevertheless, this 
is an effective but expensive way (in terms of administrative and operative 
costs) to reduce risk, and consequently during normal periods performance 
tends to be poorer than for the rest of firms. 
 
Several studies deal with the question of how a currency crisis in one 
country affects itself or other countries from a macroeconomic point of 
view, ignoring the direct microeconomic effects on individual companies. 
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There are only few firm-level analyses; therefore, the main challenge for 
future research is to broaden knowledge in this area, using more crisis 
cases. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
(Goede vrienden zijn moeilijk te vinden; uitstekende vrienden bijna 
onmogelijk. Dank jullie wel! Karen) 
“Wat omhoog gaat moet naar beneden komen” 
Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) 
In 1686 formuleerde Newton de “wet op de zwaartekracht” met het zeer 
bekende gezegde: “Wat omhoog gaat moet naar beneden komen”. Deze wet 
is niet alleen van toepassing op fysica en mathematica, maar ook op het 
leven van alledag. De financiële en economische werelden vormen daar 
geen uitzondering op en ook zien wij duidelijk de cyclische bewegingen: 
perioden van groei en welvaart worden gevolgd door krapte van de markt 
en recessie, waarna weer een periode van groei kan intreden. 
Door Thom en Toos Vermeiden 
 
”De wet op de zwaartekracht” 
 
 
Door de tijden heen hebben economen getracht de omvang van de 
economische cycli te begrijpen en te beperken. Naast het formuleren van 
een theorie zijn zij erin geslaagd de perioden van recessie te verkorten. 
Desondanks is het onmogelijk gebleken de cyclische bewegingen te 
elimineren en daardoor de wet op de zwaartekracht ongedaan te maken. 
Erger nog, zij zijn niet in staat geweest te voorkomen dat economieën in 
perioden van crises terecht kwamen, zoals gebleken is bij de recente crises 
in Latijns Amerika, Oost-Azië en Rusland. 
 
Het is een gegeven dat, gezien over een zekere periode, de 
productieomvang, inkomsten en uitgaven fluctueren en als gevolg daarvan 
de rentabiliteit van de ondernemingen. Omdat wij de neergaande macro-
economische bewegingen niet kunnen voorkomen of, erger nog, in een 
macro-economische crisis belanden, kunnen wij tenminste een poging doen 
om de negatieve effecten voor bedrijven te beperken. Het onderzoek begint 
bij het begrijpen van de negatieve effecten van economische crises op de 
rentabiliteit van een onderneming en hoe deze kunnen variëren, 
samenhangend met de verschillen in bedrijven. Variabelen zoals 
kapitaalstructuur, tak van industrie, omvang van de onderneming alsmede 
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interne regels met betrekking tot  “corporate governance”, kunnen helpen 
om verschillen in resultaten te verklaren. Bovendien, veel van de effecten 
van economische crises op de bedrijfsresultaten, worden bepaald door het 
ondernemersklimaat waarin bedrijven opereren. Markten van opkomende 
economieën fluctueren meestal sterker dan markten van oudere 
economieën. Dit als gevolg van onder andere financiële restricties, rigide 
macro-economisch beleid en politieke instabiliteit. Bij die economieën 
lijken de negatieve macro-economische effecten van een crisis groter. Deze 
kennis geeft aanleiding te veronderstellen dat, zodra een economie beland is 
in een crisisperiode, er een bedrijfsbeleid gevoerd zou moeten worden dat 
gunstig is voor de rentabiliteit.  
 
Uit recente literatuur blijkt dat veel research is gedaan naar de macro-
economische effecten van crises en hoe deze effecten de economieën van 
andere landen heeft beïnvloed.  Echter, er is een gebrek aan informatie over 
de micro-economische terugslag van deze crises, in het bijzonder voor 
opkomende markteconomieën. Het boek “Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm 
Performance” geeft  meer inzicht in dit onderwerp. Daar is gebruik gemaakt 
van de “case study - The Mexican 1994 currency crisis”. 
 
 
Dit proefschrift omvat een samenvatting van artikelen over dit onderwerp, 
waarvan de meeste al zijn gepubliceerd (of voor publicatie goedgekeurd) in 
internationale en Mexicaanse tijdschriften. De belangrijkste artikelen staan 
in hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4 en de rest is opgenomen in bijlage 1 en 2 van dit 
proefschrift. Deze laatste artikelen zijn bestemd voor die lezers die nauw 
betrokken zijn bij en geïnteresseerd in de Mexicaanse situatie. Feitelijk zijn 
de twee opgenomen artikelen als zodanig ook geaccepteerd voor publicatie 
in Mexicaanse tijdschriften. 
Hoofdstuk 2 begint met de vraagstelling of de Mexicaanse crisis op 
bedrijfsniveau al of niet verwacht was. Volgens crisisliteratuur zijn 
voorziene crises minder ernstig dan onvoorziene, omdat alerte bestuurders 
hun plannen geleidelijk kunnen bijstellen en niet plotsklaps. Als 
Mexicaanse bedrijven de crisis zouden hebben voorzien en als er een 
flexibele kapitaalstructuur was, dan zouden zij hun dollargerelateerde 
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leningen tijdig en dus voorafgaande aan de crisis hebben kunnen 
verminderen. Bedrijven zouden dan gezocht hebben naar mogelijkheden 
om de op handen zijnde crisis beter te lijf te gaan. Dat had bereikt kunnen 
worden door hun liquiditeit en interne financiering te vergroten. Bovendien 
zouden enkele bedrijven een begin gemaakt hebben om zich te richten op 
het produceren voor buitenlandse markten in plaats van binnenlandse, 
waardoor de investeringen beperkt zouden zijn. In een “event study” 
werden deze variabele factoren meegenomen, en er werd teruggeblikt aan 
de hand van verschillende aangenomen periodes: vier kwartalen, drie, twee 
en één kwartaal. De belangrijkste uitkomst was dat Mexicaanse bedrijven 
niet in staat waren deze valutacrisis te voorzien en dat zij niet de flexibiliteit 
hadden om vóór het ontstaan van de crisis hun kapitaalstructuur aan te 
passen. Dat komt overeen met de heersende mening dat niemand in staat 
was deze crisis te voorzien, omdat destijds de graadmeters van de 
Mexicaanse economie gunstig waren. 
 
Omdat er klaarblijkelijk geen crisisverwachting was, is het niet verrassend 
dat deze valutacrisis ernstige gevolgen voor Mexicaanse bedrijven had. 
Door toestroom en uitbreiding van buitenlands kapitaal (als gevolg van het 
liberaliseringproces van de 90er jaren van de vorige eeuw) de hieraan 
voorafging, hadden Mexicaanse bedrijven meer toegang tot 
dollargerelateerde leningen. Alhoewel de wisselkoers gedurende die tijd 
min of meer gefixeerd was, leek het erop dat door de gunstige macro-
economische omstandigheden de zorgen over het koersrisico, dat impliciet 
met dit soort schulden verbonden is, afnamen. Het hoge niveau aan 
investeringen werd hoofdzakelijk gefinancierd door bankleningen en in 
mindere mate door handelsoverschotten en buitenlandse activa; daardoor 
was het niveau van de schuldenlast hoog. Met de devaluatie van de peso in 
1994, werden bedrijven geconfronteerd met een enorme stijging in peso’s 
van hun dollargerelateerde leningen. Bovendien, doordat binnenlandse 
interestpercentages stegen werden de kosten van pesogerelateerde leningen 
hoger. Dit alles veroorzaakte, met een beperking van de 
kredietmogelijkheden en binnenlandse vraag, bij veel bedrijven 
faillissement of op zijn minst ernstige financiële problemen. De studie over 
de uitbreiding van de crisis en de effecten ervan op Mexicaanse bedrijven 
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wordt uitgebreid beschreven in hoofdstuk 3. De belangrijkste aanname, die 
ten grondslag ligt aan dit hoofdstuk, is dat verslechtering en herstel blijken 
uit significante wijzigingen in de hoogte van de ratios voor de financiële, 
operationele en solvabiliteitsgerichte bedrijfsresultaten. Met het oog daarop 
werden analyses uitgevoerd naar structurele veranderingen, om te kunnen 
vaststellen waarom deze gebeurtenissen plaatsvonden en wat het belang 
ervan was. In het bijzonder werden de technieken die zijn ontwikkeld in 
Andrews (1993) en Bai e.a. (1998) gebruikt om de “nul hypothese” van 
geen verandering te kunnen vaststellen en af te zetten tegen het alternatief 
van twee spontane breuken op het gebied van een specifieke ratio, waarvan 
de breukdata als onbekend werd behandeld. Terwijl de effecten van de 
crisis op de jaarrekeningen plotseling zouden kunnen hebben plaatsvinden 
(daar er geen crisisverwachting was) is er alle reden om te beargumenteren 
dat het herstel zich niet plotseling maar eerder geleidelijk zou hebben 
ontwikkeld. Daarom hebben wij de mogelijkheid van een geleidelijk herstel 
mede in de overweging genomen door het “twee breuken model” in deze 
richting aan te passen. De belangrijkste bevindingen tonen aan dat deze 
valutacrisis in het algemeen negatieve effecten had op de jaarrekening van 
bedrijven (ze verslechterden tussen het vierde kwartaal van 1993 en dat van 
1995), en de onderlinge verbondenheid, zoals die zich geleidelijk 
ontwikkeld en verspreid had. Bovendien was het herstel slechts gedeeltelijk 
en geleidelijk; over de hele linie was de crisisperiode schadelijk, zelfs voor 
bedrijven die het hoofd boven water konden houden. Er waren echter 
verschillen in rentabiliteit al naar gelang bedrijfstak. Om een voorbeeld te 
noemen: de bedrijfstakken, die zich het laatst herstelden, waren 
telecommunicatie en dienstverlening en de minst getroffen sectoren waren 
de mijnbouw en de conglomeraten. 
 
Een voorlopige verklaring voor de verschillen in de rentabiliteit van 
bedrijven is toe te schrijven aan de interne “corporate governance” regels. 
Onderzoek naar een koppeling tussen rentabiliteit en de “corporate 
governance” regels heeft geleid tot de  volgende mening waarover 
consensus bestaat: slechte handhaving van de “corporate governance” 
regels hangt samen met lagere operationele resultaten en Tobin’s Q. Dat 
komt het meest naar voren ten tijde van crises, omdat juist  dan de 
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waardevermindering voor investeerders ernstiger wordt. Als gevolg van 
omstandigheden halen nerveuze investeerders hun geld uit bedrijven die de 
“corporate governance” regels slecht naleven, wat opnieuw de winsten doet 
verminderen en de waarde van het bedrijf. Bovendien nemen de kansen toe 
dat er claims worden ingediend. Deze situatie is slechter voor opkomende 
markten, waarbij externe bestuurlijke mechanismen (zoals in de wet 
vastgelegd protectionisme) tekort schieten.   
 
In hoofdstuk 4 bezien wij de invloed van interne “corporate governance” 
regels op de rentabiliteit van Mexicaanse ondernemingen ten aanzien van 
banken, bedrijfsactiviteiten en familiebanden etc. Exportoriëntatie en de 
risico’s van buitenlandse kapitaalmarkten vormen samen nog een dimensie 
van de mechanismen van interne “corporate governance” regels en deze 
zijn ook betrokken in de analyse. Wij hebben een globale inschatting 
gemaakt van de effecten en wel met behulp van een model, waarin een lijst 
met ingeschatte gegevens is opgenomen en hebben geconcludeerd dat 
tijdens de Mexicaanse valutacrisis van 1994 het hebben van bancaire 
verplichtingen nadelig was voor de rentabiliteit van ondernemingen. De 
argumentatie voor deze opmerking is dat banken in crisistijd, voor 
opkomende economieën, meestal meer oog hebben voor hun eigen belang 
dan voor dat van bedrijven. Onder die omstandigheden zijn bancaire 
relaties synoniem en staan voor slechte interne afspraken en bedrijfsbeleid. 
Daarentegen is gebleken dat het deel uitmaken van zakengroepen een 
positieve invloed heeft op bedrijfsresultaten. Dat is in lijn met recente 
literatuur waaruit blijkt dat er positieve effecten zijn van goede “corporate 
governance” regels (en risicoverschillen) van deze zakelijke netwerken, 
omdat zij er zorg voor dragen, dat het management van dichtbij wordt 
gevolgd en de binnenlandse handel en financiering ondersteunen. Tenslotte 
is gebleken dat exportoriëntatie een stijgend positief effect geeft op het 
bedrijfsresultaat en wel vanaf de periode vóór de crisis als daarna. 
 
Op basis van de in hoofdstuk 2 t/m 4 beschreven bevindingen waren wij in 
staat enkele zakelijke aanbevelingen  te doen om de kwetsbaarheid van 
bedrijven voor toekomstige macro-economische crises te beperken. Deze 
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suggesties worden uiteengezet in de concluderende opmerkingen van 
hoofdstuk 5:  
 
1.  Beperk de risico’s van zowel de omrekeningskoersen als van de 
verkeerd samengestelde leningen, teneinde de risico’s van wisselkoersen te 
verkleinen. 
 
 
5.  Creëer netwerken met andere bedrijven, met het doel zakengroepen op 
te bouwen met meerdere uiteenlopende activiteiten of vorm multinationals 
waardoor de gezamenlijke winsten worden gestabiliseerd. Deze netwerken 
ondersteunen de handel en financiering binnen de groep en zorgen ervoor 
dat het management van dichtbij wordt gevolgd. Daardoor kunnen de 
bedrijfsresultaten van deze firma’s beter zijn dan van andere bedrijven. 
2.  Spreid risico’s door zowel voor binnenlandse als voor buitenlandse 
markten te produceren, omdat blijkt dat exportgeoriënteerde bedrijven 
minder dan andere bedrijven afhankelijk zijn van de locale macro-
economische omstandigheden. Bovendien, deelname aan internationale 
markten kan een betere bescherming betekenen voor de “stakeholders”, 
omdat exporterende bedrijven een goede reputatie moeten hebben om 
handel te kunnen drijven en om financiering van externe markten te 
verkrijgen. 
 
3.  Vertrouw meer op activa en handelskrediet dan op financiering door 
banken. In opkomende markteconomieën is er voldoende aanleiding om te 
concluderen dat banken in het algemeen hun eigen belang voorop stellen in 
plaats van als belangenbehartigers of adviseurs op te treden, waardoor de 
werking van de eigen “corporate governance” regels wordt beperkt.    
Tijdens normale perioden geven banken aan ondernemingen, die gelieerd 
zijn de reikwijdte van hun spankracht te vergroten, waardoor ze meer 
kwetsbaar zijn tijdens een crisis.  
 
4.  Houd de liquiditeitsindicatoren hoog, zelfs indien dit voor de korte 
termijn nadelig is voor de bedrijfsresultaten, teneinde de flexibiliteit van de 
ondernemingen om met een crisis om te gaan te vergroten. 
 
  Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance  
_________________________________________________________________ 
110 
Hoewel het een effectieve manier is, is het ook duurder (wat betreft 
administratieve en operationele kosten) om de risico’s te beperken. Als 
gevolg daarvan is het bedrijfsresultaat in normale perioden vaak minder dan 
dat van andere bedrijven. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
Appendix 1:  Propagación de crisis en las empresas:  La experiencia 
mexicana (published at Economía Mexicana XIV, num 1, 119-135 (2005)).  
Summary in English attached. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre 
de 2005 
 
SUMMARY IN ENGLISH: 
CRISIS PROPAGATION ON FIRMS: THE MEXICAN 
EXPERIENCE 
The following regression equation is run using Newey-West covariances:    
 
where: 
PROPAGACIÓN DE CRISIS EN LAS EMPRESAS:  LA 
EXPERIENCIA MEXICANA 
 
Karen Watkins, Jaap Spronk y Lucía Félix 
 
 
 
 
Karen Watkins, Jaap Spronk, and Lucía Félix 
 
 
 
The degree of crisis propagation on firms can be determined according to 
operational and financial results.  This paper studies how 88 private, non-
financial Mexican firms suffered and recovered from the 1994 economic 
crisis.  Quarterly data is obtained from the Mexican Stock Exchange 
(BMV), which includes performance, financial, and activity corporate 
information (from the first quarter 1993 till the first quarter 2001).  From 
this data six financial ratios are constructed: return on assets, profit margin 
on sales, interest rate coverage, debt ratio, inventory rotation, and bill 
payment rotation.   
 
RiT = a0 + a 1t + a 2d1iT + a 3d2iT, 
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R = Ratio under study 
i = 1, 2, ..., 88 (firms) 
t = Time 
 
 
Results show that the periods and degree of deterioration and recovery 
depend on the industry and size of companies. Conglomerates were both 
wounded and recovered before the rest of industries. The sector that 
T = 1, 2, ..., 33 (quarters) 
a0 = Constant 
d1 = Downturn dummy variable.  If the effect is seen in the first quarter 
1995, 
d1 = 0 → t < I95 
d1 = 1 → t ≥ I95 
d2 = Recovery dummy variable.  If recovery is seen in the first quarter 
1997, 
d2 = 0 → t < I97 
d2 = 1 → t ≥ I97 
 
To determine a priori downturn and recovery periods, the rate of change 
(with respect to the equivalent quarter of the previous year) of the ratios 
under study is graphed against time.  Using the graphs as a starting point, 
additional regressions are run changing the value for the dummy variables.  
The best-fitted regressions are chosen.  The equation is run for each 
individual firm, and afterwards these are grouped according to industry and 
size.   
The hypotheses tested are that there is neither downturn nor recovery in the 
selected ratios:  a2 = a3 = 0.  If there is downturn and │a2│ > │a3│, 
recovery is just partial; if │a2│ = │a3│, there is total recovery, and if │a2│ 
< │a3│, recovery is greater than downturn. To test that a2 = –a3 (at a 10% 
level), Wald tests are employed.  Finally, MANOVA and ANOVA 
procedures are used in order to check aggregate differences in downturn 
and recovery between groups of companies.  
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showed the lowest level of perturbation was mining, and the most injured 
one was services. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
economía mexicana NUEVA ÉPOCA, vol. XIV, núm. 1, primer semestre 
de 2005 
 
PROPAGACIÓN DE CRISIS EN LAS EMPRESAS:  LA 
EXPERIENCIA MEXICANA 
 
Palabras clave: propagación de crisis, crisis financiera, análisis empresarial 
(F3, GO, G3) 
Abstract: The degree of crisis propagation on firms can be determined 
according to operational and financial results. This research studies how 88 
private, non-financial Mexican firms suffered and recovered from the 1994 
economic crisis. Results show that the periods and degree of deterioration 
and recovery depend on the industry and size of companies. Conglomerates 
were both wounded and recovered before the rest of industries. The sector 
that showed the lowest level of perturbation was mining, and the most 
injured one was services. 
 
 
 
Karen Watkins, Jaap Spronk y Lucía Félix 
Resumen: El grado de propagación de las crisis en las empresas puede 
determinarse a partir de sus resultados financieros y operacionales. En este 
trabajo, se estudia cómo 88 empresas privadas (no financieras) mexicanas 
se perjudicaron y recuperaron de la crisis económica de 1994. Se encuentra 
evidencia de que los periodos y magnitud de la caída y la recuperación 
dependen de la industria y tamaño de las compañías. Los conglomerados se 
vieron afectados y se recuperaron antes que el resto de las industrias. La 
industria que reflejó el menor grado de perturbación fue la minera, y el 
sector más perjudicado fue el de servicios. 
 
 
 
Keywords: crisis propagation, financial crisis, firm-level data (F3, GO, G3) 
 
 
  Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance  
_________________________________________________________________ 
116 
1 INTRODUCCION 
 
                                                
Las crisis financieras, según Mishkin (1992), se presentan cuando hay una 
perturbación en el sistema financiero que causa que los problemas de 
información asimétrica (selección adversa y riesgo moral) se acrecienten. 
Cuando hay una crisis, la mala condición de los negocios y la incertidumbre 
sobre la salud de los bancos impulsa a los inversionistas a sacar sus fondos 
de estas instituciones, y éstos a ofrecer menos créditos. La cantidad de 
intermediación financiera realizada por los bancos disminuye, empeorando 
los problemas creados por la selección adversa y el riesgo moral. El 
mercado se vuelve incapaz de canalizar los fondos eficientemente y, como 
consecuencia de esto, la actividad económica se contrae considerablemente. 
En estas condiciones, a muchos bancos les es imposible recuperar sus 
préstamos, lo que provoca erosiones en su valor neto. Es así como las crisis 
financieras se caracterizan por un descenso en los precios de los activos32 y 
por la caída de un número considerable de empresas financieras y no 
financieras. 
 
El objetivo principal de este estudio es determinar la cronología y magnitud 
de la caída y recuperación empresarial, relacionadas con la crisis económica 
mexicana de 1994. En otras palabras, ya que las crisis guardan una relación 
estrecha con las tensiones en los sectores financieros y empresariales, este 
estudio se centra en analizar cómo las empresas mexicanas fueron afectadas 
por la crisis financiera de 1994. Para este propósito se utilizan los datos 
financieros trimestrales de una muestra de 88 empresas privadas mexicanas 
que sobrevivieron la crisis, desde el primer trimestre de 1993 hasta el 
primer trimestre de 2001. 
 
A inicios de la década de 1990, México y otros países de América Latina 
iniciaron procesos de liberalización del sector financiero y la cuenta 
corriente. Se privatizaron bancos y se incrementó considerablemente la 
inversión extranjera. Esto generó un boom en la industria bancaria, dado el 
 
32 A los inversionistas les resulta difícil distinguir entre empresas rentables y no rentables.  
Por tal motivo, perciben los bonos y las acciones de las empresas menos atractivos, lo que 
provoca la disminución en su precio.  Esta caída en el precio de los activos se debe 
también a que las empresas empiezan a tener pérdidas. 
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mayor acceso a fondos; nuevos bancos empezaron a operar, se expandió el 
crédito y los servicios financieros. En México, los controles y restricciones 
crediticias fueron minimizados, así como se abolieron los requerimientos de 
reservas. La expansión del crédito, junto con un mal análisis y supervisión 
del mismo, conllevó al financiamiento de proyectos riesgosos. Esto 
incrementó la vulnerabilidad del sector financiero ante las perturbaciones 
económicas. 
 
Como es de esperar, la crisis macroeconómica se propagó hacia las 
empresas. Durante esta crisis, las compañías mexicanas tenían mucho 
acceso a la deuda denominada en dólares estadounidenses. A pesar de que 
al inicio de la década de 1990 el tipo de cambio era semifijo, esto es, 
fluctuación dentro de una banda, las favorables condiciones 
macroeconómicas reducían las preocupaciones por el riesgo cambiario 
implícito en esta deuda. Los grandes montos de la inversión se financiaban 
principalmente con préstamos bancarios y en menor medida con crédito 
comercial y venta de acciones; por lo tanto, el nivel de endeudamiento era 
considerable.  Con la devaluación del peso en 1994, las empresas 
mexicanas enfrentaron un aumento significativo en el valor en pesos de la 
deuda denominada en dólares. Además, el incremento de las tasas de interés 
locales acrecentó el costo de la deuda en pesos. Lo anterior, junto con la 
La crisis mexicana comenzó con las tensiones políticas durante 1994. Hubo 
fugas importantes de capital en respuesta al conflicto de Chiapas y al 
asesinato de Luis Donaldo Colosio. Estos eventos, junto con un creciente 
déficit de cuenta corriente (el cual ascendió en promedio 1 punto porcentual 
por año durante 1989-1994), trajo consigo la devaluación del peso al final 
de 1994. En un periodo de dos meses, la devaluación del peso superó el 
100% (véase Kalter y Ribas, 1999).  Las tasas de interés se incrementaron a 
fin de evitar mayores salidas de capital. Esto generó recesión económica e 
insolvencia bancaria. Los depositantes sacaron el dinero de los bancos, los 
bancos pagaban mayores tasas de interés, los créditos morosos se 
incrementaron y el crédito se vio reducido. El PIB real cayó 10% durante 
1995 y la inflación alcanzó 52% durante el mismo año. No fue sino hasta el 
final de 1997 cuando el PIB real se recuperó completamente. 
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disminución en las opciones crediticias y en la demanda interna, hizo que 
muchas empresas quebraran o al menos fueran seriamente perjudicadas. 
A raíz de la crisis asiática de 1997, tuvieron lugar una serie de encuestas 
empresariales que ofrecían información sobre la caída y recuperación de las 
compañías orientales. Un ejemplo de ello lo ofrece Hallward-Driemeier 
(2001). Sin embargo, menos atención se le ha dado a la propagación de la 
crisis mexicana de 1994. Este estudio pretende cubrir de alguna manera este 
faltante. 
 
 
La propagación empresarial de las crisis macroeconómicas puede 
determinarse mediante el comportamiento de variables financieras y 
operacionales. El presente estudio analiza cómo una muestra de 88 
compañías mexicanas (no financieras y privadas) se perjudicaron y 
recuperaron de la crisis de 1994. Se concluye que el momento y la 
extensión de la caída y la recuperación dependen del sector industrial y el 
tamaño de las empresas. Las compañías más perjudicadas fueron las 
pertenecientes a la industria de servicios; otros sectores como el minero se 
vieron más bien beneficiados. Los conglomerados fueron los primeros en 
recuperarse, representando en promedio las empresas más grandes. 
 
El trabajo está organizado de la siguiente manera. La sección 2 se ocupa de 
la descripción de los datos y la metodología del estudio de hechos. Se 
explica el modelo que se emplea. En la sección 3 se presentan dos 
apartados de resultados. En el primero se hace un breve análisis descriptivo 
general, a partir de los resultados financieros promedio que muestran las 
empresas para la época pre crisis, crisis y post crisis. El segundo apartado 
se refiere al análisis econométrico. En esta sección se llega a la conclusión 
de que la industria de servicios fue la más afectada durante la crisis, aunque 
la primera en verse perjudicada fue la de conglomerados. Por otro lado, la 
industria que sufrió menos fue la minera, debido a que era la más orientada 
al mercado externo (y poseía entonces el menor descalce y riesgo 
cambiario). Asimismo, se encontró que las empresas grandes gozaron del 
menor deterioro, incluso puede argumentarse que la crisis les benefició. La 
sección 4 se refiere a las conclusiones y limitaciones del trabajo. 
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2  METODOLOGIA 
 
2.1 Datos 
Para esta investigación se utilizan los estados financieros (en miles de pesos 
constantes) de 88 empresas mexicanas que operaban en 1994 y 
sobrevivieron la crisis, teniendo como fuente la Bolsa Mexicana de 
Valores. La base de datos cubre información trimestral (para todos los 
trimestres disponibles a partir del primer trimestre de 1993, hasta el primer 
trimestre de 2001) de seis razones financieras33: 
 
1) Rendimiento sobre activos (ROA), medido como utilidad neta / activos 
totales promedio. 
2) Margen de operación, calculado como utilidad de la operación / ventas 
totales. 
3) Cobertura de la tasa de interés, medida como utilidad antes de intereses e 
impuestos / gasto por intereses. 
4) Razón de endeudamiento, calculada como pasivos totales / activos 
totales. 
5) Rotación del inventario, medida como costo de los productos vendidos / 
inventario promedio. 
6) Rotación de cuentas por cobrar, calculada como ventas / cuentas por 
cobrar promedio. 
 
La base de datos cubre únicamente aquellas empresas que operaban antes, 
durante y después de la crisis; es decir, las sobrevivientes. A pesar de existir 
un sesgo de selección evidente, se decidió trabajar con estas empresas con 
el fin de examinar la magnitud y cronología de la propagación de la crisis 
en las empresas más fuertes del sistema económico mexicano de la época. 
Asimismo, resulta de interés conocer el efecto neto de la crisis ex post, con 
 
33 Dado el carácter exploratorio de este trabajo, las razones se eligieron tal que pudieran 
reflejar los efectos de la crisis tanto en el rendimiento (razones 1 y 2), como en el 
financiamiento (razones 3 y 4) y actividad de las empresas (razones 5 y 6).  Estas variables 
se escogieron a partir de una serie inicial de 16 razones financieras, donde se eliminaron 
las que presentaban altos grados de correlación con las aquí señaladas. 
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el fin de determinar si la caída empresarial fue mayor o menor que la 
recuperación para las empresas sobrevivientes. 
 
2.2.  Metodología 
 
El método para estimar el modelo de propagación empresarial consiste en 
mínimos cuadrados ordinarios. Antes de estimarlo, se corrigen los datos por 
heteroscedasticidad y autocorrelación, utilizando las covarianzas de 
Newey-West. 
 
El modelo de propagación empresarial es el siguiente: 
 
donde: 
i = 1, 2, ..., 88 (empresas) 
 
Para determinar de antemano los trimestres donde ocurre la caída y la 
recuperación de las empresas, se grafican (con respecto al tiempo) las tasas 
de variación de las razones financieras en cuestión de un trimestre con 
respecto al mismo periodo del año anterior. Utilizando los gráficos como 
punto de partida, se corren algunas regresiones adicionales cambiando los 
valores de las variables dummy. Se escogen los valores de las dummy de 
aquellas regresiones que presentan el R ás alto. El modelo econométrico 
se corre para cada empresa en forma individual y para cada razón 
RiT = a0 + a 1t + a 2d1iT + a 3d2iT, 
 
R = Razón financiera en cuestión 
T = 1, 2, ..., 33 (trimestres) 
t = Tiempo. Es variable de tendencia, para mejorar el ajuste 
a0 = Constante 
d1 = Variable dummy de deterioro. Si el efecto se observa en I 95, 
d1 = 0 → t < I95 
d1 = 1 → t ≥ I95 
d2 = Variable dummy de recuperación. Si la recuperación se da en I 97, 
d2 = 0 → t < I97 
d2 = 1 → t ≥ I97 
2 m
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independiente. Se agrupa posteriormente por industria y tamaño de las 
empresas. 
 
Al obtener a2 y a ete a prueba que sean estadísticamente diferentes 
de cero (al 10% de significancia). Para ello se utiliza el estadístico T-HAC, 
el cual se adquiere de una prueba t que considera heteroscedasticidad y 
autocorrelación en las series. Las hipótesis nulas (Ho Ho
que no hay caída ni recuperación, respectivamente. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3, se som
1 y 2) consisten en 
Se espera que los signos de a2 y a3 sean: 
1) Para ROA, a2 signo negativo y a3 positivo. 
2) a2 negativo y a3 positivo para el margen de operación. 
3) En la cobertura de la tasa de interés, se espera que a2 tenga signo 
negativo y a3 signo positivo. 
4) a2 positivo y a3 negativo para la razón de endeudamiento. 
5) Para la rotación del inventario, a2 negativo y a3 positivo. 
6) En la razón de rotación de cuentas por cobrar se espera que a2 tenga 
signo negativo y a3 positivo. 
Si la empresa se ve perjudicada y │a2│ > │a3│, la recuperación es parcial; 
si │a2│ = │a3│, la recuperación es total y si │a2│ < │a3│, la recuperación 
supera al deterioro. Para probar la hipótesis que a2 = –a3 (al 10% de 
significancia), se utiliza una versión de la prueba de Wald consistente con 
heteroscedasticidad y autocorrelación en las series. 
Se realiza el análisis para cada empresa y luego se ve si el periodo de 
deterioro y recuperación está relacionado con la industria y tamaño de las 
firmas34,35. Para ello se efectúa un estudio MANOVA, que considera todas 
 
34 Se obtienen los promedios ponderados de las razones financieras por industria y por 
tamaño.  La ponderación que tiene cada empresa dentro de una categoría industrial (o de 
tamaño) es el monto de sus activos totales / monto de los activos totales de todas las 
empresas que pertenecen a esa categoría.  De esta manera, se le da mayor ponderación a 
las empresas que tienen mayor representabilidad en el mercado. 
35 El criterio de tamaño se define arbitrariamente de acuerdo con los activos de las 
empresas.  Se consideran empresas pequeñas aquellas cuyos activos totales son menores a 
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las razones financieras elegidas y determina si existen diferencias entre los 
grupos establecidos de tamaño empresarial e industria. Para observar las 
diferencias por cada razón financiera de forma individual, se aplica un 
estudio ANOVA36,37 . 
 
3  RESULTADOS 
                                                                                                                          
 
3.1. Análisis descriptivo general 
 
El análisis descriptivo general se basa en la evolución de las seis razones 
financieras elegidas (considerando las 88 empresas), durante los periodos 
de pre crisis (I-1993 a III-1994), crisis (IV-1994 a III-1997) y post crisis 
(IV-1997 a I-2001). El valor promedio de estas razones financieras para 
cada uno de los tres periodos mencionados se obtiene de la siguiente 
manera: partiendo de las empresas individuales, se hace un promedio 
simple por razón financiera, para los periodos de pre crisis, crisis y post 
crisis. Tomando estos valores para todas las empresas, se pondera de 
acuerdo con la proporción de activos de cada empresa en relación con el 
total de activos de la muestra. 
 
Los resultados del cuadro 1 señalan que, durante la época pre crisis, las 
empresas mexicanas presentaban altos niveles de riesgo de insolvencia. La 
razón de endeudamiento era cercana a 50%; conjuntamente, más de la 
 
un millón de pesos; medianas las que cuentan con activos totales entre un millón y 10 
millones, y las empresas grandes son aquellas que tienen activos mayores a 10 millones de 
pesos.  Se estudian además siete categorías industriales: manufactura, telecomunicaciones, 
comercio, construcción, servicios, conglomerados y minería.   
36 El estudio ANOVA y MANOVA se realiza a través de la prueba de Brown-Forsythe, 
que es una modificación de la prueba de Levene, en la cual se reemplaza la diferencia 
absoluta de medias por la diferencia absoluta de medianas y así se obtiene una prueba 
superior en términos de eficacia y capacidad.  En esta prueba, la hipótesis nula es que la 
varianza de todos los grupos es igual.  La alternativa es que al menos un grupo tiene 
distinta varianza.  Entonces, si P<0.10, no se rechaza la hipótesis alternativa (es decir, los 
grupos son distintos para esa variable en particular). 
37 La prueba de Levine está basada en un análisis de varianza (ANOVA) de diferencia 
absoluta de medias.  El estadístico F en esta prueba se acerca a una distribución F con G=1 
grados de libertad en el numerador y N-G grados de libertad en el denominador; bajo la 
hipótesis nula de igual varianza entre los grupos. 
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mitad de esta deuda estaba denominada en dólares estadounidenses, por lo 
que había en general mucha exposición al riesgo cambiario. Como es de 
esperar, durante la crisis esta situación empeoró. 
 
Las empresas, como consecuencia del aumento de la deuda, tuvieron 
mayores dificultades para generar la cantidad suficiente de ingresos que 
cubrieran los gastos por intereses. Esto se refleja levemente en la razón de 
la cobertura de las tasas de interés, que pasó de 9.62 veces durante la época 
pre crisis a 8.74 veces durante la crisis. En el periodo post crisis, la 
cobertura del pago de intereses llegó a 11.55 veces, ya que las empresas no 
estaban pagando intereses como parte del programa de alivio de la deuda. 
 
                                                
Las variables que pueden brindar una luz de alerta sobre posibles 
disminuciones en las utilidades son las razones de actividad38, que 
demuestran la eficacia con la cual se administran los activos de una 
empresa. Estas razones presentaron aumentos en las épocas de crisis y post 
crisis. En especial, se observa un deterioro en la rotación del inventario, que 
pasó de 4.38 días en la época pre crisis a 16.71 días durante la crisis, 
llegando hasta 19.03 días en la post crisis, lo que refleja  la caída en la 
demanda interna. 
 
38 Las variables consideradas son rotación de las cuentas por cobrar y rotación del 
inventario. 
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Cuadro 1. Resultados financieros promedio para las épocas pre crisis, crisis 
 y post crisis* 
 
Razón financiera                            Pre crisis                  Crisis                  Post crisis 
Razón de                                           41.65%                  46.13%                 48.27% 
endeudamiento 
Cobertura de las                                9.62 veces           8.74 veces            11.55 veces 
tasas de interés  
Rotación de las                                 4.94 días             5.51 días               5.96 días 
cuentas por cobrar 
Rotación de                                       4.38 días            16.71 días              19.03 días 
inventarios  
Margen de                                         18.31%                 16.56%                 16.81% 
operación 
ROA                                                  3.76%                    3.99%                 3.73% 
* Los datos se obtuvieron según la metodología que se explica en el trabajo, 
tomando en cuenta las 88 empresas. 
 
A pesar de la reducción en las ventas, no cambiaron significativamente las 
utilidades ni los activos totales, lo que revela sólo un pequeño efecto 
empresarial de la crisis cambiaria para las empresas sobrevivientes 
consideradas. De acuerdo con los resultados del cuadro 1, el ROA 
promedio pasó de 3.76 a 3.99% durante la crisis. Como se explica en el 
siguiente apartado, esto puede tener su origen en que la crisis no afectó por 
igual a todos los sectores. La razón de rentabilidad que sí mostró deterioro 
durante la crisis fue el margen de operación. 
 
Con lo anterior y dado el comportamiento de las razones analizadas, se 
puede concluir que las empresas estudiadas se perjudicaron levemente de la 
crisis. Asimismo, ya que posterior a este evento se muestran pocas mejoras 
en las razones financieras consideradas, se puede alegar que las empresas 
tan sólo se recuperaron parcialmente. 
 
Algunas de las posibles explicaciones de la supervivencia de estas empresas 
durante la época de crisis son el aumento en las exportaciones (la 
proporción de ventas en el extranjero con respecto a las ventas totales casi 
se duplicó durante la época de crisis), la buena capacidad de hacer frente a 
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problemas de liquidez reflejada en la razón circulante y el nivel de 
financiamiento interno, y los programas gubernamentales de no pago de 
deudas. 
 
3.2. Análisis econométrico 
 
3.2.1.  Por industria 
 
Se consideran 35 empresas de la industria de la manufactura, 4 firmas de 
telecomunicaciones, 15 empresas de comercio, 11 empresas de 
construcción, 6 compañías de servicios, 10 conglomerados y 7 empresas de 
minería. En general, se observa deterioro y recuperación empresarial, y a
a
 
Los resultados del modelo econométrico, resumidos en los cuadros 2 y 3, 
muestran que en promedio la industria de conglomerados fue la que se vio 
perjudicada primero (IV-94) a raíz de la crisis económica. Esto tiene su 
explicación en el hecho de que los conglomerados, al ser corporaciones 
formadas por varias empresas independientes, interrelacionadas por 
vínculos de propiedad, son las empresas que representan en mayor medida 
la economía del país
                                                
2 y 
3 presentan los signos esperados. 
39. 
 
Cuadro 2. Periodos de deterioro por industria 
Razón financiera   Manufactura Telecomunicaciones Comercio Construcción Servicios Conglomerados Minería   
Razón de 
endeudamiento 
II-95 III-95 I-95 I-95 I-95 I-95 I-95 
 
Cobertura de las 
tasas de interés 
I-95 
II-95 
IV-94 a  I-95 a 
II-96 III-95 I-95 IV-94 IV-94 IV-95 
 
Rotación de las 
cuentas por 
cobrar 
II-95 II-95 II-96 II-95 1-95 I-95 III-95 
 
Rotación de 
inventarios 
I-95 II-95 I-96 I-95 IV-94 I-96 
 
Margen de 
operación 
I-95 I-95 I-95 I-95 IV-95 IV-94 IV-95 
 
ROA I-95 I-96 II-95 I-95 IV-94 IV-94 II-95 
Moda I-95 II-95 I-95 I-95 I-95 IV-94 IV-95 
Intervalo de 
deterioro 
I-95 a  
II-95 
I-95 a 
 II-96 
I-95 a  
II-96 
I-95 a 
 II-95 
IV-94 a  
IV-95 I-95  I-96 
 
39 Por lo tanto, es de esperar que tengan repercusiones al mismo tiempo que hay problemas 
en la economía.  Véase Roll (1988). 
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Cuadro 3. Periodos de recuperación por industria 
Razón 
financiera   
Manufactura Comercio Telecomunicaciones Construcción Servicios Conglomerados Minería   
Razón de 
endeudamiento 
I-96 I-96 III-96 IV-96 I-96 I-96 III-96 
 
Cobertura de 
las tasas de 
interés 
II-96 I-97 I-97 II-95 II-95 II-95 IV-95 
Rotación de 
las cuentas por 
cobrar 
II-96 II-96 II-96 IV-96 II-97 IV-95 IV-95 
Rotación de 
inventarios 
I-97 II-96 II-96 II-97 II-97 I-96 I-96 
Margen de 
operación 
II-97 II-95 II-96 I-96 II-96 I-96 IV-96 
 
ROA II-95 III-96 I-96 II-96 III-96 III-95 II-96 
Moda II-96 II-96 II-96 IV-96 I-96 
II-95 a  II-95 a  I-96 a II-95 a  
II-97 IV-95 
Intervalo de 
recuperación II-97 I-97  I-97 II-97 
II-95 a 
 II-97 
II-95 a 
 I-96 
 
IV-95 a  
IV-96 
La existencia de conglomerados aumenta y diversifica los activos de las 
empresas; por tal motivo, a pesar de ser las primeras empresas en ser 
afectadas, su grado de deterioro es comparativamente bajo. Esto explica 
también que los conglomerados sean los primeros en recuperarse entre los 
periodos II-95 y I-96. El grado de recuperación que presentan supera al de 
deterioro, permitiendo así no sólo una recuperación, sino también una 
mejoría en sus estados financieros posterior a la crisis. 
 
La industria de servicios sigue muy de cerca a la industria de 
conglomerados, mostrando una caída entre IV-94 y IV-95, y una 
recuperación que en promedio fue mucho menor que ésta. El deterioro tan 
rápido en la industria de servicios pudo haber tenido su origen en el hecho 
de que casi 70% de su deuda era denominada en dólares (y ésta era de las 
industrias menos orientadas al mercado externo), de la cual alrededor de 
40% era de corto plazo. 
 
En promedio, las últimas industrias en verse perjudicadas (en este orden) 
son: 
 
1) Comercio. Previo a la crisis mostraba una sana estructura de la deuda. 
Junto con telecomunicaciones y minería, poseía los menores niveles de 
 
  Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance  
_________________________________________________________________ 
127
apalancamiento. Su nivel de recuperación posterior a la crisis fue total, 
incluso superó al descenso. 
 
2) Telecomunicaciones. Antes de la crisis presentaba uno los niveles más 
bajos de la razón de endeudamiento (después de la industria minera), así 
como los menores porcentajes de deuda denominada en dólares (sólo 
superada por comercio) y de deuda de corto plazo con respecto a deuda 
total. Su sana estructura de deuda pudo haberle permitido retrasar la caída. 
Otras razones de este retraso pueden haber sido que esta industria tenía el 
mayor margen de operación previo a la crisis (37%, lo cual es posible dada 
su estructura monopólica) y el mayor rendimiento sobre los activos (de casi 
8% previo a la crisis). Sin embargo, la recuperación en esta industria fue 
sólo parcial. Esto da indicios que, no obstante la estructura de capital es 
importante para retrasar el deterioro, el grado de recuperación posterior se 
debe en mayor medida a otras variables tales como la importancia del 
mercado externo. Por lo tanto, es de esperar que tengan repercusiones al 
mismo tiempo que hay problemas en la economía.  
 
                                                
3) Minería. Las empresas que componen esta categoría en general se vieron 
afectadas40 durante el cuarto trimestre de 1995. Esta industria presentaba 
durante las épocas pre crisis y crisis niveles de financiamiento interno 
superiores al resto de las industrias, lo cual le ayudó a retardar la caída y 
superar la crisis. Otra razón para su tardío deterioro y satisfactoria 
recuperación es que este sector tenía la mayor relación con el exterior (con 
una razón de exportaciones/ventas totales de casi 40% previo a la crisis y de 
48% durante la misma). Es por ello que la industria minera durante la época 
de crisis pudo incrementar el margen de operación y el rendimiento sobre 
los activos. La recuperación de las empresas mineras fue mayor a la caída 
que sufrieron; es decir, la crisis cambiaria les benefició. 
 
A pesar de ser las industrias de comercio, telecomunicación y minería las 
últimas en deteriorarse, como se observa en el cuadro 3, no fueron las 
últimas en recuperarse. Las industrias que se recuperaron al último fueron 
 
40 La caída en esta industria se observa básicamente en las razones de endeudamiento, 
rotación del inventario y de las cuentas por cobrar. 
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servicios (en realidad no puede decirse que hubo recuperación), 
construcción y manufactura, y esta última es la única industria de las tres 
que logró una recuperación mayor al grado de deterioro. Las industrias que 
muestran la recuperación más rápida son minería y conglomerados, que en 
promedio se recuperaron en el primer trimestre de 1996. Resumiendo, en 
todas las industrias se dio una caída y una recuperación en distintos grados 
y en distintos periodos. 
 
3.2.2. Por tamaño 
 
Se consideran 22 empresas pequeñas, 38 medianas y 28 grandes. En 
general, se observa deterioro y recuperación empresarial, y a
los signos esperados. 
 
                                                
2 y a3 presentan 
Después del estudio econométrico (que se resume en los cuadros 4 y 5) por 
tamaño de las empresas, se puede concluir que en promedio las empresas 
grandes se vieron afectadas primero por la crisis que las empresas pequeñas 
y medianas. Existen varias explicaciones para esto: las empresas grandes se 
pueden considerar como conglomerados de empresas pequeñas, pues por lo 
general éstas se dedican a diversas actividades o producen distintos 
productos. Por tal motivo, estas empresas representan más en la economía 
del país y, como consecuencia, las perturbaciones en la economía se ven 
reflejadas de inmediato en sus estados financieros. Otra explicación que iría 
en sentido contrario, pero que puede aplicarse al caso, es que cuando las 
empresas grandes tienen problemas financieros y operacionales, éstas 
provocan efectos inmediatos en la economía del país como un todo (ya que 
representan la mayor parte de la economía).41  Por último, un motivo 
evidente de por qué estas empresas se afectaron primero es que muestran 
comparativamente el mayor nivel de endeudamiento en dólares previo a la 
crisis. 
 
41 Para un análisis de cómo las empresas pueden conllevar a una crisis macroeconómica, 
véanse Krugman (1999) y Claessens, Djankov y Lang (1998). 
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Cuadro 4. Periodos de deterioro por tamaño 
Razón 
financiera   
Pequeñas Medianas Grandes 
Razón de 
endeudamiento 
II-95 I-95 I-95 
I-95 IV-94 
Rotación de las 
cuentas por 
cobrar 
Rotación de 
inventarios 
I-95 I-95 I-95 
 
Margen de 
operación 
I-95 I-95 I-95 
ROA I-95 I-95 I-95 
Moda I-95 I-95 I-95 
Intervalo de 
deterioro 
I-95 a 
I-96 II-95 II-95 
Cobertura de las 
tasas de interés 
I-95 
I-96 II-95 II-95 
 
I-95 a IV-94 a 
 
 
Cuadro 5. Periodos de recuperación por tamaño 
Razón 
financiera   
Pequeñas Medianas Grandes 
Razón de 
endeudamiento 
I-96 III-95 I-96 
 
IV-96 I-96 II-95 
 
Rotación de las 
cuentas por 
cobrar 
IV-95 I-96 
 
Rotación de 
inventarios 
III-95 I-97 III-96 
I-97 I-96 
ROA II-95 II-95 
 
I-97 I-96 I-96 
Intervalo de 
recuperación 
II-95 a  
I-97 I-97  III-96 
Cobertura de las 
tasas de interés 
I-97 
Margen de 
operación 
I-96 
III-95 
Moda 
II-95 a  II-95 a 
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A pesar de lo anterior, no hay muchas diferencias con respecto al periodo 
de perturbación, ya que en promedio todas las empresas se vieron 
perjudicadas en el primer trimestre de 1995. En cambio, en lo que se refiere 
a la recuperación, se observa que las empresas grandes fueron las primeras 
en recuperarse y que las pequeñas se recuperaron al último. Esto refleja la 
mayor flexibilidad financiera y acceso al crédito de las empresas más 
grandes, así como su mayor exposición a los mercados internacionales42. 
 
Con los resultados anteriores por tamaño e industria y dadas las 
conclusiones obtenidas del análisis ANOVA (en el cual, sólo la variable 
margen de operación presentó varianzas iguales) y MANOVA, se puede 
concluir que el periodo de deterioro y recuperación sí está relacionado con 
la industria y el tamaño de las empresas. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONES 
que se dio en diciembre de 1994. Utilizando una metodología de estudio de 
eventos, se encontró que hubo en general deterioro y recuperación 
empresarial. Este deterioro se dio en la mayoría de las empresas en el 
primer trimestre de 1995, y la recuperación se dio en la mayor parte de los 
casos en el segundo trimestre de 1996. 
                                                
 
En el momento en que se desencadena una crisis macroeconómica, ésta se 
propaga hacia las empresas, que se ven afectadas por las crisis tanto de su 
propio país como externas. En este documento se estudió la propagación 
sufrida por las empresas mexicanas en la crisis financiera 
 
Se encontró evidencia de que el tiempo de caída y recuperación depende 
del tamaño de las empresas y la industria a la cual pertenecen. Los 
resultados muestran que los conglomerados se vieron afectados y se 
recuperaron antes que el resto de las industrias. Una explicación para ello es 
que los conglomerados, al dedicarse a varias actividades distintas, son las 
empresas que representan en mayor medida a la economía del país y, por 
tanto, es de esperarse que tengan repercusiones al mismo tiempo que hay 
 
42 Previo a la crisis, las empresas grandes exportaban más de 13% de su producción; este 
porcentaje era cercano a 10% para las compañías medianas y 3% para las pequeñas. 
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problemas en la economía. La industria que reflejó el menor grado de 
perturbación (más bien la crisis le benefició) fue la industria minera, que 
mostró la mayor participación dentro del comercio internacional. La 
industria más afectada fue la de servicios, ya que previo a la crisis 
presentaba la mayor vulnerabilidad dentro de su estructura de deuda. 
 
Con respecto a los resultados por tamaño de las empresas, se observó que 
las empresas grandes se deterioraron antes y en menor grado que las demás. 
Lo anterior se puede explicar considerando a las empresas grandes como 
conglomerados de empresas pequeñas. Asimismo, las firmas grandes 
fueron las primeras en recuperarse, lo cual refleja su mayor flexibilidad 
financiera, acceso al crédito y participación dentro del comercio 
internacional. 
 
Se pudo llegar a la conclusión de que las empresas sobrevivieron la crisis, a 
pesar de que en general tenían excesivas deudas en dólares, particularmente 
por tres razones: el aumento en las exportaciones, la buena capacidad de 
hacer frente a problemas de liquidez y los programas gubernamentales para 
retrasar el pago de deudas. 
 
A partir de la experiencia de las empresas mexicanas en la crisis de 1994, se 
derivan algunas recomendaciones de política empresarial. Con ello se 
pretende reducir las probabilidades de propagación de las próximas crisis. 
Lo anterior es importante, ya que a pesar de que las empresas se pudieron 
recuperar de la crisis de 1994, aún en el año 2001 seguían mostrando 
problemas en su estructura de capital. 
 
Dentro de las medidas que las empresas podrían tomar para reducir su 
grado de vulnerabilidad ante las crisis están: 1) disminuir la deuda 
denominada en dólares, así como la deuda de corto plazo; 2) ampliar el 
mercado externo, no sólo hacia Estados Unidos, sino con el resto del 
mundo para diversificar el riesgo; 3) ampliar el capital de los socios, 
promover la venta de acciones y el ahorro dentro de las empresas, que les 
permita tener un financiamiento interno lo suficientemente grande como 
para enfrentar las futuras crisis, así como depender menos del 
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financiamiento bancario; 4) cuidar de no caer en problemas de liquidez, 
manteniendo las razones de liquidez en niveles altos aunque se sacrifique 
un poco de rentabilidad. 
 
En lo que se refiere a las limitaciones del estudio, se puede señalar que 
dentro de éste no se capturó a toda la economía real. Dada la disponibilidad 
de información, sólo se tomaron en cuenta empresas que cotizan en bolsa 
(en general, son las empresas más grandes). Otra limitación es que la 
muestra de empresas para algunas industrias es muy pequeña para 
generalizar; sin embargo, ésta es la única información disponible. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Appendix 2:  Corporate governance and performance during the aftermath 
of the 1994 Mexican crisis (published at EconoQuantum, vol. 2, number 2). 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE DURING 
THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1994 MEXICAN CRISIS 
Karen Watkins, Jaap Spronk, and Dick van Dijk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Good corporate governance arrangements have been 
associated with high performance.  This paper 
studies the effects of family, bank, and business 
group ties on Mexican firm performance during the 
period 1995-1997.  Two performance variables are 
taken into account for robustness reasons:  return on 
assets and profit margin on sales.  Results show that 
companies with positive corporate governance 
schemes performed better than the rest during this 
period.   
Keywords:  corporate governance, firm performance (G30) 
RESUMEN 
 
Buenos mecanismos de gobierno corporativo se 
relacionan con buen desempeño empresarial.  Este 
artículo estudia los efectos de los vínculos 
familiares, bancarios y empresariales en el 
desempeño de las empresas mexicanas durante el 
período 1995-1997.  Dos variables de desempeño 
son empleadas por razones de solidez:  retorno sobre 
los activos y margen de ventas.  Los resultados 
muestran que durante este período, el desempeño de 
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las firmas con mejores estructuras de gobierno 
corporativo fue más favorable que para las demás. 
 
Palabras clave: gobierno corporativo, desempeño 
empresarial (G30) 
 
 
1   INTRODUCTION 
th
Mexican companies were forced to adapt to the new circumstances, or 
declare bankruptcy.  As a consequence of the currency devaluation and the 
rise in domestic interest rates, companies´ peso and dollar denominated 
debt increased in real terms.  In addition, firms faced cash constraints as 
internal demand dropped and credit was restricted.  The outcome for 
Mexican firms was mixed: some firms survived the crisis, others did not, 
and some even benefited from it. 
 
The explanations for Mexican companies´ differences in performance after 
the 1994 economic crisis derive from two sources:  financial and 
operational robustness prior to the crisis, and corporate governance 
schemes.  The first of these streams relate to initial conditions; for instance, 
profitable firms with low debt levels had better odds to survive the crisis 
than others (for a recent study on this issue see Watkins et al., 2005).  
Regarding corporate governance schemes, recent studies on the 1997 Asian 
 
 
The Mexican 1994 economic crisis started with the devaluation of the 
Mexican peso, on December 20 , 1994.  This unexpected event took place 
in a setting of fixed exchange rate regime, low inflation, fiscal surplus, and 
large foreign reserves.  During 1994 Mexican authorities were confident 
about the stability of the economy; nevertheless, the growing current 
account deficit and political shocks during that year generated strong 
capital outflows.  The outcome was a shift to a floating exchange rate 
regime, devaluation of more than 100%, inflation of around 50%, and 
recession.  During 1995 real GDP declined 10%, interest rates rose 
considerably in order to avoid further devaluation, and credit was reduced. 
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financial crisis have proved that good corporate governance improves 
performance (see Mitton, 2002, and Kim and Lee, 2003).    
 
Our paper adds further insight into the role of corporate governance in the 
aftermath of economic crises, by examining the Mexican case. In particular, 
we consider the influence of corporate governance arrangements such as 
bank, business, and family ties on firm performance during the immediate 
period after the crisis: 1995 to 1997. Mexico’s industrial environment has 
been characterized as one with diversified firms, controlled by few 
influential families, who possess ties with the government and banks (see 
Castañeda, 2002). For robustness reasons we take into account two 
performance measures: return on assets (ROA) and profit margin on sales 
(PROFIT). Although several papers have analysed corporate governance 
effects on performance (see Claessens et al., 2000), to the best of our 
knowledge there is none related to the aftermath of the Mexican 1994 crisis.  
We believe this is due to the lack of publicly available corporate 
governance data, and the difficulty to obtain historic financial information.  
We have built a unique database for 176 listed non-financial companies 
using five sources:  Mexican Securities Market’s (BMV) online resources, 
microfilms at BMV for historic data, Annual Financial Facts and Figures 
(published by BMV), and electronic devices such as SIVA and Infosel-
Financiero. 
 
Our main result is that firms with good corporate governance schemes 
performed considerably better than others during the period 1995-1997.  In 
particular, belonging to diversified business groups favoured performance, 
while having bank or family ties was prejudicial for firms. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the theory on 
corporate governance and the hypotheses to test. Section 3 describes the 
data set and variables employed.  Section 4 discusses the results, which are 
based on a dynamic panel data model with random effects. Section 5 
concludes. 
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2   THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Corporate governance can be defined as a collection of procedures that 
provide protection for companies´ stakeholders.  In the words of Kose and 
Senbet (1998), ¨Corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which 
stakeholders (equity holders, creditors, and other claimants who supply 
capital, as well as employees, consumers, suppliers, and the government) of 
a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such 
that their interests are protected¨.  This relates to the agent-principal 
problem, as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977).   
 
Agency costs can be reduced through different governance mechanisms.  
Boubakri et al. (2005) classify these mechanisms as internal and external.  
Internal governance mechanisms relate to ownership structure (such as 
ownership concentration);  external mechanisms refer to the legal system, 
labour markets (such as markets for outside directors competing in 
reputation as experts in monitoring CEO´s; see Fama and Jensen, 1983), 
and takeover markets (markets for corporate control).   
 
For the purpose of this paper we focus on internal governance mechanisms, 
which are directly controlled by a firm. We classify ownership structure 
into three sub-categories, according to available information for Mexican 
firms: independent, family ownership, and informal ownership.  
Independent firms are those having no family, business, or bank links.  By 
family ownership we refer to companies where two or more members of the 
board of directors possess the same first and second last names, meaning 
they are brothers or sisters.  This is a proxy for companies where the 
majority of equity is held by the same family.  Informal ownership relates 
to companies having group or bank links, which implies that not only direct 
stakeholders have power over the decisions of the firm.  Ownership 
concentration is not a publicly available variable in Mexico, therefore it is 
excluded from the analysis. 
 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), and Maury (2005), claim that when 
investor protection is poor (meaning external governance mechanisms are 
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weak), family controlled companies become attractive as the private 
benefits of control represent a relevant share of the company's value.  Then, 
under these conditions it is easier to expropriate minority shareholders.  
Authors such as Alba et al. (2003), Lee (1998), and Baek et al. (2004) have 
related concentration of ownership in family hands with poor performance 
(as in Thailand and Korea, late 1990´s).  The argument behind this is that 
inexperienced family members, instead of professional managers, usually 
take control of these types of firms.  On the same line, Kim and Lee (2003), 
and Mitton (2002) argue that during the Asian crisis companies with lower 
proportion of outside ownership performed worse than the rest.  In order to 
reduce to some degree this outcome, in Mexico the Code of Corporate 
Governance recommends at least 20% of directors for listed companies to 
be outsiders (see Dahyaa and McConnell, 2004).  This derives our first 
hypothesis:  Firms having family ties performed worse than those without 
during the period 1995-1997.   
 
Diversified companies and conglomerates stabilize aggregate profits, which 
is important in countries with incipient capital markets like the Mexican 
(see Aoki, 2001).  In times of crisis performance for these companies can 
be better than for independent ones, which favours the risk diversification 
argument (see Claessens et al., 2000).  This argument can be extended to 
diversified business groups.  Castañeda (2000, 2005) points out that during 
the Mexican crisis, internal capital markets permitted the flow of funds 
from booming companies (mainly exporting firms) to the rest of the 
economy.  These business groups favoured the survival of many 
companies, as they improved capital allocation.  We can add that being part 
of a diversified business group can stabilize aggregate sales, due to internal 
group trading.  In addition, within the groups there are important 
governance functions.  As stated by Khanna and Palepu (1996), these 
networks support internal trade and ensure close monitoring of 
management.  On a similar line, Claessens et al. (2000) point out that after 
the Asian crisis, firms belonging to diversified business groups had 3% 
higher market valuations than the rest.    This brings out our second 
hypothesis: Firms belonging to diversified business groups performed 
better than other firms during the period 1995-1997. 
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The recent East Asian downturn has shown that during crises companies 
with bank links perform worse than independent ones, in particular in 
countries where regulation is poor.  As stated by Lee (1998), Claessens et 
al. (2000), and Morck and Nakamura (1999), Asian firms having bank ties 
were extremely leveraged before the 1997 crisis. This increased their 
vulnerability to shocks, and made them more susceptible to agency costs of 
debt (see Kim and Lee, 2003).  These companies were exposed to higher 
risk levels than the rest, and were able to obtain credit to finance losses.  
Instead of monitoring and disciplining them, banks acted as firms’ 
accomplices.  In addition, as firms relied heavily on banks for financing 
their investments, when banks faced financial troubles, even profitable 
firms were not able to obtain credit (see Baek et al., 2004).   This generates 
our third hypothesis to test:  In Mexico, bank links had a negative impact 
on firms´ performance during the period 1995-1997. 
 
3   DATA  
 
3.1 Sample, data sources, and variables 
 
Last quarter non-balanced data (from 1995 till 1997) for all listed non-
financial firms (176 in total) is extracted from the Mexican Securities 
Market (BMV).  Firms that were not listed at least during one of this after 
crisis years are not taken into account, as the interest of the paper is to study 
corporate governance effects on firm performance during the aftermath of 
the crisis.  Two sources of data from electronic systems are used: SIVA 
(Integrated System of Automated Securities) and Infosel-Financiero.  Data 
for firms who are not currently listed on the market, and historic data is 
extracted through microfilms at BMV.  The list of board of directors (for 
1994) is obtained through the Annual Financial Facts and Figures, 
published by BMV.  All monetary variables are presented in real terms 
(Mexican pesos of the year 2000).   
 
Corporate governance variables are introduced as dummies for group 
affiliation (two or more board members of a firm sitting on the board of at 
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least another listed firm, whatever their position), bank linkages (at least 
one of the firm’s board members belongs to the directorate of one or more 
banks), and family ties (two or more members of the board having the same 
first and second last names, meaning they are brothers or sisters).  Groups 
are further described as diversified and not diversified groups.  As for the 
definition of a diversified group, it is considered as one that is composed of 
many firms (at least fifteen, for internal capital and trade markets 
argument), from all sizes and industries (risk diversification), with at least 
one export-oriented company (50% or more of sales outside the country - 
competitiveness positive effect), and with one or more firms having access 
to foreign stock markets through American Depository Receipts (foreign 
financing and better accounting procedures, which favours good corporate 
governance). 
 
Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total assets; to 
reduce the weight of extreme observations in the econometric analysis, 
ROA values higher than 20% in absolute value have been excluded.  Profit 
margin on sales (PROFIT) is defined as EBIT + depreciation and 
amortization, over net sales.  Tobin’s Q is not employed as a measure of 
performance: being a market based measure, it is not an adequate indicator 
in countries with incipient capital markets like the Mexican.  In addition, 
this ratio is not available for the complete sample of Mexican companies, as 
some firms were not quoted during 1995 (but their information was public 
since they issued bonds or commercial paper in BMV; see Castañeda, 
2005). 
 
Three size dummies, arranged according to market assets´ value, are 
introduced.  Small companies are considered as those with less than 
$1,000,000 in assets; medium firms possess between $1,000,000 and 
$10,000,000 in assets; big enterprises consist of companies with more than 
$10,000,000 in assets.  In addition, seven industry categories are employed 
to capture size and industry specific effects;  for instance, it is expected that 
during crises small companies have more financial constraints than the rest 
(see Titman and Wessels, 1998), and industries such as the services sector 
depend more on the local economy.  In fact, industry effects usually predict 
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between 17 and 20% of financial performance (see Coles et al., 2001).  In 
addition, control variables for performance such as productivity (net sales 
over net capital stock; it is associated with higher performance),  foreign-
denominated debt over total debt (foreign debt makes a firm more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy), cash flows over total assets (the 
greater, the higher the probability of a company to expand and diversify; 
this makes a company less vulnerable during crises), and leverage (total 
debt over equity; as it increases, so does the exposure to shocks and the 
amount of agency costs of debt - see Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2005) 
are used. 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
Table 1 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics for return on assets 
and profit margin on sales, during the immediate post-crisis year.  In 1995 
there were 142 quoted firms, which are classified as independent, or having 
bank, family, or business ties (diversified or not).  These companies are 
further grouped according to size and industry.   
 
During the year 1995, the average return on assets and profit margin on 
sales were 0.04 and 0.07, respectively.  During 1993, which represents a 
normal year, the average values for ROA and PROFIT were 0.07 and 0.12 
(according to information from BMV, see Table 2 in the appendix).   This 
reflects that due to the crisis, on average performance declined substantially 
during the immediate aftermath year 1995.  However, this conclusion is not 
accurate for all types of firms.  For example, independent companies seem 
to outperform firms in all other categories, with an average ROA of 0.07.  
The same is true for companies belonging to business groups, as they 
present profit margin on sales of 0.09.  On the lower end are companies 
with family and bank ties, with ROA of 0.01 and 0.02, respectively.   
These results are in general consistent with the theory, except for the case 
of independent companies.  According to the corporate governance 
literature for emerging market economies, companies belonging to business 
groups perform better than independent ones in times of crisis; see 
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Claessens, Djankov, and Xu, 2000.  However, independent companies in 
Mexico have initial advantages over the rest of firms, which might explain 
this apparent controversy.  First of all, 60% of these independent firms are 
export-oriented.  In particular, these types of companies performed better 
than others due to the positive impact of the devaluation of the Mexican 
peso; their average PROFIT during 1995 was 0.12.  Second, more than half 
(56%) of the independent companies in the sample are big.  As explained in 
the next paragraph, big companies have less financial and operational 
constraints than the rest. 
 
From table 1 it becomes evident that there are size and industry effects on 
performance during 1995.  Big companies performed much better than the 
rest during and after the crisis, which can be attributed to their greater 
operational and financial flexibility.  In times of crisis, scarce credit is 
assigned mainly to the biggest (and perhaps not the most profitable) 
companies.  For instance, prior to the Mexican 1994 crisis, big companies 
were less leveraged than others.  This relationship changed during the crisis 
period, when small firms became the least leveraged.  Considering that 
small firms’ equity declined on average 16% during the time, there is 
evidence of an important credit crunch for small firms.    
 
On an industry basis, the best performing sectors were mining, 
manufacturing and conglomerates.  The mining industry does not depend as 
much as the rest on the local economy, as it exports most of its products 
(and their prices are fixed in international markets).  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the Mexican crisis practically had no impact on its aftermath 
results.  Manufacturing also depends less than other sectors on the domestic 
demand, as an important proportion of its products are sold in external 
markets.  As for conglomerates, in times of crisis they serve as an 
insurance, for their diversification stabilizes aggregate profits.  During the 
crisis period exports grew on average 104% for the manufacturing industry, 
and 180% for conglomerates.  Services, commerce, construction, and 
telecommunications are more connected to the local economy; therefore 
internal macroeconomic shocks have a greater impact on them.  
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4   REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
In this section, the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance schemes is analysed.  Table 3 in the appendix displays results 
from estimating a dynamic random effects panel data model, using the 
Swamy-Arora estimator of the component variances. The reported t-values 
are based on standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity, so random effects can be employed.  Time fixed effects 
are also introduced, in order to study the dynamics of performance during 
the immediate post-crisis years.  ROA values greater than 0.20 in absolute 
value are treated as outliers, as in aftermath crisis years it is expected 
performance to be low.  In fact, the median ROA for the period 1995-1997 
is 0.04.  The sample includes data from 1995 till 1997, which reflects the 
crisis aftermath period.  
 
From table 3 the main conclusion is that internal corporate governance 
arrangements did influence Mexican firm performance during the period 
1995-1997. Consistent with the literature, having bank or family ties was 
prejudicial for companies, while belonging to business groups (particularly 
diversified business groups) favoured performance.   
 
Companies participating in diversified business groups had several 
advantages over the rest of firms.  First of all, they created efficient internal 
capital markets, as described by Castañeda (2002).  From the publicly 
available data published by BMV, it is evident that these firms had twice 
the amount of trade credit compared to the rest of companies.  Second, this 
data shows that there was an important flow of internal trade taking place.  
Specifically, during 1995 companies from diversified business groups had 
three times more net sales than the other firms, which means they did not 
face such a sharp drop in demand.   These companies acted like a small 
economy, creating their own demand and supply, and therefore they were 
not so much exposed to the local economic downturn.    
 
In general there are not significant differences in performance according to 
size or industry indicators.  Therefore, it seems that internal corporate 
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governance variables are more powerful explaining performance during the 
aftermath period, compared to size or industry effects.     
 
All control variables taken into account are significant, except for leverage.  
Productivity and cash flows over total assets present the expected signs, 
however foreign debt over total debt has opposite sign.  Lagged ROA and 
PROFIT are significant and positive, which reflects the influence of initial 
conditions on performance.  Time effects, which are introduced in the 
regressions by including the periods 1996 and 1997 are also significant and 
positive, which indicate recovery. 
 
5   CONCLUSION  
 
Poor corporate governance arrangements are related to lower performance 
and firm value.  This is particularly true in times of crisis, when 
stakeholders are less confident about firms´ robustness, and expropriation is 
more feasible.  In these circumstances nervous agents take their money 
away from companies with poor corporate governance, which further 
deteriorates firm value.  In contrast, companies with good corporate 
governance schemes have better odds of surviving an economic downturn. 
 
As expected, the Mexican 1994 currency crisis had larger aftermath effects 
on companies with poor corporate governance schemes.  We have shown 
that firms having bank or family links performed worse than those without 
them, and that companies belonging to diversified business groups were the 
least injured during the economic downturn.  Initial conditions were also 
important in explaining performance during the period 1995-1997, as 
shown by the positive results of independent firms.  These companies were 
mainly export-oriented and big, which represents an advantage over the rest 
of firms. 
 
From these conclusions we derive several recommendations for Mexican 
companies, in order to deal with future crises:  1) To diversify risk by 
producing both for local and international markets.  2)  To participate in 
international financial markets through American Depository Receipts.  3)  
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To create networks with other companies, with the objective of building 
diversified business groups.  4) To rely more on equity and trade credit than 
on bank financing.  5)  To hire managers according to experience and 
aptitude, and not based on family attributes.   
 
6    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
We want to thank Gonzalo Castañeda for providing access to his company 
database, created as part of CONACYT Grant No. 32583-D, and Jaime 
Diaz Tinoco for providing access to SIVA.  Our thanks also to Patricia 
Angel Vazquez for her help at BMV.   
 
  Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance  
_________________________________________________________________ 
147
 
7   APPENDIX 
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for the year 1995 
Firm  Number 
of Firms 
 
Characteristic 
RETURN ON ASSETS PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
All Firms  142 0.04 
(0.16) 
0.86 -0.76 -0.63 0.07 
(0.25) 
0.95 
Independent  25 0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.19 0.54 0.05 
(0.20) 
-0.74 0.32 
Bank Link 97 0.02 
(0.15) 
-0.63 0.58 0.07 
(0.26) 
0.86 
7 
-0.76 0.95 
Family Tie  76 0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.63 0.51 0.06 
(0.24) 
-0.76 0.80 
Business Group  90 0.04 
(0.18) 
-0.63 0.86 0.09 
(0.26) 
-0.76 0.95 
Diversified Group  18 0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.33 0.23 0.08 
(0.26) 
-0.76 0.56 
Small 37 0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.19 0.25 0.06 
(0.16) 
-0.74 0.32 
Medium 60 0.02 
(0.17) 
-0.63 0.54 0.05 
(0.27) 
-0.76 0.82 
Big 45 0.08 
(0.20) 
-0.29 0.86 0.11 
(0.29) 
-0.72 0.95 
Commerce 22 -0.01 
(0.21) 
-0.63 0.36 -0.02 
(0.28) 
-0.76 0.50 
Conglomerates 14 0.04 
(0.19) 
-0.29 0.58 0.07 
(0.36) 
-0.72 0.95 
Services 10 -0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.16 0.04 0.00 
(0.27) 
-0.70 0.16 
Mining 3 0.11 
(0.16) 
0.00 0.23 0.31 
(0.36) 
0.06 0.56 
Construction 17 -0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.20 0.06 0.03 
(0.17) 
-0.33 0.32 
Manufacturing 69 0.08 
(0.17) 
-0.24 0.12 
(0.23) 
-0.74 0.82 
Telecommunications -0.03 
(0.06) 
-0.11 0.05 0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.05 0.20 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (year 1995) for the two performance variables of interest: RETURN ON 
ASSETS and PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES.  Values equal or greater than one in absolute value have been 
excluded as outliers.  Firms are classified as independent, or having bank, family, or group (diversified and not) 
links.  Companies are further grouped according to size and industry.  Standard deviation is shown in 
parenthesis.   
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics for the period 1990-2000 
 ROA PROFIT 
Period Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
1990 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.14 
1991 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.12 
1992 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.15 
1993 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.15 
1994 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.23 
1995 0.04 0.16 0.07 0.25 
0.10 
0.13 
1996 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.24 
1997 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.17 
1998 0.04 0.12 0.17 
1999 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.16 
2000 0.05 0.16 0.19 
Table 2 presents mean values (years 1990-2000) for the two performance 
variables of interest: RETURN ON ASSETS and PROFIT MARGIN ON 
SALES.  Values equal or greater than one in absolute value have been 
excluded as outliers.   
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Table 3: Firm performance and corporate governance arrangements 
 
VARIABLE RETURN ON ASSETS PROFIT MARGIN ON SALES 
Bank Link -0.01****  (-1.46) -0.04**  (-1.93) 
Family Tie -0.01****  (-1.50) -0.03*  (-4.47) 
Business Group 0.01**** (1.56) 0.02  (1.23) 
Diversified Group 0.03*  (6.51) 0.07*  (3.72) 
Small 
0.02*  (3.61) 
0.01***  (1.63) 0.00  (-0.09) 
Big 0.00  (0.48) -0.03  (-1.33) 
Commerce 0.03  (1.00) 0.00  (0.02) 
Conglomerates 0.01  (0.19) -0.08  (-1.31) 
Services -0.01  (-0.10) -0.06  (-1.20) 
Construction 0.01   (0.36) 0.03  (0.36) 
Manufacturing 0.06*  (2.36) 0.04  (0.46) 
Telecommunications 0.00  (-0.37) 0.05  (0.61) 
Productivity (-1) 0.01*  (2.70) 0.00  (-0.18) 
Foreign Debt (-1)/Total Debt (-1) 0.00  (-0.25) 0.02*  (4.71) 
Cash Flows (-1)/Total Assets (-1) 0.11*  (3.69) 0.30*  (5.66) 
Leverage (-1) 0.00  (-0.56) 0.00  (-0.41) 
Period=1996 0.02*  (6.70) 0.04*  (16.18) 
Period=1997 0.06*  (5.58) 
ROA (-1) 0.03*  (4.41)  
PROFIT (-1)  0.02***  (1.52) 
 
*, **, ***, **** Significant at 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively. 
The table presents results from estimating a dynamic random effects panel data model, using the Swamy-Arora 
estimator of the component variances. The reported standard errors are robust to cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity.   The sample includes data from 1995 till 1997.  RETURN ON ASSETS values greater than 
0.2 in absolute value are eliminated as outliers, which represent 24 observations.  t-values based on standard 
errors that are robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity are in parenthesis.  
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Macroeconomic Crisis and Firm Performance
In recent literature much research has been produced regarding the
macroeconomic effects of crises, and on how these effects spread to
different countries through contagion channels. However, there is a
lack of information on the microeconomic repercussions of these
crises, particularly for emerging market economies. The book “Macro-
economic Crisis and Firm Performance” brings up additional know-
ledge on this topic, using as case study the Mexican 1994 currency
crisis. We begin questioning if the Mexican 1994 crisis was anticipated
or not, under a firm-level perspective. The main result obtained is
that Mexican firms were not able to anticipate this currency crisis, or
at least that they did not have the flexibility to adjust their capital
structure accordingly before the crisis took place. The crisis propa-
gation and effects on Mexican firms are then studied into depth. The
main findings show that this currency crisis had generally negative
effects on companies’ balance sheets, and firms’ interconnections
evolved in propagation among themselves. In addition, recovery was
only partial and gradual, and overall the crisis episode was prejudicial
even for surviving firms. Nevertheless, there were some differences in
performance, related to firm characteristics such as internal corporate
governance arrangements. We conclude that, during the Mexican
crisis, having bank links was prejudicial for companies´ performance.
On the contrary, during this crisis episode, belonging to business
groups contributed to firm performance. An export-orientation
showed to have an increasingly positive effect on performance, from
pre-crisis to post-crisis periods. From the findings obtained, we derive
a number of recommendations in order to reduce companies´ vulner-
abilities to future macroeconomic crises.
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University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are RSM
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founded in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The research undertaken by
ERIM is focussed on the management of the firm in its environment,
its intra- and inter-firm relations, and its business processes in their
interdependent connections. 
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in manage-
ment, and to offer an advanced graduate program in Research in
Management. Within ERIM, over two hundred senior researchers and
Ph.D. candidates are active in the different research programs. From a
variety of academic backgrounds and expertises, the ERIM community
is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of
creating new business knowledge.
www.erim.eur.nl ISBN 90-5892-138-3
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